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Abstract
Theinternational
witnessed
a self-proclaimed'historical
community
(WTO)in lateSummer2004as a
theWorldTradeOrganization
breakthrough'at
andreducedomestic
allexportsubsidies
framework
wascreatedto eliminate
Whilemanyhailedthisstepas a majorvictoryfor
subsidies
andtariffsrespectively.
othershavebeencautious
on the 'success'of
nations,
thisagreement.
developing
effectsof thisframework
Thishonorthesisevaluatesthe short-andlong-term
sectorsof the US,SouthAfricaandMali.Thepaper
on theagricultural
agreement
of whatledto this'victory'for
a historical
analysis
nations
firstundertakes
developing
at the WTO.The paperthenfocuseson two majorcrops,cottonand maize,in order
on povertyalleviation,
foodsecurityand
to explorethe impactof the agreement
Ultimately,
thethesisproposes
sustainability.
andeconomic
severalpolicy
ecological
historical
breakthrough
in orderto harvestthe 'potential'
in thelongconsiderations
run.

1. lntroduction
of Mali
in the NewYorkTimes,the presidents
2003editorial
ln a July11th,
gavea compassionate
andBlaiseCompaore,
andBurkinaFaso,ToumaniToure
of cotton.Withtheirtitle"Yourfarm
pleato the US publicto endits unfairsubsidizing
subsidies
in
us",theyarguedthat$3 billionannualfarm
arestrangling
subsidies
but nevertheless
real
well-offfarmershasthe unintended
2001-2002
to "relatively
some10 millionruralpoorpeoplein WestandCentralAfrica"
effectof impoverishing
to theWorldTrade
(ToureandCompaore,
appealed
2003).Theysubsequently
(WTO),theworld'sconsensus-based
rulingbodyon freetrade,to
Organization
"applyfreetraderulesnotonlyto thoseproductsthatareof interestto the richand
poorcountries
havea proven
powerful,
butalsoto thoseproducts[, cotton,]where
(ibid.)Together
withBrazil,BeninandlvoryCoast,they
advantage."
comparative
of US exportsubsidies
thatan elimination
fileda complaint
to theWTOclaiming
forAfricancottonfarmersof $250millionannually
earnings
wouldresultin increased
(SmithandRice,2004).
2OO4,
the WTOhasruledandaffirmedtheirrulingin
As of earlySeptember
andexpoftcredits,alongwithEUtradecasethatUScottonsubsidies
itslandmark
WTOrules"of freetrade
distortingsugarsupport,havebeenfoundto "contravene
(Oxtam,2004).Furthermore,
talkson the
the WTOand its 147membersrevitalized
whichwere
on all agriculturalsubsidies
Agendatocusing
DohaDevelopment
produc[ed
a] historic
meetings
doomedfor failurethrough"round-the-clock
Theresultof this"grueling
on August1st2004(WTONews,2OO4l.
breakthrough"
of the USandEU,wasa groundwhichincluded
majorconcession
session",
goodsto eliminate
allexport
andmanufactured
Framework
on agriculture
breaking

supportandtariff
of othersubsidies,
trade-distorting
andthe limitation
subsidies
barriers(WTONews,2004).
thestoryof the 'historic
breakthrough',
In orderto understand
as proclaimed
Panitchpakdi,
I firstexaminethevariouspowerSupachai
by WTODirector-General
playersandotheractorsthathaveshapedthisparticular
outcome.
Thischronological
grounding
breakthrough
willbe basedin an analysis
of the 'historical'
of the powerwiththecreation
of the GeneralAgreements
thatwenthand-in-hand
on
struggles
birthof the WTOin 1995.This
Tariffsand Trade(GATT)in 1947andthe subsequent
presentsa succinctoverviewof the more
analysis,whileby no meansexhaustive,
to increasefreetradebasedon
thathaveattempted
thanfiftyyearsof liberalforces
wisdomsand lessonslearnedandappliedduringthe post-Second
the widespread
WorldWarera.
I presentandanalyzethe mostimportant
andsignificant
Secondly,
negotiations
the UruguayAgreementon
andtreaties,especially
agricultural
thathaveemergedduringthe post-WorldWar llera. lt is withinthis
Agriculture
lhe GenevaAccord,or
contextthat I presentthe July31't 2oO4'breakthrough',
AgriculturalFrameworkAgreementandthe recentCottonDisputeSettlementthat
wasachievedat the WTOin orderto assesswhetheror nottheyconstitutehistoric
breakthroughs.
analysis
of theagricultural
sectorsin the United
Third,I providean in-depth
on cottonandmaizewithineacheconomy.
States,MaliandSouthAfrica,focusing
agreement
andthe
ThisFourth,I analyzethe prospectsof the WTOFramework
for the maizeandcottonsectorsin the US, Maliand
CottonDisputeSettlement
SouthAfrica.Thisanalysisanswersthe researchquestionon the potentialimpacton
farmers.Fifth,thisanalysisof the
foodsecurityfor thesesmall-andlarge-scale

2. Methodology
appliedin thispaperis thecasestudymethod,
The primarymethodology
threecountrieson the impactof the WTOFramework
agreement.
whichinvestigates
UnitedStates,SouthAfricaandMali,werechosenconcerning
Thethreecountries,
ladder.Whilethe UnitedStatesis
on thedevelopmental
situation
theirrespective
clearlysituatedat itstop,SouthAfricahasalreadypastthefirstmajorstepsandMali
in theprocessof gaininga strongfootholdon theladder's
firststeps.
is currently
methods,
ln termsof research
thiscasestudyanalysis
is builtuponan inreview,whichincludes
extensive
analysis
of statistical
sourcesand
depthliterature
includeboththe usageof tertiary
empiricalstudies.Theseanalysesof statisticaldata
WorkingGroup,as wellas the evaluation
datasets,suchas Environmental
of
secondarysets,suchas the FAOSTATShomepage.
Furthermore,
thecasestudyanalysisis severely
limitedby financial
andtime
fieldworkwithinthe three
constraints,
as I havebeenunableto undertakenecessary
havingundertaken
myselfandam indebted
to fellowscholars
countries
thishardand
insightful
work.Last,butnotleast,as becomesevidentwhencritiquing
thiswork,its
developments
andworkspublishedand released
scopeis limitedby the fast-moving
policies.Consequently,
agricultural
in thisfieldof international
whilecertainpartswill
suchas the modalities
be outdatedas moreinformation,
by the endof 2005at the
itsfindingsnevertheless
HongKongsummit,willbe released,
shouldcreatean
progress
accountof currentagriculturaldevelopmental
accurate
up to thisstage

3. From 1lh Century Liberalism to GATT
hasbeendominated
for morethan500years
Whilethe Westernhemisphere
andprotectionism,
it wasas earlyas in the mid19thcentury
capitalism
by mercantilist
thatthe leadingworldpower,GreatBritain,tooka majorsteptowardsthe freeingof
Facingpressure
fromits industrial
bourgeoisie,
it repealed
the
agriculturaltrade.
protectionist
CornLawsin 1846andopenedup theirmarketsin favorof cheaper
productsandtextiles.As
for industrial
importedfoodand increasedmarket-access
"thenationhadfinatlysettledthe
of Keynes,commentates,
biographer
Lekachman,
and its successinspiredin the third-quarter
issueof freetradeversusprotection"
nationsto followsuit(1966).lnternational
tradeincreased
otherEuropean
reachingits highestlevelduringwhatPolanyihastermedthe Hundred
dramatically,
systemthatwas basedupona self-regulating
Years'Peace,a balance-of-power
goldstandard.
by a stableinternational
lt wasduringthisperiod
marketsupported
well
thatthe ideawasfoundedthat"tradehadbecomelinkedwithpeace",a doctrine
andreminiscent
in the presentcontextof globalcapitalism
of Clintonian
established
policies(Polanyi,
1944,p.3tf).
andthesubsequent
of thegoldstandard
breakdown
Withthe unraveling
countries
in WorldWarl, "mostleadingcapitalist
reverted
resulting
to mercantilist(Peet,2003,p.147).Thesesentiments
wellwereespecially
typeprotectionism"
in whichcountries
foundedin the 1930sduringthe periodsof the GreatDepression,
giventhe unstableandvolatileinternational
increases
resortedto unilateraltariff
andthe lackof exchangeratestability.
tradeenvironment
climaxof protectionism
in theSecondWorld
Havingreachedtheultimate
multilateral
wereeagerto establish
tradeorganizations
thatwould
War,countries

reconnect
formerlydislocated
war-nations.
In addition
to the International
Monetary
(lTO)was
Fund(lMF)andthe WorldBank(WB),an InternationalTrade
Organization
proposedin orderto "overseethe operationof a multilateral
codeof tradeconduct"
(lngcoandNash,2004,p.25).However,
thiscodeof tradeconductwascontingent
uponthe UnitedNations'(UN)approvalotmultilateraltreaties,
whichas Peet
proclaims,
was"a targefly in the internationalointment"
froma US perspective
(2003,p. 148).As US controlofthe UNwaslimited,
the US Congress
subsequently
TradeOrganization,
rejected
in 1948theCharterof the International
fearingits newly
gainedhegemonic
statuswouldbe undermined
by a communist
tradescheme.As a
matterof fact,the abilityfor the UNto imposesanctionson the US in caseof noncompliance
wouldhaveinvolved"a sacrificeof sovereignty
unprecedented
in the
historyof [theUS]"(Loreeqtd.in Peet,2003,p.149).
It is withinthiscontextthatthe 23 post-World
War ll countriesr
involvedin the
resortedbackto the earlieragreedon GeneralAgreement
negotiations
consequently
on TariffsandTrade(GATT)in October1947in Geneva.Whilelackingthe
institutional
mechanism
capacityand a strongenforcement
of the lTO,its main
qualified
"limitedmandate,
features,
legalobligations,
rudimentary
disputesettlement
institutional
mechanism,
improvised
arrangement
in Geneva,andunsatisfactory
arrangements
for agricultural
trade",becamethe foundation
of morethanfortyyears
(lngcoandNash,2004,p.25l.AsJagdishBhagwati
of tradeliberalization
has
argued,"theGATTtradingsystemhasachievedunprecedented
tradeexpansion
and
(Bhagwatiqtd.in Mandle,2003).
worldprosperity"

1Thesefoundingnationswere:Australia,Belgium,Brazil,Burma,Canada,Ceylon,Chile,
France,India,Lebanon,Luxembourg,
China,Cuba,Czechoslovakia,
New
Netherlands,
Zealand,Norway,Pakistan,SouthernRhodesia,Syria,South Africa,UnitedKingdomand the
UnitedStates.(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm)

talkswerea greatsuccess.
While
Theinitialroundsof multilateraltrade
by 1950,thethirdGATT
andimportlicensing,
ignoring
the largerissuesof subsidies
whichamounted
to a25 o/oculof the 1948
roundresulted
in 8700tariffconcessions,
BBCNews,2OO4).
Theseresultswerebaseduponthe
tarifflevels("Timeline,"
principles
non-discrimination
equalmarketaccess,reciprocity,
and
of "liberalization,
(Peet,2003,p. 150).Oneof the mostimportant
arrangements
wasthe
transparency"
'non-discrimination'principle,
whichcreatedthemosffavorednation(MFN)status
to allsignatory
application
of tariffreductions
or increases
thatclaimeda universal
as the 'mostfavored'
countries,
so thateverynationreceivesthe 'same'treatment
nation(WorldBank,2002,p. 197tf).Whiletheseandsubsequent
tariffcuts,suchas
resulted
in significant
reductions
worth
duringthe KennedyRoundin 1963-67,
sectorlargely
approximately
around$50billiondollarsof worldtrade,the agricultural
BBCNews,2004).
remained
ataboo("Timeline,"

4. Breakinga Taboo:The AgriculturalSector
Thereasoning
behindthe lackof liberalization
in theagricultural
sectorprior
largelyto the political,
socialandeconomical
to 1980shasbeenattributed
contextof
period.Politically,
enteringtheColdWareraandhavingwitnessed
the post-War
the
to a practiceof self-sufficient
deadliestwarsof mankind,countriesretreated
goodscovered
whilemanufactured
agriculture
as a'security'concern.
Consequently,
goodswerestillheavilyprotected
undertheGATTwerefreelytraded,agricultural
Thisactionwassociallysupported
supported.
by thewidespread
andinternally
experiences
o{ foodstampsandshortagesduringthe interwaryearsand
receiveda veryhighpriorityamong
consequently
foodsecurityandfoodsovereignty2
policymakers(lngcoandNash,2OO4,
p.25).
economic
ln termsof political
reasoning,
agriculturaltrade
wasexplicitly
excluded,as demandedby the US,fromconsideration
in the GATT,as statedin
ArticleXl:2con importandArticleXVI:3on exportexceptions.
Thesearticlesallowed
bordermeasures
for usingnontaritf
andagriculturalexport
to exist
subsidies
"providedtheywerenot usedto gain'morethanan equitableshareof the world
p.25).
trade"'(ibid.,

2The term food sovereigntywas coined lirst by members of Via Campesina,an international
coalitionof peasantfarm groupswho raisedof awarenessfor the adverseconsequencesof
economicglobalizationat the World Food Summit+5 in Rome in 2002. "Food sovereignty
emphasizesthe rightof each nationto protectand regulatedomesticagriculturalproduction
and trade to achievesustainability,guaranteea livelihoodfor farmers,and assureits citizens
are fed. Food sovereigntydoes not negatetrade, states Via Campesina;"it promotesthe
formulationof trade policiesand practicesthat serve the rightsof peoplesto safe, healthy
and ecologicallysustainableproduction."(http://www.ncrlc.com/food_sovereignty.html)

policieswererisingas developednations
On a broaderscale,protectionist
increasingly
focusedon creatinga stableexport-focused
agricultural
sector.As a
(EEC)devisedthe nowfamous
matterof fact,the European
Economic
Community
protectionist
Policy(CAP)in 1958(ibid.,
andtrade-distorting
CommonAgricultural
p.25).lts counterpart,
the US anditsagricultural
industry
on theotherhand,greatly
demandin a post-warEuropein the processof
benefitedfromincreased
production
modernization
Supportive
of domestic
andreconstruction.
conditions,
a
duringthe 1970sin the USwiththe introduction
majorpolicyshiftoccurred
of the
1973FarmBill.Thisbill,whichsimilarto itssuccessors
washighlyvestedby
"removedproduction
powerfulagro-industry
lobbyists,
constraints
on American
farmersandencourage
commercial
exports,[...]fundamentally
alter[ing]
the relation
(McMichael,
agriculture
to theworldeconomy"
1998,p.3). In summary,
of American
giventhe increasing
importance
of internationaldevelopment,
suchas foodaid,and
limited,yet powerfulreachof the GreenRevolution,
the chorological
the 1970swas a
periodcharacterized
by vastglobaldemandandan increasein yieldand 'green
production'(Ledermann,
2003).
However,withvastincreasesin production
output,the globalmarketsin the
1980sprovedto be unableto sustainthisdemandas overproduction
occurredand
goodscollapsed,
pricesfor agricultural
puttinggreatstrainon thefeasibility
of
policies(lngcoand Nash,2OO4,
protectionist
p.26).Thisincreasedstress
agriculturaf
occurred
witha vastincrease
on farmers'incomes
simultaneously
of the numbers
of
importance
nationshavingjoinedthe GATTandthe increasing
of developing
nations
pointsout,whilethedeveloping
as foodimportmarkets.
As McMichael
nationsonly
accounted
for ten o/oof allwheatimports,thisfigureincreased
to 57 "/"by 1980,
accounting
forvastmarket-opportunities
thatwere'to be explored'by
the
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industrialized
FirstWorld(1998,p.3).Thus,by the 1980s,theagricultural
world
market"becarne
a battlefield
in whichcountries
foughtwithexportsubsidies
[and
othermethodsl
for marketshares"(Riegerqtd.in RiegerandLeibfried,
2004,p.88).
It waswithinthiscontextof risingagricultural
production,
toughening
international
andthe increasing
competition
interestsof industrialized
countriesto
seekexportmarketsthattheGATTtradeministers,
underthe leadership
of the
UnitedStates,launched
theUruguayBound,the"mostambitious
andfar-reaching
traderoundso far"("Trade,"
BBCNews,2004).

5. Setting the Stage: The Uruguay Round
The UruguayRound,whichwasnamedafterPuntadel Este,Uruguaywhere
in 1986andlasteduntilitssuccessful
the initialmeetingtookplace,wasestablished
in 1994,whichmarkedthe establishing
in Marrakesh
of theWTOas
conclusion
predecessor
arm.Whilecharacterized
by
to theGATTandcreatedan enforcement
of agricultural
exporting
failureandupsets,suchas thewalkoutby delegations
the UruguayRound
in 1990in Brussels,
itsgrandestachievement,
countries
(URAA),hascarriedon its influence
Agreement
on Agriculture
as thefounding
WTOsetting.As RichardPeetstates,"the
documentfar intothe post-Uruguay,
nota swansongbuta phoenixfor international
UruguayRound[...]represented
(2003,p.153).
tradeagreements"
withmajornewtradeagreements,
suchas theAgreement
Accompanied
on
thismultilateral
TextilesandClothing,
traderoundwasmarkedby thesuccessful
intothefree-trade
complex.
Furthermore,
integration
of agriculture
the Uruguay
the UnitedStatesbackintothe foldof GATT
Roundhasbeensuccessful
in "brin[ing]
afterit haslargelyfrustratedits tradingpartnerswitherosive
rulesand procedures"
justifiedas'leveling
retaliation,
the playingfield'(Tussie
useof unilateraltrade
and
Glover,1993, p.22-23)

Whilemajoragreements
regulating
trade,suchas thewell-critiqued
Property
on Trade-related
Aspectsof lntellectual
Agreement
Rights(TRIPS),
the
(TRIMS)andtheGeneralAgreement
Trade-related
lnvestment
Measures
on Trade
(Shiva,2000;Wade,2003),l
in Services(GATS),haveoftentakencenter-stage

sectionon the majorachievements
in reducing
tariffs
intendto focusin thefollowing
provided
in the21 articlesandtheannexesof the URAA.
andsubsidies
products
werelargelyexemptfromprevious
earlier,agricultural
As mentioned
countries
oftenappliedtariffsandnon-tariff
Consequently,
tariffnegotiations.
(NTMs),suchas "quotas,
importbansandembargoes"
to regulate
and
measures
protecttheirvulnerable
agricultural
sector(lngcoandNash,2004,p.271.
domestic
5.1 URAA: Tariff Reductions
for severalruleson marketaccess,export
The URAAlaidthegroundwork
sector.Thefirststep
anddomestic
supportlevelsin theagricultural
subsidies
to alignagricultural
traderuleswith
wasan agreement
by negotiators
undertaken
goods.In addition,theyalsocalledfor
thoseapplyingto tradein manufacturing
(ibid.,p.28).Under
througha processcalled'tariffication'
transparency
increased
involvedthe mergingof NTMsintotariffss,
Article4, MarketAccess,tariffication
of the difference
betweendomesticandworldmarketprice.
througha calculation
principle,
nationandnon-discriminatory
developed
the most-favored
Upholding
in tariffequivalents
to a reduction
thensubsequently
devotedthemselves
countries
by an "averageof 36 o/oanda minimumof 15 "/"oversix yearsanddeveloping
of 1O"/"over10years"(ibid.,p.28).
by an averageof 2O"h anda minimum
countries
wereputin placemeaning
thatnations,
havinglowered
Furthermore,
tariffbindings
2003,p.12).
theirtariffs,"agreedto holdthetariffsat the newlowerlevel"(Mandle,
to agricultural
tariffreductions
contained
Howeverthiscommitment
two
majorflaws.First,the cutswerenotweightedfor the volumeof trade,meaningthatit
'

NTMs (Nontariff measures)are policyor practicesthat altersthe conditionsof
with tariff barriers,
internationaltrade besidestariffs.Most prominently,used interchangeably
these includeimportand exportquotas.
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exportnations.Second,andevenmoregravely,as
heavilyfavoredlargeragricultural
werebasedon
pointout,"thereductioncommitments
lngcoandNashaccurately
'averagecuts'ratherthancutsin the averagetariff",resultingin the strangesituation
that if a tariffol 1 "/"was cutto 0.5 7", a 50 7oreductionhadtakenplace(2004,p.28).
wasflawedin that it alloweda nationto cut
the tariffcutsagreement
Subsequently,
theirmostviablecropswithminimumtariffswhileprotecting
lower,lesser-important
tariffcuts4.
withthe creationof SpecialSafeguard
Thisissuewasfurtheraggravated
the rightto anyWTOmemberwho
(SSG)Provisions
in Article5, whichreserved
if importpricesfluctuateheavily.
to declareadditionaltariffs
tariffication,
undertook
SSGprovisionallowsfor the taritfto risein casethe
As an example,a price-based
the SSGtariffwouldact as a
falls.Consequently,
costof the importedcommodity
"forthe fixedtariffand reducesor eliminates
the effectof
mechanism
compensatory
mechanisms
market"(ibid.,p.30).Thesesafeguard
fallingpriceson thedomestic
to
whichallowedfor limitations
andexceptions
werefurthersupportedby provisions
boundtariffs.s
the earliermentioned
clearlyfavoredthe developed
world,under
However,whilecertainloopholes
(S&D)hasbeenputin
Article15of the URAA,specialanddifferentialtreatment
nations'
placeto allowan expansion
space'todeveloping
of 'development
of
of theparticular
needsandconditions
sector.Beingconscious
agricultural
of marketaccesscommitments,
countries
in the implementation
developing
acceptedthat"least-developed
countriesdid not haveto makeany
negotiators
4 As it shouldbecomeobviousto the reader,an evaluationof the prospectsof an agreement
on trade involvesa lawyer-likeanalysis,tryingto get past vague and impreciselanguage.
5 For example,ArticleXX of the GATT 1994 allowsfor importrestrictionsbased upon a
varietyof concerns,includingthe "protectionof human,anima,or plant life for health,reasons
(lngcoand Nash,2004.,p. 29).
of publicmoralsand protectionof nationaltreasures"

t5

(ibid.,
or exportcompetition"
on tariffs,domestic
support,
reduction
commitments
subsidies
commitment
in exportanddomestic
for
p.35).Furthermore,
reduction
countrieswerefairlylower.Howeverdueto theirgeneralmonetary
developing
and
subsidies
in thefirstplace,theywereof littleimportance
in providing
constraints
effect.
5.2 URAA: Domestic Support
the mostcontentious
and
havebeena keycomponent,
Whiletariffreductions
support
pointof argument
focusedon thedomestic
at the negotiations
ambitious
for subsidies
commitments
farmersreceived.CoveredunderArticle6, reduction
as it was
weresingledout as a majorgoaltowardsreducingtradedistortion,
production
hasled in the
generallyperceived
thatdomesticsupportof agricultural
production
fromthe
pastto overproduction,
resultingin decoupling
agricultural
in turnhasledto
dynamicsof supplyanddemandof the market.Thisoverproduction
In orderto
thatwere'looking'fora purchaser.
of commodities
excessstockpiles
createdemand,as worldmarketpricesweremuchlowerthandomesticprices,
put in placein additionto the domestic
exportsubsidieswereconsequently
in orderto selltheirgoodson the globatmarket.
subsidies,
subsidies
distortingagricultural
Forthispurpose,andto increasevisibility,
withredfor prohibited
wereclassifiedintoboxes"usingthe traffictightapproach,
amberfor subsidiesthathadto slowdown,andgreenfor nontradesubsidies,
(ibid.,p.31).Whilenegotiators
decidedto dealwiththe redbox,
distortingsubsidies"
separately,
a newbluebox,whichfiguresas a
whichcoveredexportsubsidies,
'box'betweenthe amberandgreenbox,wascreatedand"considered
to
transitional

be less-trade
distorting
thanmarketpricesupports(seeAppendixItor overallchart
of the boxesandAppendixlllor US examplesof boxes).

Applyingtheseclassifications
and delvingintothe details,Article6 callsfor a
reductionin domesticsubsidiesin the mosttrade-distorting
amberbox in excessof
d e m i n i m i s l e v e l s o5 fo / " f o r d e v e l o p e d a n1dO o / o t odre v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e st hoef t o t a l
production.Baseduponthe 1986- 1988base periods,
valueof agricultural
developedand developingcountriesmade reductioncommitmentsof 20 %by 2O00
and 13.37orespectively
by 2004 (ibid.,p. 31).
An exampleon how these reductionswere calculatedis baseduponthe
calculationof the totalAggregateMeasurement
of Support,as outlinedin Article6,
Annex3 and Annex4. Analyzingthe belowexampleprovidedfor by the WTO (see
below),the only product-and non-productspecificsupportmeasuresthat were
includedare the ones in excessof the 5 "/ode minimisthresholdof developed
countryx in year y. Based upon these calculations,a nationx would have had to cut
its total AMS by 20 7o until2000.

17

Source:WTO.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_introo3_domestic_e.htm#box

andloopholes
However,
dueto severalexemptions
mentioned
earlier,such
provided
poorfarmersor measures
for low-income,
resource
as inputsubsidies
domestic
foodsecurity,
takenin orderto strengthen
andthefactthatthe 1986-1988
baseperiodon whichcutswerebasedwasmarkedby historically
highsupportlevels
resultedin few actualreductions
of domesticsubsidiesandcuts.Whileseveral
governments
havesimplyshiftedtheirsupportlevelsfromthe amberto the lesserknownas "box-shifting",
bluebox,a practice
commonly
distorting
othercountries,
suchas the US,didnothaveto undertake
anyreductions,
as "reforms
undertaken
priorto the negotiations
wereadequate
to fulfillthenewruleson reducing
domestic
support"(ibid.,p.36).

5.3 URAA:ExportSubsidies
Thethirdmajorissuewas reductionin exportsubsidies,
the formerredbox.
Theseexportreductions,
as statedin Article9.2,"requirethatmembersreduce
exportsubsidiesby 21 "/"in volumeand36 7" in valueoverthe six-yearperiodfrom
(ibid.,p.33).Thesefigureswereagainspatially
1995to 2OOO"
differentiated
for

commitments
were"14"h in volume
developing
countries,
forwhichthe reduction
periodfrom1995to 2004"(ibid.,p.33).
and24 7oin valueovera 1O-year
Theseexemptions
werenot universalin application,
as developing
country
membersdid nothaveto reducesubsidiesthat aregearedtowards"marketing
products
transport
exportsof agricultural
andfreightchargeson
[...] andinternal
9.4,WTO,AoA)Furthermore,
WTOmembersagreed
exportshipments
[...]."(Article
products"in a
to "prohibitthe introduction
of newexportsubsidiesfor agricultural
binding(Economic
Research
similarfeatof exportsubsidies
Service,2004).
Whileexportsubsides
havebeenreducedsince1995,"highlevelsof export
subsidiesremainandcontinueto distortworldmarkets"(lngcoand Nash,2OO4,
p.36).WhiletheAgreement's
"all
mainachievement
hasbeenhailedas to eliminate
productsoversix yearfor developed
exportsubsidiesfor agricultural
countries,
ten
withthe least-developed
for lessdevelopedcountries,
countriesbeingexempted",
onlylittleprogress
hasbeenachieved
so far (Peet,2003,p.153).The EU is still
whichhavebeenfoundmost
for 90 o/oof allOECDexportsubsidies,
accounting
commonly
as opposedto grains,oilseedsand
amongdiaryandsugarproducts
Service,
Research
2001).[SeeAppendix
cotton(Economic
lllJ

ln summary,
as illustrated
in thetablebelow,theAgreement
on Agriculture
reachedat theendof the UruguayRoundresulted
in thefollowing
required
reductions
andopenedthe roadfor the foundingof the WTOandthe startof the
Dohanegotiation
Round.lt is important
to note,thatthesefinaldetailsof theAoA
werelargely"decided
bilaterally
betweenthe USAandthe EC in the nowinfamous
BlairHouseAccordin 1992"(JawaraandKwa,2003,p.26tf).it shouldcomeas no
surprise
thenthatthe USwaslargelyableto 'fine-tune'the
modalities
of the
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suchas the GreenandBlueBoxesand
legalloopholes,
agreementandestablished
Nevertheless,
successful
completion
of the
the earliermentioned'box-shifting.'
steppingURAAandthe transitionfromthe GATTto the WTOmarkedan important
nationsintothe international
traderegimeandthefirstmajor
stoneforthedeveloping
WTOtraderound,Doha(TussieandLengyel).
ReductionCommitments
in AoA
Tariffs
Averagecutfor all agricultural
products
Minimum
cutperproduct
(baseperiod1986-88)

Domesticsupport
support
cut
Totalagriculture

Developed
Countries
(1995-2000)

Developing
Countries
(1995-2005)

36 Yo

24 o/"

15o/o

10%

200h

73"/"

36%
21 o/"

24%
14 "/"

(base period 1986-88)

ExportSubsidies
Value of subsidies
Subsidizedquantities
(base period 1986- 90)

Least
Developed
Countries6

None

None

None

Source: EconomicResearchService,"WTO:...",2004

6The Least DevelopedCountries,LCDs,are: Angola,Bangladesh,Benin,BurkinaFaso,
Burundi,CentralAfricanRepublic,Chad,DemocraticRepublicof Congo,Djibouti,The
Gambia,Guinea,GuineaBissau,Haiti,Lesotho,Madagascar,
Malawi,Maldives,Mali,
Mozambique,
Myanmar,Niger,Rwanda,Senegal,SierraLeone,Solomon
Mauritania,
lslands,Tanzania,Togo,Uganda,Zambia(Source:WTO)
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6. Enteringthe DohaRound
to reach
of the SeattleWTOsummitin 1999,the inability
Afterthe collapse
operations
of development
on suchdiverseissuesas tradein services,
consensus
painteda darkpictureof futuretradenegotiations.
of agriculture
andliberalization
protestors
and
themorethan30,000anti-WTO
However,
whilewe bestremember
failure,JeffreyJ. Schottarguesthat
thepoliceforceas the reasonforthesummit's
"theWTOmeetingfellvictimno to protestsoutsrdein the streets,but
ultimately,
centef'(2000,
rnsldethe convention
disagreements
ratherto serioussubstantive
p.5).Thus,whilea vastmajorityof countrieswereeagerto "expandthe WTO
conflictsof
agendabeyondthe issuesmandatedby the UruguayRoundaccords",
existedon howto proceedwiththem(ibid.,p.6).
interests
on
negotiations
Giventhe mandatein Article20 in the URAAfor continued
whenthe
agriculture
startingin 2000,the potentialof thesetalkswascontroversial
Agendain
WTOlaunchedthe broaderDohaRoundandits DohaDevelopment
November2001in Doha,Qatar.Whilesomeregardedthisnewesttraderound
otherspainteda starklydifferentpicture(lngco
launchas a "positivedevelopment",
p.37).As JawaraandKwapointout,developing
countries"were
and Nash,2OO4,
whichmostof them
withan 'agreement'with
bulliedandcoercedintoacquiescing
achieved
fortheir
countries
profoundly
disagreed.
[...1allthatthedeveloping
Agenda'[,a Ministerial
strenuouseffortswasthe label'TheDohaDevelopment
on the
thatnegotiations
declaration
on TRIPsandPublicHealth,andagreement
'singapore
consensus'on
the modalities
beginon thebasisof 'explicit
issues'would
at Cancun"(Jawaraand Kwa,2003,p.xv).
of negotiations
6.1 The Failure of Cancun

as the
Meetingin Cancun,thislatertopicprovedto be the mostcontentious,
the
issuesforesawthe expansionof the rightsof foreigninvestors,
Singapore
policy,whichwouldregulate
cartelsandincrease
of a competition
establishing
contracts
betweenlocalandforeignfirms,includingfor government
competition
(AfricaRenewal,
amongits 147members
2004,p.24).Failingto reacha consensus
Roundnegotiations
cameto an abrupthaltin
bodyagain,the DohaDevelopment
concerning
the
2OO3
overa seriesof disagreements
Cancun,Mexico,in September
agreements,
andtheextentof non-agricultural
agreements
detailsof theagricultural
it wasconference
chair,MexicanForeign
suchas the Singaporeissues.Ultimately,
in
resulting
whoclosedthe meetingandtheconference,
MinisterLuisErnestDerbez,
wereat faultandsignsof
of whichcountries'delegates
blame-game
a widespread
jubilationandfrustration
on bothsides.Thesemixedreactionsrangedfrom"civil
centre"
societyrepresentatives
[that]brokeout in songanddancein the convention
a tantrumin
sulking,[throwing]
RobertZoellick"clearly
to USTradeRepresentative
(Jawaraand Kwa,2003,p.xxi).
hisfinalpressconference"

While many factorscertainlyhave contributedto the collapseof the trade
talks,the commonmain factorthat has been attributedwith it is the fact that
developingcountrieswere able for a firstsuccessfultimeto maintaintheirhigh level
of cohesion,such as displayedin their powerfulcreationof the G20, in face of strong
and bullying"
effortsby the US and the EU to "divideand rule"and use "arm-twisting
in order to achievetheir preferredoutcomes(Jawaraand Kwa, 2003, p.xxxvi
whilepreviouseffortsto apply
ff.;Narlikarand Tussie,2004,p.947tt).Consequently,
developmentaid and bilateralfreetrade agreementsas sticks and carrotshave been

ableto coercedevelopingnationsintoa lessfavorableoutcome,theyhavefailedto
of Braziland India,stillconsists
bearfruitsas the G20,underthe leadership
presently
of 19 membersT.
As Narlikar
andTussiepointout,thishistorical
seemsto "suggestthatthe G20is a productof almosttwodecadesof
achievement
(ibid.,p.948).
countries"
learning
by developing

6.2 The Threat of the Demiseof the WTO
Havingfailedto reachan agreementin the Doha Roundand havingfallen
behindthe timetable,manytrade analystsput the WTO's 'constitutional'
headon the
chopping-blockand argued that anotherfailureto resolvethe key issueof agriculture
couldresultin the totalcollapseof the WTO.Giventhis bleakoutlook,intense
developedwhichinvolvedcontinued'green-room'powerbackroomnegotiations
politicalnegotiationsbetweenthe developedand developingagriculturalexporters.
White"developingcountrydelegatesformallyregisteredtheir disappointmentat a
missedopportunity",behind closeddoorsthey "werejubilant"(Jawaraand Kwa,
2003, p.xxii).This spirit of havingachieveda milestonein the processof multilateral
negotiationscarriedon even to previoussupportersof developedcountries,such as
SouthAfricanTrade MinisterAlec Erwin.who statedthat "this is the first time we
haveexperienceda situationwhere,by combiningour technicalexpertise,we can sit
as equalsat the table.This is a changein the qualityof negotiations
between
developingand developedcountries"(Elliotet al.,qtd. in Jawaraand Kwa,2003,
p.xxiii).

7 MembersincludeArgentina,Bolivia,Brazil,Chile,China,Cuba,Egypt,India,Indonesia,
Mexico,Nigeria,Pakistan,Paraguay,Philippines,
SouthAfrica,Tanzania,Thailand,
Venezuelaand Zimbabwe.(lxv)
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7. Scripting a Fairy-Tale:The Geneva Framework Agreement
cameout of theircloseddoors
ln the nightof July31", WTOnegotiators
negotiations
that a "breakthrough
had beenreachedthat
andannounced
agreement"
wouldkeepthe previously
doomedDohaDevelopment
Roundalive(WTONews,
of itscontentmightbe controversial,
it is generally
2004).Whiletheevaluation
agreedthatthisGenevaFramework
marksa majorsteptowardsthe
Agreement
in agriculture,
continued
on tradeliberalization
discussion
as it proposes
newand
moreprecisecommitments
on the threepillarsof domesticsupport,export
competition
andmarketaccess.Whileit contains
hardlyanyquantifications
andit is
presents
stilla'diamondin the rough',it neveftheless
itselfas a key-document
with
greatinterestfor furtherempiricalandstructuralanalysis.
ln the followingsections,I willevaluatethe Framework
agreements
in two steps:First,I evaluatethe institutional
achievements
breakthatoccurredat
pointfrompreviously
failednegotiations.
the meetingas a departure
Second,I will
investigate
the Framework's
majorachievements
andits perceivedwinnersand
losers.
7.1 Bypassing the Ministers
perspective,
First,froman institutional
as Kwaand Bellopointout,the
meetingmarkeda significant
breakfromtheearliermeetings
in the DohaRound
whichhadresultedin a nearcollapseof the WTO.Becausetheseprevious
ministerialmeetings
in Cancunin 2003andSeattle1999hadresultedultimately
in
stalemate,
of the Summer2004established
the GeneralCouncilmeeting
itselfas "de
factothesupremeinstitution
for decisionmaking"(Belloand Kwa,2AOq.As the
previous
ministerial
NGOsandpopularprotesters,
meetingincluded
as wellas

mediaattention,
the leadingnationscameto the realization
thattrade
increasing
weremore"determined
whichwerelargelypartisanpoliticians,
to stand
negotiators,
(ibid.).lt wasthissenseof increased
interests"
scrutinyand
upfor theircountry's
thatwasattributed
withthefailureof thesenegotiations.
transparency
Learning
fromthispastbackfire,
the mainnegotiators,
underthe leadership
whichincluded
the US,EU,Australia,
Parties),
Brazil
of the FIPS(Fiveinterested
to be madewithina smallergathering
of only
andIndia,pushedfor a newdecision
Movingswiftlyand
duringtheirJulyGeneralCouncilmeeting.
40 tradeministers
thechanceandneededtimefor review,they
oftenwithoutgivingothercountries
producedshortlyaftermidnighton 1'rof August2OO4
the Framework
agreement,
"whichDirector-General
Supachai
Panitchpakdi
saidwillgreatlyenhancemembers'
(WTONews,
completing
theimportant
Dohanegotiations"
chancefor successfully
2004).

7.2'Progress'on AgriculturalLiberalization?
Thisapparent
lackof transparency
andsystemof exclusion
seemsto greatly
provideda
coincidewiththe practiceof the "GreenRoom",which"hadtraditionally
throughthe inclusionof onlya few corecountriesand
wayto expediteconsultations"
p.7).
theclaimsof a'democratic
deficit"'(Tussie
andLengyel,
thus"underpinning
In addition,this processof bypassingotherstateactorshas also includeda
furtherinclusionof non-governmental
organizations
and WTO criticsin general.
strengthening
the role of state actors,the WTO has purposefully
Consequently,
channeledand filteredany oppositionthat could occur on a nationalbasis by

As was the case,
accepting
onlya singlevoiceper nationas a traderepresentative.
this ultimatelyresultedin the silencingof criticalvoiceswithinthe US of the
agreement
whilelargeagribusiness
Framework
and lobbyinggroupshavelauded
(USTR)Zoellickon their positiveand close
UnitedStatesTrade Representative
throughall processes.
discussions
Finally,this processof creatingan 'arbitrary'
coregroupis aggravated
by the
fact that few developingcountrieshold the resourcesand expertisenecessaryto
to thosemeetings.
As one is unsureof whether
delegatea permanent
representative
Framework,
theyoftenhaveto takea gamble
or nottheywillresultin a 'constructive'
Confronted
withtheseconstraints,
on howto allocatetheirlimitedtimeandfunding.s
many developingcountriesfind it difficultto find a balancebetween"craftinga
consistentproposalwith due attention[and]the equallyrelevantrequirements
of
(ibid., p.7').Theevaluationof the 'consensus-based'
efficiencyand legitimacy"
Frameworkagreementis thus still up in the air, as both analystsand developing
nationsaretryingto ascertain
itsimplications.

The Frameworkagreementsmajorachievement,
buildingonto the URAA,
can be dividedinto three subsectionsin a similarfashionas the Agreementon
Agricultureduringthe UruguayRound:exportcompetition,
domesticsupportand
hasbeenhailedas the negotiators'greatest
marketaccess.First,exportcompetition
achievements
in furthering
tradeliberalization,
as "allformsof exportsubsidies
areto
be eliminatedin parallels
on all exportmeasuresestablished,
with
, and disciplines
I As a matterof fact, more than 100 nationswere absentduringthe negotiationsof the
Frameworkagreement.
e lt is importantto note, as ChristianHaeberlipointsout, that the phasing-outof the complete
armoryof exportcompetitioninstrumentsis more likelyto look like a "disarmamenttreaty:
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equivalenteffect,"by a credibleend date" (Haeberli,2004, p.4ff).The measuresto
be eliminatedinclude export credits and insurance programs,trade distorting
practices of state trading enterprises, and food aid leading to commercial
displacement"(ibid.).While no clear timelinedoes yet exist,the modalitieswill result
in significantcutbacksand changes in the US, in terms of export credits and food
aid.10However,becausea final date is yet to be determined,FrenchAgriculture
MinisterHerveGaymardis on recordas statingthat it could be "2O15to 2017 before
Europeanexport subsidiesare tinally eliminated"(Africa Renewal,2004, p.3). As a
matterof fact, as ChristianHaeberlipoints out, "they finally acceptedit only on the
that the phase-inof these disciplineswould likelylast for up to 10
understanding
years"(ibid.,p.6).
Secondly,while the export competitionissue is by no means written in stone,
the domestic support pillar is by far more complex both in terms of lack of
quantitativedata as well as ambiguousdefinitions.In general, the Framework
agreementrequiresall subsidizingmembersto "reducethe overall sum of their
trade-distortivesubsidiesll. This reductionwill have to occur with a tiered approach,
meaningthat highersubsidieslevelswouldget cut more than lower.A reductionof at
which shouldbe
least20 % has been agreedon for the first year of implementation,
at the latest December2005, which has been set as the extended "deadlinefor
concluding the round" (Africa Renewal, 2004). This cut of 20 7o, as noted by
Haeberli,is the same amountas has been achieved"overthe whole UruguayRound
supportof anykindwillnotagreeto phase
Indeed,exporters
todayenjoyinggovernmental
assurances
willnot
thattheircompetitors
thosepayments
out unlesstheyaregivensufficient
p.1tt)
(Haeberli,
measures
with
a
similar
effect."
2004,
from
support
benefit
10Critiquewasveryvocalin the EU,whichhasbeenheavilycriticized
by itsownmember
states,suchas France;andby Canada,whichholdsstatetradingagencies
11Thesetradesupporting
havebeendefinedas AmberBox,BlueBoxand de
subsidies
minimissupport.
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period"and consequently
as worthyof beingtermeda 'breakthrough'
implementation
(Haeberli,
2004,p.7tt).
In termsof the absoluteactualresultsof thesecuts,a varietyof opinions
to the US,this
exist.WhileHaeberlisuggeststhattheymightposea greatchallenge
with presentnumbershaveshown.Thus,currently
claimis disputedas calculations
annuallyoverthe lastthreeyears,
the US is spendingaround23 billion$ in subsidies
to agreement
whichis wellunderthe 49 $ billionit wouldbe allowedto useaccording
resultson the factthatthe "sum
(AfricaRenewal,2004).Thiscalculation
calculations
supportwill not exceed80 % of the sum of FinalBoundTotal
of all trade-distorting
AMS pluspermittedde minimsplusthe BlueBox,"of whichthe BlueBox levelwill be
period'so that the basefor cut will be higher
the higheramountof a 'representative
text
the Framework
thanthe actualblue box usage.Thus,on BlueBox payments,
providesthat suchsupport"willnot exceed5 "h of a Member'saveragetotalvalueof
period"(Haeberli,2004).However,even
production
duringan historical
agricultural
thereexceptionsexist,so that memberswith very high Blue Box levels,such as
cut"(ibid.).
Norway,
wouldnothaveto make"a whollydisproportionate
arguethat the effectof the Agricultural
Many criticsof this interpretation
butsimplythe
is not actualreduction,
countries
on developed
Agreement
Framework
shiftingaroundof paymentsfrombox to box,whichin caseof the
earliermentioned
US is mostlikelyto occurawayfromthe illegalAmberbox towardsthe Greenand
Blueboxes.Haeberlihoweverarguesthat the "gatewayfromAmberSupport(AMS
or de minimis)to Blue Box measuresis likelyto be a narrowone, as the solutionof
product-specilic
cappingl2has been introduced.Overall,"it remainsto be seen
12Product-specific
cappingbasicallyrefersto the idea that certainmaximumlevelsacrossthe
'shifting'of boxesno longer
variousboxeswill be identitiedfor each productso that a simple

whetherthe additionalobligationto reducesupporton a productbasiswill also apply
to sensitiveproducts"(ibid.).
The third grand pillarthat has been includedin the FrameworkAgreementis
market access.Synchronousto the domesticsubsidiescuts, a tieredformulawill be
appliedhere, meaningthat tariffs will be dividedinto "differentbands dependingon
their respectivebound tariff level" (ibid.).While Least DevelopedCountrieswould be
excluded from any reduction commitments,harmonizationwould occur in both
developingand developedcountries,resultingin higher tariffs being cut more than
lowerones.
However,these reductionmethodologieshave yet to be defined,as well as
how the bound tariffs are going to be classified.As Haeberli notes, "in order to
accommodatethe US delegation,cappingremainson the table but only as a subject
which 'will be furtherevaluated"'(ibid.).Countrieshoweverare still able to apply the
'sensitiveproducts'rule. As stated in Paragraph31, o'membersmay designatean
appropriatenumber,to be negotiated,of tariff linesto be treatedas sensitive"if they
don't undermine"the overall objectiveof the tiered approach"(WTO in Appendix).
While this heavilyfavorsexport nationswith only a few products,such as the US, as
opposed to lndia, which exports more than 100 differentagriculturalcommodities,
developingnationshave been grantedsome extra maneuverroom as their products
are generally subject to lesser reductioncommitments.Furthermore,developing
nations also would be able to designate "Special Products" (SP) based on the
previously establishedcriteria of food security, livelihood security and rural
needs.
developmental
is feasible.lt is importantto notethough,that a phalanxof developednations,e.g.
Switzerland,Japan,are opposedto this feature,fearingthat this would cut into their highlevelsof 'GreenBox'subsidies.
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In summary,thus, the three main pillarsunder negotiationfor further
countries
liberalization
marksa milestonein the WTO'shistoryand the developing
struggletowardsfree and fair trade.However,in everysinglepillarthereexistclear
of agricultural
trade.For example,whilea
drawbackstowardsfurtherliberalization
appearsto be beneficial
generalincreasein exportcompetition
superficially
for the
held favorablestatuses.Haeberli
developingnations,it also reducespreviously
questionsthe benefitssub-SaharanAfrican countrieswill receivefrom the
increase"
theirfoodbills"withoutbeingableto
agreement,
as it would"considerably
substantially
improvetheirmarketsharesabroador evenat home"dueto eradication
p.6).In
in Europel31Haeberli,2OO4,
of previouslyfavorabletariff preferences
as the mainmodalities
on marketaccessis questionable
addition,the breakthrough
and figuresstill have to be workedout. These detailedfigureswill essentially
determinewhetheror not the more lenienttreatmentof sensitiveproductsfor
examplewill offsetany possiblegains in terms of furtherreductionsof tariff.
However,as seen in the issueon domesticsubsidieswith the possibilityof boxshifting,it appearsthat every membercountrythat has the resourcesavailableto
will most likelyexploreall possibleways of
supportits farmingconstituency
whilethe proximate
victorsof the agreement
continuing
do so. Consequently,
might
appearto be the developingnationsin the shortterm,the ultimatewinnerscould
farmingnationsthat havethe legal and monetary
againbe the large industrialized

13As a matterof fact, these preferentialaccessagreementsto the marketsof the developed
world are one of the reasons"thirdworld remainedaloofform the negotiationsorganizedby
the GATT."(Mandle,p.14) However,economistKruegerarguesthat "most analystsbelieve
that, althoughGSP [GeneralizedSystemof Preferences]had some value to developing
countries,it was limitedto a few countriesand a few commodities[and that] it may not have
been worth even the diplomaticeffortsand other coststo developingcountries."(Krueger,
1995,p.40as quotedin Mandle,p.14)
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arguetheircase at the WTO and
resourcesto supporttheir farmers,successfully
benefitfromfreermarketselsewhere.

7.3The'FifthWheel':Singaporeand Cotton
included,
but werenot limitedto, the
Furtherissuesthat werediscussed
issuesandcotton,whichweretwo of the reasonsfor failureof the Cancun
Singapore
Whilethe Singaporeissues,whichconsistof a "mixedbag, relatingto
agreement.
policy,trade facilitation,
have been
and transparency"
investment,
competition
largelydroppedby the EuropeanUnion and have been reducedto a simple
the cottonissuehas remainedon
to takethemup in laternegotiations,
commitment
the table (Bhagwati,2OO4).With developingnationspushingfor an expedited
solutionto the currentlyunstableand unfairmarketsituation,cottonhas been
integratedintothe agreement,receivingspecialattentionin an "ambitious
specifically
in 18rh
for cottonlawas established
manner."Thusa subcommittee
and expeditious
2004.
November,
for cotton was establishedin the face of a dispute
This subcommittee
settlementcasebroughtby Braziland joinedby severalothercountries,including
four Centraland WestAfricannations,Mali,BurkinaFaso,Beninand Chad.As
NGOsworkingin favorof 'fairand
arguedby Oxfam,one of the largestinternational
subsidiesin the United
free trade'for the developingworld context,"agricultural
Statesare at the heartof a deepcrisisin the worldcottonmarkets"(Oxfam,2002,p.
havingfallento their
for inflation,
thatwithcottonprices,adjusted
2). lt is challenging
that
morethan 10 millionproducers
lowestlevelsince1930sdue to overproduction,
havebeenpushedto the brinkof starvation
depend"directlyon cottonproduction"
14As of March22nd,2005,
on Cottondoesholdsits ownsiteat the WTO
the Sub-Committee
Formoreinformation,
feel
whichwill be continuously
updatedwithreleasesof progresses.
e.htm
e/agrice/cottonsubcommittee
freeto consulthttp://www.wto.org/english/tratop
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and poverty(ibid.,p.2).Arguingthat Centraland West Africannationsenjoya
'comparative
advantage'in the productionof cotton,whichis as muchas threetimes
lowerthan in the US in termsof productioncost,US cottonsubsidiesare unfairly
inflatingthe market,as they 'kick in' when pricesare their lowest.Consequently,
CottonAdvisoryCommittee
based upon a study undertakenby the International
"wouldraisecotton
(ICAC)whichshowedthatthe withdrawal
of US cottonsubsidies
Oxfamarguesthatthe regionlost more
pricesby 11 centsper pound,or by 26 o/o",
(ibid.,p.1ff).
payments
compensatory
than300milliondollarsanddemanded
paymentshavenot beengranted.As Jagdish
However,
thesecompensatory
and inappropriate"
as
Bhagwatiargues,thesedemandswere "simplyunrealistic
which
othersfor the effectsof theirownpolicieswouldset a precedent
compensating
the Africanstatesagreedto
wouldopen up a "Pandora'sBox"(2004).Consequently,
in a quid-pro-quo
dealfor
a specialsubcommittee,
the US proposalof establishing
in September,2004,
Nevertheless,
eliminatingtheir demandof compensation.
FrameworkAgreement,the WTO DisputeSettlementBody
followingthe Agricultural
rulingthat the "US had paidillegalsubsidesworth3.2
upheldan earlierpreliminary
Whilethe US has
billiondollars"to its cottonfarmers("Brazil,"BBC News,2OO4).
appealedthe disputerulingin October2004,claimingthat all of its subsidiesare
remarked
the
legalwithinthe presentsystem,PhilBloomerfromOxfamInternational
(ibid.).
countries"
mostrecentrulingas "a triumphfor developing
in favorof
whilelargelypointing
eventhecottondispute,
Consequently,
of subsidies,
Brazil,hasnotyet been'won'andgiventhe US masteryof box-shifting
thatby the endof theruling,it willhaveagainrelocated
it couldcomeas no surprise

8. Outlook
of the WTOsystemsand its agreements,
Grantedthe complexities
it is
andactualcasestudiesto providefor an
withoutfurtherinvestigation
difficult
andsoundoutlookon thewinnersandlosersof the agreements.
accurate
I havebeenableto showthe degreeto whichpower-politics
have
Nevertheless,
periodof
in agricultural
negotiations
outcomes
overa historical
shapedthe particular
withthe riseof theG20coalition
as the recentdevelopments
has
time.However,
power-imbalance
in favorof theheavy-hitters
US
shown,thepast,quasi-hegemonic
shiftedtowardsa'truerconsensusandEU hasslowly,evenif onlymomentarily,
basedsystem'ofthe WTO.
However,thisstatementagainneedsto be differentiated
as seenin the
agreement,
whichhasbeenpushedfor by the US,andheavily
recentFramework
favorslargefoodexportnationsthatareableto effectively
usethe WTO'sloopholes,
the agreement
etc..Furthermore,
supports
boxshiftingmethods,
a'return'toa more
modelof analysis,as NGOsandWTOcriticshavelargelybeen
state-centric
andbypassed,
or at least'censured
andfiltered'through
sidelined
theirownstate's
traderepresentatives.
Finally,
the loomingquestionneedsto be posedwhetheror nottrade
nationsas a whole.Whileshortbenefitdeveloping
liberalization,
evenif 'fairer'will
termbenefitsare likelyto be harvested
a moreseriousinterrogation
needsto take
place.ln the nextsection,I will investigate
the agricultural
sectorsof the US,Mali
the presentand paststructures
of agricultural
andSouthAfricain orderto determine
production
andpossibilities
andhurdlesthatwouldstandin thewayof change.

9. Declared Victors and other winners: Investigation of the
Agricultural Sectors of US, Mali and South Africa
thesecurrentdevelopments
chapter,
obviousfromthe previous
As becomes
on whoarethewinnersandlosersof theGenevaagreement
raisevariousquestions
in thevarious
Investigating
the reactions
andtheCottonDisputeSettlement.
groupson a percountrybasis,I willfirst
sectorsandministerial
agricultural
'historical'
in
breakthrough
whatthe domesticreactionhasbeento the
investigate
based
an independent
analysis
I undertake
thepublicandprivatesphere.Secondly,
agreement.
of the impactof the Framework
on commodities

9.1 Settingthe stagein the UnitedStates
global
actorin thepresent
actingasthemostpowerful
TheUnitedStates,
the DohaRoundTradetalksalive.16
stakein keeping
worldorder,hadan enormous
productof 70
grosseddomestic
in theyear2000morethanthecombined
Spending
nations,the UnitedStatesnotonlyhada greatstakein findingexportmarketsbut
farmersandthestrongpolitical
continued
supportfor itsdomestic
alsoin providing
US
of Cancun,RobertZoellick,
Afterthecollapse
theyconstitute.
constituencies
fly"(Bhagwati,
2004).
"responded
TradeRepresentative
[...] by lettingrecriminations
bilateral
trade
letterto theeditor,Mr.Zoellickthreatened
In a FinancialTimes
countriesthat"havewithstoodpressureto join
with"cando"developing
agreements
(2003).Consequently,
addingpressure
neighbors"
thestrifefromlargerdeveloping
for
nationsthathaveinsistedon compensation
on the G-20andotherdeveloping
16lt is importantto note that I purposefullydid not use the term "hegemonic"in order to
portraymy sensethat in agriculturalnegotiations,the EuropeanUnionhas almostthe same
'larger-than-life'
CAP programsupportingfarmers
amountof say, especiallybecauseof its
measures.
Box
Blue
throughcontroversial
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sectorsandthe
for theirownagricultural
cotton,foughtmeasuresof protectionism
that"asWTOmembersponderthe
Singaporeissues,he threatened
liberalizirrg
future,the US will not wait:we will movetowardsfreetradewithcan-docountries"
(ibid.).
Bush,something
thathas
authority
by President
HavinggainedFast-Track
the
Clinton,Zoellicktraveled
in the lastyearsunderPresident
notbeenachieved
afterCancunwitha "trip[he]tookaround32'000
world(andthe USA)immediately
milesup anddowntheworldto geta senseof theviewof thekeycolleagues"
(Zoellick,2004).Thesestopsincluded,butwerenot limitedto Kenya,SouthAfrica,
Union.lt is withinthis
lndiaandof coursethe European
China,Japan,Pakistan,
FIPSthatthe currentFramework
of the earliermentioned
contextof the establishing
wasdraftedandlateragreeduponby theGeneralCouncil.
to the EuropeanUnion
Whilehe certainlyhadto makecertainsuccessions
in termsof the
andotherdevelopednations,suchas NorwayandSwitzerland,
cappingof tariffsand amountof amberbox reductions,he was largelyableto

'box'

Giventhe realization
liberalization.
throughhiscountry'sstanceon agriculturaltrade
of the US
thatnewmarketsare neededin orderto providefor the excessproductivity
but as
notonlyby the government,
sector,hiseffortswereapplauded
agricultural
companies.
As a matterof
wellby largespecialinterestgroupsandtransnational
whichconsistsof such
fact,in a statementreleasedby the 'AgTradeCoalition',
(FB),andtheleading
powerful
FarmBureauFederation
as theAmerican
members
for
U.S.negotiators
they"congratulate
CargillandMonsanto,
US-agromultinationals
provides
stressingthatthe agreement
conclusion
to the negotiations",
a successful
foreignmarkets",
a mission
for the "expansion
of accessto highlyrestricted

As BobStallman,
haslongsoughtto achieve(AFBF,2OO4).
agriculture
American
hasremarked,
FarmBureauFederation
of theAmerican
President
the
"theframework
textadoptedby theWTOGeneralCouncilwillcontinue
worldmarketsfor American
processof negotiation
towardthe goalof expanding
marketaccessfor U.S.farmersandranchers"
agriculture
[and]willleadto expanded
(ibid.).
hasbeendeclared
overalla victory
It is withinthiscontextthatthe Framework
goalsof "significant
Secretary's,
AnnM. Veneman,
the USAgricultural
as it achieved
in trade-distorting
domestic
reductions
in marketaccess;substantial
improvements
of exportsubsidies"
elimination
support; andin a historicmove,thecomplete
("Statement",
USDA,2004).
andnonobviousin thestudyof the majorgovernmental
Whatbecomes
withintheagricultural
optimism
is thewidespread
governmental
actors'reactions
will haveno or onlylittlenegative
sectorin the UnitedStatesthatthe Framework
increases
Backedwitha20O2farmbillwhich
on theirownlivelihoods.
repercussions
US cropanddairysubsidiesto farmersby morethan50 7o,onewouldexpectthe
'historic'Framework
domestic
to achievethe goalsof liberalizing
agreement
subsidiesreductionin the US andthe worldas a whole(FASSTrack,2OO2).
leaderTomDaschleof
However,as Zoellickreassuredin a letterto then-Democratic
SouthDakota,"thisreductionwill notweakenour abilityto supportourfarmers[...]"
(OrganicConsumerAssociation,
2004).As a matterof fact,baseduponthe
formuladevisedin the earliersection,the 20 7ocuttakenfromthe 49
calculation
the USwouldbe allowedto havewillnot
subsidies
billion$ of annualmaximum
of 23 billion$ of subsidiesperyear.
affectits currentprojectedcommitment

commodity
analysis,
I
in thefollowing
a generaloverview,
Havingpresented
of a victorymightbe differentiated
to whatextentthis interpretation
will investigate
in detailthecottonand maizesector.
basedon variousscales,wheninvestigating
9.2 The US Cotton Sector
marketas it
The UnitedStatesholdsa keypositionin theglobalagricultural
accountsfor the world'slargestexporterof cotton,as "in a typicalyearmorethan
perspective,
(Oxfam,2002,p.10).Froma domestic
halfof UScottonis exported"
however,cottonfarmersin the US are receivingvastamountsof subsidies.
cottonfarmershave
Measured
overa sevenyearperiod,from1995- 2OO2,204182
forthesthhighest
received
around10.7billion$. (EWG)Thisfigureaccounts
programin the US,withcornsubsidies
beingthegreatest(34billion$)
subsidies
payments.In termsof subsidiesper acre,cotton
overall,yet lowerper-capita
for
receivedaround230dollarsper acre,comparedwithcorn,whichamounted
Outlook,June/July2002
40 dollarsper acrein 2001/2002(Agricultural
approximately
p.33).
qtd.in Oxfam,2OO2,
perspective,
thesesubsidies,
as shownherein the caseof
Froma historical
increases
cottonin Graph1, havebeenlargelyon the increaseandtheirrespective
largelycorrelatewiththe fallingworldmarketpricefor cotton,dueto "counter-cyclical
payments[that]are madewhena commodity's
effectivepriceis belowits target
price"(USDA,2OO3).
theirtradedistortingeffect,as reflectedin the
Consequently,
increase
in globalcottonmarketexportshareduringthis7 yearperiod,canbe
clearlydetectedin Graph2.

US Cotton Subsidiesand World Cotton Prices95-02
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programs
(seeTable1) havebeenclassified
Thesesubsidies
into6
witheachrespectively
fallingwithinoneof thethreesubsidies
categories,
boxesof
witha totalof over4 billiondollars,the
theWTO.The largestof thesepayments,
Flexibility
Contractin the 1997FarmBill,havebeenofficially
Production
declaredas
howeverwiththe newestrulingin the DisputeSettlement
Body
GreenBoxsubsidies,
payments
as AmberBox.Thesecondambercategory
theywillhaveto be declared
paymentsin the 2002
are Emergency
LossPayments(renamedcounter-cyclical
FarmBill),whichincludethe MarketLossAssistance
of over2 billiondollars.The
payments,
areloandeficiency
whichaccounted
thirdAmberboxpayments
for 1.7
billiondollarsoverthatsameperiod.

Frurgrams included in cotton subsidim

FraduqtionFlexibilityContrast - UplandCctfon

$4,$47,669,2.CI8

fiomrnoditl, C€rtificates - Cocp Cotbn

$2,s09,698,72.6

C'onarncdity Cefificates - Cstlon

$4CI5,055,344

DireatCCIunterCyclical- UplondCntton

$L84,610,470

Loan Sef" Fayment - Non PFC - Cotton

$1,093,?84

Loan Deficiency - Cropland Factsr - Upland Cotton

$-7,769

Lsan Smficiency - Ineligible - Cotton

$-62,S71"

Loan SeficiencyFayment Lirnit- Upland€ottnn

$-ffiCI,477

FroductionFlexibilityRefund- UplandCotton

$-276,24.9

Sefieieney Final Faynrent - ELS cotton

$-3,837,461

flexibility
(PFC)
replacing
Directpayments,
earlierproduction
contracts
payments,
havebeenput in placefor cottonfarmersunderthe 2OO2
Farmact
"basedon thevalueof
(USDA,2003).Thesedirectpayments
havebeenestablished
production
period"(Oxfam,2002.)
andyieldsduringa perviousproduction
payments
Consequently,
as thesestandardized
aredecoupled
fromproduction
and
presentworldprices,theyare eligiblefor the GreenBox.However,
witha changeof

periodto 1998-2OO1(seeGraph1);theentitlement
to subsidies
has
the reference
increasedacreageandyields
as theseyearsrepresented
substantially
increased
for cotton.Thus,duringtheperiodof 1995- 2002,theyaccounted
underproduction
for morethan4 billiondollars,or roughly4O% of totalcottonsubsidies.
Thesecondnewintroduction
underthe2002FarmActwasto replacethe
payments,
withcounter-cyclical
whichareamber
marketlosspayments
emergency
marketlosspayments
Theemergency
accounted
between
boxsupportmeasures.
2 billiondollars,or 2Oo/oof totalcottonsubsidies.
1995- 20O2forapproximately
fromthe USDAFarmServiceAgencyfor 2003CropCounter-cyclical
Estimates
payments
for cottonare0.0393dollarsperpoundof uplandcotton(seeFigure1),
belowthe estimategivenby Oxfamin 2003of 13 centsper
whichis considerably
pound,"orone-third
of the marketvalueof thecrop"(Oxfam,2OO2l.lt consequently
becomesobviousthatwiththe highvolatilityof the cottonmarketprices,so do the

payments
varyconsiderably.
overallsubsidies
Figure1
Source:USDA
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payments,
A thirdmeasurearethe loandeficiency
whicharetriggered
whenever"worldpricesfall below$0.52per pound"resultingin the effectthat"the
payments
furtherworldpricesfallbelowthatlevel,the more[theloandeficiency
and
(Oxfam,2002,p.15).Duringourobserved
loangrainslincrease"
period,
marketing
for approximately
theyaccounted
1.8billiondollars,or 18o/"of totalcottonsubsidies.
As theyareclearlylinkedto thecurrentvolumeof production
andglobalworldprice,
Furthermore,
theyareAmberBoxsubsidies.
90 % of thecottonproduced
in the US
is underprotection
underthe "USCropRevenue
and lnsurance
Programme",
which
coversfarmersagainstpotentiallossesof yielddueto harshweatherconditions
and
As theysubsequently
reducethe riskof farming,
othernaturalphenomena.
theyare
AmberBoxsubsidies.
technically
However,
because
theyarenotproductspecific,

thattheyarealsoappliedtowardsothercrops,theyhavebeen
meaning
"permissible,
as longas theydo notexceedthede minimisquota"(ibid.,p.16).
grantedthe
measure
mostcontroversial
the lastandarguably
Finally,
Westand
pendingdispute,earlyvictoryfor Brazilandthedeveloping
currently
CentralAfricancottonproducingnations,and recentappealby the US at the WTOis
firstin the 1990FarmBill,
whichwasestablished
Thissubsidy,
theStep2 subsidies.
totaledmorethan10.7billion$ between1995- 20O2andhasrisento thecenterof
nations
debateoveradverseimpactof US subsidieson developing
the international
(EWGand
competitors"
becauseit "keepsUS exportpricesin linewithlow-cost
andmillers
p.15).Morespecifically,
it provided
285cottonexporters
Oxfam,2OO2,
underCommodity
with1.68billiondollars,as aggregated
from1995to 2OO2
(EWG).As of now,theWTODisputePanelhasruledagainstthe US,
Certificates
agreeingwithBrazilthatthe Step2 program,as wellas otherexportcreditguarantee
as illegal
throughexportsubsidies
tradingpatterns
programs
thatdistortinternational
As a matterof
on Agriculture.
of variousArticlesof theAgreement
andin violation
fact,thisrulinghasbeenbackedup recentlyby the AppellateBody,reducingany
the
possibility
of overrulingin the futurein favorfor the UnitedStates.Consequently,
on howto
US currentlyhasto presenta proposal,nota timetable,by mid-Summer
seeWTORuling,www.wto.org)
implement
theruling.(formoreinformation,

9.3 Perverse Myth of Gofton Subsidies
the cottonsectoris oneof the mostheavilysubsidized
As becomesapparent,
sectorsin the wholeworld,backedup by politicallobbyinggroups,suchas the
NationalCottonCouncilof America,whichportrays"an imageof a sectordominated

but displayingan entrepreneurial
by farmersoperatingin a harshenvironment,
drive
that benefitsthe nation"(Oxfam,2002,p.24\. As a matterof fact, revisitingthe earlier
cross-comparisonof subsidiesreceivedper acre, it is fair to concludethat the cotton
sectorand its politicalrepresentativesare very well

'in-sync'
and are able to produce

in the US Congressin a sectorthat is
someof the mostoutrageouspork-barrels
(SeeGraph3) This lackof comparative
and cost-expensive.
highlynon-efficient
advantagebecomesespeciallyapparentwhen comparedwith the net cost of
producingone poundof cottonwithinthe West Africanregion.As seen in the graph,
Benin,with 30 centsper pound,averagingsimilarnet cost as Malican produceat
less than half of the averageproductioncost of the UnitedStateswith over 68 cents
per poundbetween1999and 2001.

Graph3
Source:ICAC
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This earlierclaim of unevensubsidiesdistributionis backedup by the data
providedfor by the EWG, which shows that from 1995 to 2002,the top 10 7" of
cottonsubsidyrecipientsreceived78 o/ool cottonsubsidies(EWG).As a matterof
fact, large powerfulagriculturalfarmingcorporationswith intimateconnectionsto
agro companieshave receivedthe vast bulk of the cottonsubsidies
multi-national
payments.For example,Tyler Farmsin Arkansas,whichcontrolsalmost40'000
acresof land,has receiveda totalof almost25 millioncottonsubsidiesfrom 19952002 (ibid.). In 2001 alone,the companyreceivedalmost$6 millionin cotton
subsidies,a figurewhich is equivalentto the averageincomeof 25'000peoplein
Mali (Oxfam,2002,p.24).
The paradoxof the situationis furtheraggregatedby the fact that the
recipientsfor these subsidiesare not the local, ruralcottonfarmer,as arguedin the
subsidies.lT
most prevalentdiscourseon agricultural
As a matterof fact,the strong
trend towardsthe consolidationof the familyfarm into large-scaleconcentrated
farmingis aggravatedby the subsidieswhich providesufficientcapitalto large-scale
producersyet excludealmostcompletelythe bottom80 "/" of farmers,who receive8
per cent of the payments,a total of 5470$ per recipient.Consequently,while
PresidentBush promotedthe myth that the currentsubsidies"promotetarmer
and preservethe farm way of life [and]helpsAmerica'sfarmers,and
independence,
policies
thereforeit helpsAmerica,"it becomesclearthat the presentagricultural
most importantlyhelp to preservethe increasingmarginalizationof smallerscale
farmerson a domesticand globalscale(ibid.,p.1).

17This creationof the myth of the familyfarm has been documentedas early as in 1981 by
Dominanceof US
lngolfVogelerin his book "The Mythof the FamilyFarm:Agribusiness
Agriculture".

up to thisdate,we willhaveto waitandseewhatthe
Froma legalstandpoint,
it becomes
alreadyapparent
thatany
finalrulingof the WTOwillbe.However,
Mechanism
or throughthe
reduction
eitherthroughthe DisputeSettlement
farmersthat
in ExportSubsidieswill havea greatereffecton large-scale
Framework
advantage'through
on sustaining
theirlackof 'comparative
havebecomedependent
subsidies.ln termsof timing,however,it becomesveryrelevantthrough
agricultural
as a finalrulingagainstthe US
willbe achieved,
the reduction
whichmodusoperandi
policies
giventhe abilityof
anychangesin USsubsidies
wouldmostlikelyaccelerate
exportingmarketsto imposetariffsin retaliation.
thatthecurrentunsustainable
cottonsubsidies
it becomesapparent
Overall,
visionof a ruralAmericaon "whichwe
policyis largelyfoundeduponthe ill-advised
canprojectour hopesanddreams"(Danbom
, 1997, p.1sff).As a matterof fact,
andglobalcapitalism,
the returnto
hopingto escapethe coldrealityof neo-liberalism
hope
oftenservesas oursourceof inspiration,
our'roots'andthe agriculturalvillage
policieslargelysupportthe heavy-hitters
andenergy.As longas currentagricultural
is immensethatwe willend up facing
however,the likelihood
of cottonproduction,
withinourownbackyard
soonandthe 'family-farm'
thestarkrealityof neo-liberalism
withoutaesthetics
we triedto preservewill havebeenreformedintoa commodity
andfeelof 'naturalness.'

9.4 US MaizeSector
heldby the US population
is heavily
Thispictureof the ruralfarmland
dominatednotby cotton,but by corn,whichoccupiesthe largestamountof farmed
payments
per
highersubsidies
areaof anyothercrop.Whilecottonhasreceived
in total.Estimates
themostamounts
of subsidies
area,cornfarmershavereceived

seasonshowlittlechangein acresplanted,as theydecreasedby
of the 2003-2004
However,in its most
to 78.7in 2003-2004.
0.2 millionacresfrom78.9in 20O2-2003
the acresharvestedbroke
Reportin November,
recentUSDACornCropProduction
as the acresharvestedrose
conditions
againall records,dueto betterproduction
of cornhasreached
theoverallproduction
Gonsequently,
from69.3to 71.1millions.
by 12%
the 10 billionbushelsbarrier,as it increased
surpassing
recordheights,
(USDAandHilker,
in 2003-2004
to 10'114millionbushels
bushels
from8'967million
2005).
over1.4millionfarmers,
Grantedthisvastamountof production,
partnerships
of at leastone
and estateshavebecomethe beneficiaries
corporations,
to cotton,B0
cornsubsidypaymentsfrom1995- 2003(EWG).However,analogous
o/oof themreceivedon averagejust'4700dollarstotalover9 years,which,when
in comparison,
the
brokendown,resultsin lessthan$50permonth.Consequently,
whereasthe top 1
bottom8Oo/oof cornfarmersreceivedonly15 % of the payments,
higherthanthecotton
Thus,the number,whileproportionally
7oreceived18o/o.
(EWG).(SeeGraph4)
producers,
is significantly
lowerin termsof totalpayments
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in the USgreatlydeviatefromthegini
As canbe seen,subsidypayments
of the
it becomes
obviousthatfor anyfurtheranalysis
of 0. Consequently,
coefficient
the effectsare mostlikelyto
of US cornandcottonsubsidies,
effectsof a reduction
marginally,
havea smalletfecton smallscalefarmers,as theyareonlybenefiting
programs,
support.
fromthisformof government
mostlythroughconservation
In termsof exports,the US is the world'slargestexporterof maizeglobally
in his book"Corn&
(Oxfam,2004).However,as ArturoWarmandocumented
Howa.Botanical
BastardGrewto GlobalDominance"
Capitalism:
, it wasnotuntilthe
expofi,wheat,both
mostimportant
early1980swhencornsurpassedthe previously
phase
of the"international
in termsof valueandvolumeandbecamethe"backbone"
(Warman,
As a matterof fact,presentnumbers
2003,p.191f).
of U.S.agriculture"
year,totalUS cornvalueamountedlo 21.2
showthatin the 2002- 2003production

US$billion,whichis almostfourtimesmorethanthe 5.9 US$billionof wheat
production
(NCGA,2003).
The riseof cornto its supremestatushasoccurredsynchronous
withthe rise
of largemultinational
agribusiness
andthe'Green'andBiotech'Revolutions.
Holding
the highestvalueof production,
the cornsectoris largelydominated
by large
agribusinesses,
suchas Cargill,Monsanto,
DowandArcherDanielsMidland.
Monsanto
alonehasacquired
morethan22 seedcompanies
from1995- 1998
(MacDonald
2000).
andDenbaly,
Thesefirmshaveundertaken
a policyof mergersoverthe pastyears,which
havebecomeevenmoreimportantas withthe introduction
of GM corn,an
increasing
verticaloligopolyexists.Consequently,
as seedcompanies
and research
firmshavebeenacquired
by thesemegaagribusinesses,
so havethepesticide
and
fertilizer
marketsbecomeincreasingly
consolidated.
Thetopfourfirms'concentration
ratiosaccountfor 64 % of seedssold.Thesecompanies
areDuPont/Pioneer,
Monsanto,Novartisand Dow.Thesenumbersarealsoretlected
in the factthat
presently
(GM)crops,accounting
the US is thelargestgrowerof genetically
modified
for as muchas 68 % of theworld'sGM production
areas(ISAAA,2003).In 2003,Bt
fromits introduction
cornplantingshaveincreased
in 1996with4 "/"to a totalof 40
% (Whybiotech,2004).
Furthermore,
withinthecottonindustry,
Monsanto
dominates
thisindustry
as
it accountstor87 7oof cottonseedsales,if includedwithDelta& PineLand
(MacDonald,
Denbaly
andMark,2000).In termsof theprocessing
chain,wetcorn
millingpowersareconcentrated
by 74 "/oin 1997,grownfrom63 "h in 1977,within
ADM,Cargill,StaleyandCPC.Cottonseedmilling,
on theotherhand,whilethedata
is older,is ownedwith62 % by Anderson
Clayton(ibid.).
53

globalcornexportsfiguresshowthatthe US exports
Overall,2OO1-2OO2
for morethan60 o/o,1847
millionbushelsor 2O"/"of totalUS maize
accounted
production,
whichis significantly
morethanthe4O"/"thatthe US accounts
for in
worldproduction.
lt is withinthiscontextthatthe National
CornGrowersAssociation,
groups,warnsthat"without
oneof the largestlobbying
exportmarketsfforcornl,
lowertoday"(NCGA,2OO4).
farmandranchincomewouldbe significantly
While
"ongoing
arguingstronglyin favorof USTRZoellick's
effortsto promotefreeandfair
trade"that"assureUS cornandcornproductsfull accessto worldmarkets",
they
developments
(ibid.).As indicated
havebeenhighlyskeptical
of thepost-Cancun
in a
letterto USTRRobertZoellickandSecretary
of Agriculture
AnnVenemanby 12of
groups,theyeachvoiced" seriousconcerns
lobbying
the mostpowerful
agricultural
aboutdeveloping
countries'demand
for limitingtheimplementation
of new
on marketaccess,domestic
disciplines
support,andexportsubsidies
in anyself("Letter,"
country"
NCGA,2OO3).
declared
developing
Consequently,
whilevoicing
for furtheragricultural
liberalization,
theirappreciation
theyarearticulating
their
of Specialand Differential
concernwith"extensions
treatment"ls
for developing
whilearttullyhidingtheirownpractices
behindgreenandblueboxes(ibid.).
nations,
The US subsidiesstructurefor corncloselyresembles
the cottonsubsidies
Flexibility
paymentsmake
explainedearlier.Production
and MarketLossAssistance
(SeeTable2) Whiletheformerhasbeen
upthe largestamountsof totalsubsidies.
the latterhasbeenplacedwithintheAmberboxas
declared
a GreenBoxsubsidy,
theyexhibita "directlinkbetweenpaymentsandmarketprices"(Oxfam,2OO4,
p.7).
18Their major concernhere lies with the recent"precautionaryapproach"principlewhich is
appliedin the disputeson GM crops.The US corn growersare essentiallyworriedaboutthe
abuse of the "healthand safety"clause in the WTO agreements,which would allow for
restrictionsof marketaccess.etc.

Furthermore,loan deficiencypayments,which accountfor the third largestform of
'amberbox'.Consequently,
over the periodfrom 1995subsidies,are classifiedas
44 % of the subsidiesfell withinthe greenbox,while56 % in
2002,approximately
the amberbox. (SeeGraph5)
Totaf Corn Payments L995 - 2002

Amber Box
560/o

l@Amd-';I GreenBox
Green Box
44o/o

Graph 5
Source: EWG

Table 2:
Source: EWG

Froductiqn Fltxibility - Csrn

$t6,Zg,6,64Lu8gE

Loan Deficiency- Corn

$6,449,t*",not

FtarketGains Farrn - Corn

$1,S7,0,673,41?

Md.ri'

:

---rqfttrq;

-aaw&

Seficiency - Carn

s917,O79,7lfl

jrltMi#niar:3,.Wfit;i;6tl2w"ii;nr.:t::#.)tt*,t;::#Wir\iii':::.:;itw:;.;i::
;.:,,+litPiy!l\t|111,,,,.181r?,ii*:

Laan Sef. Payrnsnt - Ncn FFC - f,crn

$,64,0.01,529
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$13,933,gff
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Diversion - Corn
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Loan Def. Rafund - Csrn
Prcd" Flcx" Refund - Corn
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$-1u,097
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g.s The Cofron Sectorof Mali:
TheWestAfricannationof Malihassituateditselfat the centerof the current
WTOcottondisputeand hastakengreatstridesin the pastandpresentin providing
approachwhichplaceda lot of faithintothe'whitegold',cotton.
for a state-centered
in Malicontinuously
discourse
As a matterof fact,the developmental
stressed
that
(Jeune
"'cotonestla cl6du d6veloppement
[cottonis the keyto development]"
qtd.in KeeleyandScoones,
2004).Consequently,
underthe
AfriqueEconomie
AlpahOumarKonare,cotton,withits high
of PrimeMinister
leadership
receiveda vastamountof
statusattachedto it, hashistorically
socioeconomic
political
financial
andresearch
attention
anddomestic
support,
throughwhichMali
allothersub-Saharan
Africannationsin termsof production
output
hassurpassed
andis currentlythe largestcottonproducerandexporterin SSA.
It is withinthiscontextof the promisefor development
of cottonthat I will
I
evaluatethe currentWTOagreementandits impacton Malilateron. Consequently,
willfirstprovidea historicalaccountof the two majorstagesof Frenchcolonialism
in orderto illustrate
the pastactivities,
effortsandhopesthathave
andindependence
successstoriesin contemporary
ledto whatis believedto be a "rareagricultural
Africa"(Bassett,2001).Second,thisanalysiswillbe followedby recent
by outsidepressures
fromthe WB
of liberalization,
as emphasized
developments
and lMF.Finally,I will providefor an analysisof the presentcottonsectorandits
factorsthatneedto be takenintoaccountwhenevaluating
the WTO
intriguing
agreement.
CottonDisputeSettlement
andthe Framework

highqualitycottonforthe
Malihaslonghelda leadingrolein producing
globalexportmarketdueto favorableclimaticconditions
picking
and lessmechanical
Greecein termsof export
methods.Whileit doesstilltrailheavilysubsidized
quantities,
estimatesand200412005
forecastsshowthat Maliis closeto
2OO3|2OO4
reachingthe spotof the 4thlargestcottonexporterin the world.(SeeTable3)
Exports:1000Metric
Tons
(USDA:WorldCotton
Markets)

1999
2000

United States
Uzbekistan

1470
893
699
235
196

Australia
Greece
Mali

20001
2oo1'n

2001t
2002

20021
2003

20031
2004

20041
2005

(Estimated) (Projected)

1467
740
850
310
125

2395
740
681
218

201

2591
762
578
250
185

2996
642
470
267
256

2874
729
414
250

223

Table3
Source:USDA
seasonsas a benchmark,
Thus,usingthe 2OO3|20O4
Mali's256'000metric
Mt. In termsof cotton
tons(mt)accountfor3.5% of theglobalexportsof 7'183'000
production,
Malicurrentlyis estimatedof havingapproximately
545'000ha under
production
(averagebetween2003- 2005).Furthermore,
it holdsoneof the highest
yieldsin SSAwithan averageof 450 kg/haof cottonproduced.
Analyzedfroman
Maliis the largestcottonproducer,
Africanperspective,
with1.2millionbales
producedin 2003/2004,
whichis closelyfollowedby BurkinaFasoand Egypt
(FAOSTATS).

Analyzingthe cottonmarketon a domesticscale,2O04|2OOS
figuresshow
thatMaliis likelyto holda greaterendstockthanit did in the beginning,
as

teThe reasonfor the drop in 2OOO|2OO1,
as explainedlateron, was a very'effective'farming
strikein Malito gain greatersharein producerprices.
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production
of 1.O7million480poundbalesoutstrips
itsexports,
whichtotal1.025
million480poundbales.Thus,whileits beginning
stockwas257'0OO
480pound
bales,its endstockis projectedto be 282'000480 poundbales.Whilethisis
demandon a globalscale,it alsois important
indicative
of a weakening
to notethat
(use)is proportionally
consumption
outperformed
domestic
by exportsby a 1:51ratio
(20:1025
1'000480lb Bales).Thusoverall,Malihasapproximately
61'000metric
cycle,a growthof about8.5 % from
tonsof cottonleftat the endof the 2OO4|2OO5
stock,whichis considerably
morethanthe 1'000metrictonsincrease
the beginning
year("Cotton,"
production
in the 200312004
USDA,2AA4\.
Theserecentdataare partof the continuing
complexstoryof the fastriseof
cottonin theWestAfricannationsunderFrenchcolonialrule.Startingin 1960,cotton
production
in theWestandCentralAfricannationsundertheCFAfranczonedid not
(Tefft,2003,p.3).Consequently,
amountto morethan1 % of totalworldproduction
becoming
interested
in establishing
cottonas the basis
as Francewasincreasingly
for its economicsurplusextractionin a postWWIenvironment,
motivatedby
policyof 'la miseen valeurdescolonies
francaises',
Sarraut's
theyintroduced
a
to as'filiere'.
As described
by Keeley,
systemusuallyreferred
J. andScoones,
1.,this
"entailsa verytightlyintegrated
vertically-styled
organization
and managedsystem
coveringall aspectsof the lifeof cotton- fromprovisionandchoiceof inputs,to
guidancein cropmanagement,
to supplyof credit,to purchase
andmarketing
of
p.102).
andexport"(2OO4,
to processing
outputs,
Withthe introduction
of newcottonhybridvarieties,
outputincreased
(seegraph1) in the 1970sand 1980s,andthisfocuson cotton
dramatically
production
as the 'keytowardsdevelopment'enjoyed
a linearcontinuation
evenin a
post-colonial
parastatal,
erathroughthe continued"workof a quasi-privatized
the
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des Textiles(CMDT),that has
CompagnieMaliennepour le Developpement
qtd.in Moseley
controloverthe localmarket"(Moseley
andLogan,2OO3,
monopoly
p.54).lt is important
to notehoweverthatcompared
to othercountries
in the West
region,thecreationof a statecottoncompanies
occurred
fairly
andCentralAfrican
late(Tetft,2003,p.8).As a matterof fact,priorto the creationof the CMDT,Mali
in cottonyields,whichgrewbetween1960and 1974
experienced
a drasticincrease
perhectare.
The
at an "annualrateol15/o,triplingaverageyieldsto 833kilograms
expanded
at an annual5.5% rateovertheperiod
areaundercottoncultivation
in 1974"(ibid.,p.12).
69'000hectares
reaching

The CMDT,as the otfspringfromthe cottonfiliereafterindependence
in
1974,waspartiallyownedby the Malianstate,60 o/o,and40 o/ow€raheldby the
pourle Developpement
des FibresTextiles(CFDT),of which
CompagnieFrancaise
andconstitutes
oneof the world'stop ten
64 % is ownedby the Frenchgovernment,
(KeeleyandScoones,
cottonmerchants
largestinternational
2004,p.103).
cottonoperationactsnotonlyas a
Consequently,
this highlyvertically-integrated
'commercial
thatit provides
company'in
cottonfarmerswithcredits,seedsand
to producecottonwhichit thenresellson the international
technology
market,but it
as a "ruraldevelopment
agency",
as CMDThastakenthe
alsoholdsa mandate
for "socialdevelopment
in the Mali-Sud
leadingrolein providing
region",
whichgoes
wellbeyond"theprovisionof healthcentersand literacytraining,to the provisionof
infrastructure,
suchas roads,andsomecommitment
to environmental
management"
parastatal,
(ibid.,p.103).lt is withinthissystemof the holistic,
all-encompassing
still
largelycontrolled
by itsformercolonialpower,thatthe political
cloutof theCMDT

needsto be understood.

political
Theincreasingly
importance
of theCMDThowever
did notgo
unchecked.
Oneof the mostimportantdevelopments
duringthe post-1974period
undertheCMDTwerethesuccessive
farmerprotestsandtheirincreasing
abilityin
untairandpressing
for fairerproduction
conditions,
mitigating
mostimportantly
pricespaidto thefarmers.
protestwas
higherproduction
Thefirstsuchwidespread
triggeredin 1964whenfarmersprotestedto whatwasperceived
to be "dishonest
practices"
(Bingenet al.,qtd.in Tefft,2003,p.14).
cottongradingandweighing
Finallyhavingtheirdemandsmet,theycreatedso calledfarmerorganizations,
(AV),whichwereresponsible
associations
villageoises
in the "assembly
and
(Tefft,2003,p.14').Furthermore,
weighing
of seedcottongradingin villages"
they
overallachievedlowerCMDToperatingcostsandhighercreditrecoveryratesas the
localdevelopment,
AVsgainedcontrolover
suchas the creation
of infrastructures,
wells(ibid.).Theyliterally
e.g.schools,healthcenters,
sprouted
acrossthecotton
producing
zonein Mali,startingwitha singleAV in 1974to morethan900by 1987.
Presently,
thereareover4'500AVsin the cottonproducing
zone(ibid.,p.14).

politicalprotestby cottonproducers
The secondlarge-scale
tookplacein
a cottonstrikeas theCMDTwasunwilling
1991, whenthe cottonfarmersdeclared
to
practices"in
relatedto specificcottonpricingand marketing
meettheir"grievances
of President
MoussaTraora(ibid.,p.14).As Jim
theaftermath
of theoverthrow
Bingenhasargued,this"ruralrevoltsymbolized
a neweraof 'democracy
in the
andbroughtfortha vitalnewpoliticalactor(theUnionof Cottonand
countryside',
FoodCropProducers,
Syndicat
desproducteurs
de cotonde vivriers,
SYCOV)in
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(Bingen,
(haveto findarticleagain),p.1)ThisSYCOV,
democracy
Malianpolitics"
in theendof 1991becamea major
localcottonfarmers,
consequently
representing
CMDTdecision-making
units"
newactorandhasbecomea partyto all "relevant
(Bingenet al,qtd.in Tefft,p.15).

Underthis leadershipof the SYCOVin cooperationwith the CFDT,CMDT
and the WorldBank/lMF,the farmersenduredanothermajorpolicyshiftin 1994with
the devaluationof the CFA francby 5Oo/o,surpassingthe previouslyfixedexchange
rateof 50:1.This devaluationwas largelypushedthroughin orderto "reducingthe
heavydependenceof the West Africafanc zone on imports,stimulatingexport
productionand importsubstitutionand shiftingconsumerdemandtowardsmore
locallyproducedgoodsand services.The ultimategoalwas to stimulateselfsustaining,broad-basedeconomicgrowth,whichwouldreduceMali'swidespread
povertyand food insecurity"(Dibleyqtd. in Tetft, 2003, p.23).This issuewas even
the more pressingas donors increasinglyplacedconditionson their financial
assistance,as the cottonsectorhad acquireda 9 billionCFAFdeficitby 1985/1986.
This scenariowas repeatedagainin 1992,when due to the fall in worldpricesand
of the CFA franc,the CMDT neededfinancialsupport
the previousovervaluation
fromthe "Malianand Frenchgovernments,
the EuropeanUnionand WorldBankto
cover their losses"(Bocchinoqtd. in Tefft, 2003, p.21-22).
Initially,afterthe devaluationin 1994and a parallelrise in worldcottonprices,
the impacton Mali'scottonsectorwas felt "overnight",resultingin a nominalriseof
189 % in the CFA price of fiber (Tefft,2003, p.23). However,even thoughthe CMDT
saw a net raisein the salespriceof 463 CFA francper kilogram,underthe producer
pricefixing system,the farmersonly received30 CFAF per kg. lt was not until the
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nextyearthatthe nominalbaseproducerpriceof seedcottonwasraisedby 65 %
in the
from85 to 140CFAfranc,thesehigherlevels"spurredlargeincreases
production
of coilonginned.Between1994and
of seedcottonandin thequantity
pushingthefrancophone
grewannually
CFAcountries'
by 21 o/o",
1998,production
to 15% in 1997/98(ibid.,p.23-24).
worldmarketsharefrom8.8"/"in 1991192
however,
thisexpansion
largelywas
to earlierexpansions,
Contrary
as the acreageof plantedcottonincreased
on the'backof nature',
undertaken
annuallyby 7.6 7" between1994- 1998,resultingin an overallincreaseof 45 % in
As CMDTdatashows,the averagecottonfarmplanted2.4to
totalareacultivated.
seedcottonand4.4 hectaresto cerealswitha totalareaof I hectares(CMDTqtd. in
beenarguedthatthe initialresultof the
Tefft,2003,p.241.lt hasconsequently
as "most
of cottonproduction,
hasbeenvastexpansesin extensification
devaluation
by reducingfallowperiodsandclearingnew
farmersincreasedacreagecultivated
largelywenthandin handwitha vast
lands"(Tefft,2003,p.24l.Thisextensification
in thefactthat"manual
as reflected
in the useof animaltractionequipment,
increase
farmsdeclined
by 23 7o"from1994- 1998(CMDTqtd.in Tetft,
or non-equipped
extendedlongpastthe 1993
p.24).Thisincreasein the numbersof cottonproducers
in theCMDTzone
as by 1998,93 % of farmhousehold
intothe present,
devaluation
weregrowingcottonandby the 2000,amountedto over200'000,a 5O"/"increase
fourmorecottonginswereconstructed,
since1993(Teffi,2003,p.25).Alongside
raisingthetotalto 17.
in production
hasgreatly
as pointedoutby Moseley,
thisincrease
However,
As a matterof
the pressurethatcottonhasplacedon the environment.
increased
placedby thegovernment
andtheCMDTon "expanding
fact,thepreference
production
alternatives
in olderproduction
in newareasratherthanseeksustainable
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zones" has resultedin increasedsoilerosion,pesticideand nutrientrunoff(Moseley,
2004,p.55).Thus,farmersduringthe post-1993periodhave increasingly
experienceddecliningyieldsin the old cottonbasin,and the blamehas solidlybeen
placedby the WorldBank,the CMDT and othergovernmentalofficialson the poor
discourseof the "poverty-induced
farmers,and as representedin the international
thesis"(ibid.,p.55).However,as his researchhas
environmentaldegradation
indicated,the "relativelyrich,ratherthan the relativelypoor,are the proximatecause
degradationin southernMali"(ibid.,p.57).As a matterof fact,the
of environmental
poorermembersof ruralcommunities,
seekingto gain profitsgeneratedfromthe rise
in cottonprofits,are seriouslylaggingbehindin theirrichercounterparts,
largelydue
knowledge,in theirability"to practice
to lack of capitalinvestmentsand agricultural
resourceexploitation
on the same scale"(ibid.,p.57).
Anotherindicatorof the increasingenvironmental
unsustainability
of cotton
productionhas been the fact that previousadvantages,as indicatedby the signsof
relativelylower crop loss rates of 20 to 35 % comparedto 60 % in other African
nation,is slowlyeroding.As a matterof fact, growingresistancehas often been
namedon the main reasonsfor the decreasein seed cottonyields,as pesticide
quantityused has doubled (Tefft,2003, p.27).ln 1995,for example,"cottonbollworm
resistanceto the relativelynon-toxicpyrethroidsbecameproblematicand was
compoundedby additionaldamagefrom whiteflies"(Bingenqtd. in Moseleyand
at presentit is generallyperceivedthat Malianfarmers,
Logan,2003).Consequently,
underthe leadershipof the CMDT,have largelyenteredthe'classicpesticide
treadmill'response,as opposedto undertakinga moreorganicapproach,such as
formulatedunderthe very successfulintegratedpest managementplans(lPMs).

of thefactthatCMDThasbeenan the largestemployer
Because
and
providednumerouswell-paidjobs,the CMDThasincreasingly
becomethe targetof
andpatronage,
as high-level
officials
skimmedoffsecurityfundsfor
corruption
andtheirpoliticalalliespersonalprotits.Consequently,
Malihasrecently
themselves
chargesin 1999,as "threevice-presidents
beenshakenwithcorruption
of theCMDT
the rulingpartyandsenior
for corruption",
closelinksexistbetween
wereremoved
of theCMDThavereceived
officials,
as wellas the morethan2000officials
(ibid.,
higherbenefitsandwagesthananyotherstateemployees
substantially
p.10a).Thishasledto drasticchangesto thecottonsub-sector
as demandshave
for restructuring
increased
andprivatizing
the CMDTand"reassigning
[theroleof the
itsproducer
statelin thepublicandprivatesectorand[...]remodeling
support
Thisreformhasbeenadoptedon 6rhof June2001,
system"(Zoundi,2OO4).
and is to be carriedout until2006.
amendedin 2003by the government
Thesereformcallshaveessentially
beenfurtherstrengthened
by the very
strongcottonboycottin 2000/01season,whena largenumberof cottonfarmers
refusedto planttheirannualcotton,"resulting
in a 47 % tallin seedcotton
production"
lossof at least20 billionCFAfrancsin potential
anda subsequent
for the strikewasthe factthatthe
revenues(Tetft,2003,p.35).The motivation
wereseverely
financially
strained
farmers'AVs
whentheCMDTdecidedto reneged
of 195CFAF/kgandpaidfarmersonly155CFAF/kg(ibid.,
on itsearlieragreement
p.34).Furthermore,
besidesthesepriceconstraints,
reportsof the 'disappearance'of
36 millionUS dollarsthathadbeenestablished
at the CMDTdid not helpits cause
for institutional
survivaleither.
Realizing
thatthe cottonsectorwas"no longerservingas a dynamicmotor
for economicdevelopment
in ruralMali",thesereformscallfor a restructuring
of the

as "refocusing
effortincludes
suchmeasures
CMDT(ibid.,p.39).Thisrestructuring
work;gradual
withdrawal
fromextension
CMDTtowardspublicservicemissions;
of
continued
withdrawal
supplyactivities;
inputandequipment
withdrawalfrom
(Zoundi,
morerationaluseof humanresources"
activities;
CMDTfromtransport
effortsof the cottonandoil seedssub-sector
theseliberalization
2004).Furthermore,
in managing
thecottonsub-sector,
by producers
alsocallfora "betterparticipation
themto buyintoCMDTcapitalandgreatercontrolby
allowing
whichincludes
CMDT's
thattheyneed"(ibid.).Mostimportantly
producers
services
in providing
refocustowardspublicserviceshasalreadyresultedin the reductionof its workforce
as wellas extensionserviceshave"droppedfromapprox.
by almost600employees,
1000to a bare500,whichmeans1 agentfor 450-500farms,ratherthan250- 300
farms"(ibid.,p.6).

9.6 MaizeSector in Mali
whilecottonin Malihasto someextentlostits dominant
Consequently,
discourse,
hasreceived
maizeproduction
stancewithinthe development
as a cropusedforthe internalmarketandneighboring
moreattention
increasingly
research
Introduced
in Maliin the 1970sby French-operated
trade.20
countries'
playeda minorrolein Mali(MSU
stationsin WestAtrica,maizehashistorically
to
as a reaction
WorkingPapers,1994,p.6f).However,
Development
lnternational
policyhas
"chronic
fooddeficitsduringthe 1970sandearly1980s,government
(ibid.,p.18).
in cerealsas a policyobjective"
self-sufficiency
stressed
consistently
usingthe synergiesthatexistwiththe alreadyexistinglinkageand
Consequently,
a Exportligures lor maizeare negligibleas maize is largelyconsumedeitherfresh or
marketedtowardsthe urban population.
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deliveryof the CMDT,maizefarmingwas
approachtowardstechnological
integrated
to reducestarvation.
As the CMDTdecidedto
launchedas a cropalternative
promotemoreintensive
maizeproduction,
applying
improved
maizevarieties
and
grewdramatically.
increasedusageof fertilizer,maizeproduction
As seenin the
followingGraph7, improvedmaizewasadoptedveryrapidlyoverthe periodfrom
by MSUresearchers,
thisincrease
in the adoption
1975- 1990.As established
of
withincreasedmechanization
of expandedcotton
maizewas highlycorrelated2l
production.
theirprofitsintomechanization
As cottonfarmersinvested
equipment,
wereableto "plowandweedfrequently
in a timelymanner"(ibid.,
theyincreasingly
p.2O').Furthermore,
theyalsowereableto applyleft-over
fertilizer
fromthe previous
as maize"is the mostfertilizer-responsive
cottonyearto maizeproduction,
rained
(ibid.,p.20).
cereal"
In addition,foreigndonorswereincreasingly
eagerto supportmaize
production
to cottonandrice.Forexample,a francophone
as an alternative
project,ProiectMargestablished
an "operational
development
budgetfor a seed
programof maizedemonstrations,
multiplication
farm,a large-scale
a programof
loansfor non-mechanized
farmers,andthe construction
first-equipment
of maize
(ibid.,p.21).However,
twomainsetbacks
storagesilosat CMDTregionaldepots"
occurred,whenin 1983a maizestreakvirusoutbreakdestroyedhundredsof
in 1986whenthe CMDTwas no longerableto
hectaresof maizeandsubsequently
financially
approachtowardsproduction
of maize,as it hadto
sustainits integrated
pricesfor maize(ibid.,p.20-22).Beingexposedto thesemarket
removeguaranteed

21Their findingsare that "bivariatecorrelationsbetweenthe area of improvedmaize and the
numberof draftanimalsand equipmentin serviceoverthe period1975- 1909givesthe
followingresults(allsignificantat the 0.01 level):numberof draftoxen 0.98;numberof plows
0.99 ; numberof weeders0.98;numberof seeders0.98"(p.20)
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chemical
fertilizer
input,
pressures,
farmersadaptedratherquicklyby reducing
traditional
maize-millet
applying
andincreasingly
seedvarieties
changing
methods(ibid.,p.22).
intercropping

by JamesTefft's
up to 1990aregreatlysupported
Thesefindingsreaching
that
to a popularperception
workpublishedin late2003.As he pointsout,"contrary
food
andhousehold
cashcropshavea negativeeffecton foodcropproduction
in
has provento be a boomto coarsegainproduction
security,cottonproduction
Mali"(2004,p.17).As a matterof fact,hefoundthataverageannualgrosscereal
wasin generalalmosttwiceas
percapitabetween1989/90- 1997198
production
As regression
zonesas opposedto the overallregion.22
highin CMDTproduction
in percapitacottonareawas
analysisby Dionein 1989hasshown, "a 107oincrease
percapita"
witha '12ohto 13 7" increasein netcoarsegrainavailability
associated
growthin
theearlierdocumented
(Dioneqtd.in Teftt,2004,p.17).Consequently,
in maizeproduction
hasbroughtwithitselfa3.5"/"annualincrease
cottonproduction
thetotalareathatwasplantedin theCMDT
between1960and 1985.Furthermore
from1960to 1985(Tefft,2004,
to 51000hectares
zonerosefrom6000hectares
prices,cerealproduction,
analogous
to
p.18).Withtheresenthigherfarm-level
hastakenplaceas a
in areaas extensification
drastically
cotton,hasincreased
Figuresshowthatthe totalaveragecerealareaplantedin
responseto devaluation.
for a29 "/"
ha grewfrom3.4to 4.4 between1993/94and 1997/98,accounting
changeoverall(ibid.,p.24).Thisprocesswasfurtheraidedby increased
leadingin increased,
while
as seenin theearlierhighcorrelations,
mechanization,
2 To use an example,in the Koulikoro/Fanaregion,productionper capita (kg per person)
averagedat225, as opposedto the CMDT zone with 407 kg per person.

in the 1980s.(SeeGraph7)
startingdramatically
maizeproduction
stillvolatile,
Maize in Mali
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the datagreatlysupportsTefft'searlierclaimof increased
Furthermore,
andareaunder
in 1994,as production
production
afterdevaluation
extensive
production
measuredin ha increasedfrom256952hectaresin 1993priorto
to 619896hectaresin 1999,whichis an increaseof morelhan 24O"/".
devaluation
(SeeGraph8)
per se, maizein Malihasbecome
Overall,whilenotan exportc;lrop
in the mid-1980s
sincethe "loose[ning]
especially
important,
increasingly
[bythe
inputsacross
CMDT]toallowfarmersto freelymanagethe allocation
[of]agricultural
2004).
differentfarmplots[...] Maizethenbecamea maiorcashcrop"(Hussein,
the described
importance,
as maizehasreachedincreasing
Consequently,

is clearlya keyfactorthat
betweenmaizeandcottonproduction
interdependence
impactof the WTO
the potential
needsto be takenintoaccountwhenevaluating
(SeeGraph9).
andthecottontradedisputesettlement.
agreements
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9.7 Maize and Cotton Sectors in South Africa
settlersandtheircolonialregimeshaveforcefully
Historically,
European
of cornin orderto meetthe urbandemandfor export
thedevelopment
supported
productsandfor exportuse.ln manycolonies,as a matterof fact,corncultivation
if [thesettlers]
wereto remainin theAfricancoloniesat all"
wasthe only"alternative
(Warman,
2003,p.72).lt is withinthiscontextthatSouthAfrica,underthe modelof
roseto becomethe"leadingproducer
of cornin Africa[...] accounting
for
Apartheid,
(ibid.,p.87).Consequently,
duringthe periodof the
abouta thirdof totalproduction"
onlyZimbabweandSouthAfricawereessentialexportersof corn
GreenRevolution,
setting.
in the Sub-Saharan
case,
Placedwithinthe currentcontext,SouthAfricapresentsan interesting
thanMali,yetstill'underdeveloped'when
interpreted
as it is clearlymoredeveloped
Consequently,
SouthAfricahasoftenbeenclassifiedas a
froma US perspective.
of potential
in Africasincetheendingof
developing
nationwithgreatamounts
production,
Apartheid
rulein 1994.Intermsof agricultural
SouthAfricaactsin two
almostas a mirrorimageto Mali'sagriculturalsector.
First,on a macrointeresting
sectoras opposedto Maliandsimilarto the US,only
scale,whiletheagricultural
for approximately
14"h of itsGDPand10% of itsexportgoods,it still
accounts
providesemployment
anda backboneof people'slivelihoods
for morethan7 million
people.As statedin the "Strategic
Planfor SouthAfricanAgriculture",
the
in SouthAfrica,whichare
50'000large-scale
commercialfarmers
approximately
predominantly
white,"employabout1 millionworkers,whichis 11% of totalformal
in thecountry''(NDA,
2001).Theseemployees
sectoremployment
thenprovide
to morethan6 millionfamilymembers.
livelihoods
andhousing
Furthermore,
withthe

farmers,an additional
onemillionfamilymembers,
and
small-scale
riseof 24O'OOO
(ibid.).
intothecalculations
alsoneedto be included
500000temporalworkers
popularandeconomically
significant
takingintoaccountthe"increasingly
Overall,
activities
total
andgameJarming
agro-tourism
[...] about40 o/oof thecountry's
population
dependent
mainlyon agriculture
andrelatedindustries"
aretherefore
( i b i d.).
it is important
to notethatwhilethe importance
of farmingis still
However,
of farmlandhasoccurred
relevant,a mergingof tarmsand increasedconcentration
to the mostrecent2002
SouthAfrican
similarto the UnitedStates.According
tarmunitsdecreasedby
the numberof activecommercial
Censusof Agriculture,
(Statistics
to the 1993censusto 45818activecommercialfarmers
12162compared
in {ormalagriculture
thenumberof employees
also
SA,2004,p.1).Furthermore,
by almost14o/oto belowa millionwith940'815employees,
of which
decreased
(ibid.).
the largestnumberof paidemployees
WesternCapeemployed
Secondly,SouthAfricastandsout fromMali,as maize,as opposedto cotton
to 749'870metrictonsbeingexportedin 2O02,
is its largestexportcrop,amounting
Using2O01-2002
data,
witha totafvalueof morethan135millionUS$(FAOSTATS).
47 millionbushelsof maize,whichaccounts
tor2"h of global
SouthAfricaexported
maizeexports,a smallfractionwhencomparedto the 1.8 billionbushelsexportedin
of 358millionbushelsin 2OO1l2OO2,
this
the US.fn termsof overallcornproduction
(USDA(2),2A04\.Au
exportsumaccountsfor a mere13 "/"of totalproduction
contraire
to the situationin Mali,cottonon the otherhandis notan exportcrop,as
between1994/95to 200312004
amounts
the averageexportfor cottonlintproduction
from2OO1l02
to only1850metrictonstotal,withno exportsoccurringandprojected
However,
whilemaizeproduction
hashistorically
titl2004/05(CottonSA.org).

in certain
is notnegligible
sector,cottonproduction
dominated
theagricultural
1 o/oof totalSouthAfrican
regions.Cottonpresentlyaccountsfor approximately
"generating
US$50millionannually"(Kock,
approximately
ralproduction,
agricultu
while1530large
2000,as quotedin ShankarandThirtle,p. 3). Furthermore,
the FreeStateandKwaZulu-Natal
in the LimpopoProvince,
commercialfarmers
in certain
farmingis stillsignificant
produceover90 % of the output,smallholder
in the Makhathini
Flats,
about3000Zulusmallholders
regions.Forexample,
producean aggregated
98 % of
and500in Tonga,Mpumalanga,
KwaZulu-Natal,
cottongrownin SouthAfrica(HofsandKirsten,2002,as quotedin
smallholder
ShankarandThirtle,p.4).
of the GMOAct of 1997hasadopteda
withthe institution
As the government,
of genetically
policyuniqueto the wholeSSA,whichis in favorof the adaptation
in South
havebeenintroduced
bothGM maizeandcotton23
modifiedagriculture,
projectsare
morethan600differentbiotechnology
Africasincethen.Presently,
havingits
Monsanto
withmorethan50 companies2o,
believed
to be in existence,
2003).As a matterof fact,
in SouthAfrica,involved(Ledermann,
Africaheadquarters
playsan integralpartas it "provides
GMtechnology
as stressedby the government,
us witha wayof meetingthe growingdemandof foodwithoutplacingevengreater
cropswith
lt allowsus to growbetter-quality
pressureon our scarceresources.
a Bt cotton is also plannedfor introductionin Mali, as a recentnews reportby GRAIN has
discussed.As a matterof tact, researcherswith the Institutd'EconomieRuralein Mali are
currentlyin the processof finalizinga five-yearplan with the USAID,Monsanto,Syngenta
and Dow Agrosciencesto developand commercializeGM cotton.
24lt is importantto note that while many of these companiesprovideresearch,competition
betweenthem has reportedlyincreased.As an example,while a privateinput supply
in MakhathiniFlatswith Bt
company,VUNISA,was in chargeof supplyingsmallholders
has
most recently.As a matter
been
undermined
their
monopoly
status
cotton by Monsanto,
"buys
prices
farmers
fixed
by CottonSouth Africa,[it]
the
at
cotton
trom
VUN|SA
of tact, while
opened
NSK,
which
has
a
high-capacitycotton gin"
with
Danish-owned
now has to compete
(Shankarand Thirtle,p.4).
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theenvironment"
andprotecting
higheryieldswhileat thesametimesustaining
2003).Presently,
approximately
SA,as quotedin Ledermann,
(Dept.of Agriculture
in
manipulated
alreadybetween10 and15o/ool maizecropplantedis genetically
orderto protectit tromthe 'stalkborer'(Reynolds2002,as quotedin Ledermann,
production
hasbeenintroduced
in 1999,showing
Bf-cotton
2003).Furthermore,
'strong'resultsin the Makhathini
as 95 7" of small-scale
Flatsareaof KwaZulu-Natal,
in thatspecific
farmershavebeenestimatedto be growingGM cottonby 20O112002
theirgrossmarginby 11o/"in thefirstseason
regionwith"augmentling]
, and77 "h in
Council
to farmersgrowingnon-Bfcotton"(Nuffield
thesecondseasonin comparison
2003).
2003,p.23,as quotedin Ledermann,
on Bioethics,
of Bt cottonas a toolfor
Whiletheseresultsgivehopeforthe application
povertyreduction,
Aaronde Grassihaspointedout that improvedcottontechnology
seemsunfitto reducepoverty,as a hostof otherfactorsare largelycontributing
of powerin
the unequaldistribution
towardsit.Justto namea few,he identifies
planning
favoring
wealthier
farmers,
accessto water,"top-down
termsof negotiating
landinequality
compounded
by slow
natureconservation,
elitisttourism,authoritarian
pensions
andoff-farm
wages,overproduction
andHIV/AlDS"
landreform,declining
p.38as quotedin Ledermann,
(deGrassi,2OO3,
2003).Fromanotherpointof view,
in KwaZulu-Natal
by ShankarandThirtleintothesituation
as a recentinvestigation
is to enable"the
of Bt technology
of theintroduction
argue,the maincontribution
associated
withpesticide
creditandlaborconstraints
to circumvent
smallholders
(Shankar
theyshowthat"non-BT
andThirtle,2004,p.1).Consequently
application"
pesticide
of the
andthatthe maincontribution
in SouthAfricaunder-use
smallholders
resultingfromunderis to enablethemto realizethe lostproductivity
newtechnology
use"(ibid.).
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projectsheavilyfocuson
two recentreportsof development
Nevertheless,
blackfarmersout of poverty.As reportedin July
cottonas a toolto lift small-scale,
projectin Easterncapeis hopedto providefor a
2004,a R150millioninvestment
cottonsector"(SouthAfrica.info,
muchneededboostto "SouthAfrica'sstruggling
Beingoneof the poorestprovincein SouthAfrica,it is hopedthat
..:",2OO4).
"R150m.
Da
textilemanufacturer
by the EastLondon-based
undertaken
thisinvestment,
andempowerlocalblack
some6000seasonaljobs
will"create
GamaTextiles,
cotton
(ibid).Overall,the projectformsan integralpartof a widespread
farmers"
blackfarmersinto
strategy"whichlooksto drawemerging
development
industry's
whichshouldproduce
as almost1500ha of cottonwillbe planted,
cottongrowing",
36000baleswithinthe nextthreeyears(ibid.).ln addition,the LabourJobCreation
of threeSouthAfricantradeunions,hascreatedthe Moutse
Trust,an agglomerate
to providemoney
Thisprojectis intended
Mpumalanga.
in Denilton,
CottonUmbrella
in orderfor 130womenfarmersto enterthecotton
to buyfarmingequipment
(SouthAf
rica.info,"Cotton...", 2OO4).
businesses
in a
hasbeeninstrumental,
of Missouri
the University
In termsof research,
in
itsexpertise
in Mali,in providing
StateUniversity
similarfashionto Michigan
of
interrelationships
systemto analyzethecomplexeconomic
creating
a modeling
(FAPRI,p.1).Withthefall
of Pretoria
industry
to the University
foodandagriculture
marketing
boardson
"eliminated
a largenumberof parastatal
legislation
of apartheid,
the maincontrolis held
products
rangingfromsugarto maize"(ibid.,p.4).At present,
"puttingSouthAfricawithcountrieslike
andproducerassociations,
by cooperatives
of "nearlyalldirectsubsides"
in termsof theirelimination
NewZealandandAustralia"
exposure
of South
(ibid.,p.4).Subsequently,
it is arguedthatwiththe increasing
in worldmarketprices,theirFAPRI
to thevolatilefluctuations
Africanagriculture
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forecasting
toolto providefor the
modelprovidesthemwiththe necessary
integration
of formerly
of the primarysector,butalsothe increasing
strengthening
global
blackfarmerswithinthecompetitive
small-andmedium-scale
marginalized
on macroeconomic
variables
of the
market(ibid.,p.4ff).Basingtheirprojections
incomepercapitaand inflation,
theyhavecreatedthe
exchangerate,population,
projections
in SouthAfrica(million
for maizeproduction
tons).(see
baseline
following
Graph10)
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Mostimportantly,
thisgraphshowsan increasein production
anda
in exports,as domestic
increase
consumption
is reducedgiventhe
consequent

projectedpopulationdecreasein SouthAfricafrom 45.1 millionsto 42.9million
between2O04and 2010.25
This decreasein consumptionis also suppodedby
increasinginflationversusthe dollar,whichwill cause higherpricesand resultingin
more maizebeingexported.Overallthough,this graph needsto be interpretedwith
care,as it does not predictthe future.26.
Overall,whilecottonholdsa potentialto be evaluatedfor farmersas an
alternatesourceof income,the importanceof maizeas the dominantstaplefood in
SouthAfricais well-established.
Classifiedas a "wagegood",it takes up as much as
20 o/ool a low-incomeconsumer'sincome,and any changesin supplyand
subsequentlowerpricescould have a greateffecton their livelihoodsand food
security(Trauband Jayne, 2004,p. 1). However,presently,the earliermentioned
significantmarketreformsand liberalizationof the agriculturalsector have not yet led
to lower prices"as maize marketingand processingcosts typicallyaccountfor 50 to
70"/"ol the totalcost of maizemealpaidby south Africaconsumers"(ibid.,p.1).
Consequently,while freer global marketsmightstrengthenSouthAfrica'sstanceas a
corn exporter,the domesticconsumerand producermight profit little.As a matterof
fact, as lbng as South Africa'smillersand processingfirms controlsuch a substantial
part of the commoditychain both in terms of percentageof profitsand production,
they hofd a de facto oligopolyon the maize consumerand producer.While food
marketreformsin neighboringcountrieshavegenerally"reducedthe marketingcost

5 For more projectioninformation
and detailedinterpretationof the model pleaserefer to the
Final Reportfor the Universityof MissouriSouth AfricanEducationProgram,FAPRI.
6 This pointon the validityof the graph is
especiallyimportant.As stressedby FApRl, it is
importantto note that "in reality,the assumptionsunderlyingthe baselineare certainto be
violated,and so actualmarketoutcomeswill deviatefrom the projectionspresentedin the
supply-and-usetables.Therefore,the usefulnessof the baselineprojectionsls not to predict
the future but ratherto analyzethe impactof a range of "what if" questionson the baseline
projections"
(FAPRl,p.10).
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prices,therearea priorireasons
andconsumer
wedgebetweenproducer
whythis
outcomemightnotbe expectedin SouthAfrica"(ibid.,p.4).Nurtured
overseveral
politicalcloudand
the maizeindustryholdsconsiderate
decadesof colonialism,
graincooperatives,
marketcontrol,as "threeof the recentlyprivatized
Sentraalwes
(SWK),OTK, andNWKown72"/oof allsilosin thecountry"
(ibid.,p.4).
Pick'n PayandShoprite
Furthermore,
twofood-retailers,
Checkers
holda de facto
in theretailsector,as theycontrol80 % of allfoodretailsales(ibid.,p.a).
oligopoly
Furthermore,
certaincompanies
arevertically
integrated,
meaningthattheycontrol
processing
andretailing.
bothsilos,millings,
it becomesclearthatin orderto evaluate
In conclusion,
the impactof the
WTObreakthrough,
a potentialincreaseof the worldpriceof cottonand maizeand
its impacton SouthAfricanfarmers,one needsto adopta system'sapproachthat
of political,
takesintoaccountthewholespectrum
economic,
socialand
environmentalconcernson the local.nationaland internationallevel in order to
undertakea usefulassessmentof its potentialimpact.

10.Assessingthe lmpacts
Havingstudiedthe contentsof the WTO Framework
agreementand the
reactionsand presentand pasttrendswithinthe maizeand cottonindustries
of the
UnitedStates,Maliand SouthAfrica,thissectionis dedicated
towardsplacingthese
contentswithinan informedcontextin orderto undertakean educatedanalysisof
possibleshort-and longtermimpactsof the agreement
on small-and large-scale
farmerswithintheseeconomies.
This analysis,whileby no meansauthoritative,
will
be drawinglargelyupona synthesis
of varioussourcesrangingfromthe economic
to
Consequently,
whileexploringseveralavenues,the ultimategoal
the sociopolitical.
questions
of thischapterwill be to providenotdefiniteanswersbutto raiseimportant
that will need to be taken into accountwhen tacklingthe vagariesof the WTO
outcomes.

lmpact #1: US Reductionof Subsidiesand its lmpacts on US
Farmers

Assessingthe impactof the currentFrameworkagreement,
one first needsto
explorethe distribution
of presentsubsidies.
WhileMaliis exemptas a LCDcountry

from any reductionand South Africa presentlydoes not exceedTotal AMS
the greatestimpactwill be foundwithinthe UnitedStates.As illustrated
measures,
distributions
are markedby a very
earlierin Graph4, bothcornand cottonsubsidies
lt becomesapparent
by its high gini coefficient.
as exemplitied
unevendistribution
that in both casesof maizeand cotton, 2Oo/oof the largesttarmsreceivemorethan
withinthe
subsidiesreduction
any subsequent
Consequently,
8O"/"of the subsidies.
farmers.As has
US settingwouldaffectmorevastlylargerfarmsthan small-scale
been shownearlier,8O"/" of the corn farmersreceivedless than $50 per month.
wouldcertainlynot havethatgreatof an effecton approximately
Thus,the reduction
1 millionfarmers.

smallerfarmershoweverstandsin starkcontrastto
This findingconcerning
uponbeingableto produce
are dependent
thatof largerfarmers,whoseoperations
cottonand maize in the world market.Of
and exportcompetitively
domestically
course,this first majorimpactis largelycontingentuponthe inabilityto undertake
as well as the longertime horizons
suchas boxshifting,
tacticsof legaltechnicalities,
implementation,
startingaround
that havebeendrawnin termsof the agreements'
to be negotiated
by the endof 2005and
the year2012,andthe upcomingmodalities
the upcomingHong Kong summit.However,grantedthe limitations,the overall
tendencyspeaksclearlyin favorof reducingsubsidiesin the longrun.Thistrendis
by PresidentBushto tacklefarmingas the
supportedby the recentannouncement
throughthe implementation
cutswill be undertaken,
majorsectorin whichbudgetary
potentially
decreasingthe currenttrendof
of fiscallimitson subsidies'recipients,

it is alsoimportant
landvalues.27
Furthermore,
to differentiate
increasing
agricultural
As of this writing,
betweencottonand corn in termsof its currentlegalcontentions.
cottonsubsidieshave undergonea vastlygreaterscrutiny,as they havebeenthe
contentionin the WTO.Consequently,
whilethe possibility
subjectsof international
existsthat corn subsidieswill receiveless scrutinyin the near future,cotton
subsidies
will haveto be reducedmorequicklyin orderto complywiththe WTO
for examplethe Step2 exportsubsidies,
ruling.Thussuchprograms,
will haveto be
eliminated
in the shorter,medium-term
or compensatory
legalmeasures
will be in
order.
Grantedthe reductionof bothdomestic,as well as exportsubsidies,
cotton
and maizepricesno longerwill be ableto be sustained
at an artificially
higherlevel.
pricesfor the domesticfarmerin the US will mostlikelydropacross
Consequently,
the boardand overallsupplfs,due to reducedprofitmarginsor even lackthereof,
wouldbe greatlyreduced.Takingthe well-documented
exampleof cottonand using
modelsapplied,this estimateddropin US cottonproduction
the variouseconomical
variesfrom1.5% (ODl,2OO4)
to 29.1% (Sumner,2003).
Takingthe averageof all
studiescited by the FAO Commodityand Trade PolicyResearchWorkingPaper
(2004),the averagesupplywouldbe reducedby 11.59 %. Expressed
in prices,the

27As WilliamMoseleyhaspointedout,thisrecentdomesticpressureon theagricultural
indirectly
sectorcouldbe interpreted
as diminishing
theearliergainedvictoryof thirdworld
power.
countries
at theWTOin relationship
withtheirbargaining
a lt is important
to notehoweverthatcertainfarmactivities
withinthe USis delinkedfromthe
logicof profitmaking.
As ArturoWarmanpointsout,"therearecasesin whichlarge
capitalist
intending
corporations
enterintoagriculture
specifically
to losemoney.Thiswouldbe poor
businessstrategyfromanypointof viewotherthanthe intricatelabyrinth
of tax breaks.
RonaldReagan,beforehe becamepresident,
boastedof notpayingtaxeson incomethanks
p.195).As a wordof caution,
ranch"(Warman,
to losseson hisCalifornia
I needto pointout
howeverthatI am unawareof anycasestudieswhichwouldspecifically
demonstrate
thistaxfromcapitalist
logicin cottonandmaizefarmingenterprises.
delinking
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estimated price increases range from 2.8 "/" (Tokarick,2003) to 29.7 % (ICAC,
with an averageof approximately16 "/"2e(FAO, 2OO4l.
2OO2),
While the models' figures are different,it does become prevalentthat a
subsidyreductionwould have an effecton Americanfarmers.Consequently,with the
loweredprices,there would be a great push towardsthese farmersto improvetheir
productionprocessesif they would like to sustaintheir operations.Based upon
earlierdynamicsof farmingoperations,they would eitherhave to increasethe quality
of the cotton or corn that is producedin order to reap a greaterprice, i.e. organic
cottonor corn,or the outputwould have to be steppedup, such that the quantityand
efficiency would be greater, while potentially sacrificing the potential gains
associatedwith the productionof highergrade cotton (A) or producingmaizefor the
organic market. While this interpretationmight lead to the increasingconcentration
of farmingoperationswithin larger,more efficientunits,the pictureseemsto be less
common-sensical,
as pointedout by Willis L. Petersonin his study "Are large farms
more efficient?". Undertaking a study of the Corn Belt revealed that "there is
evidenceof diseconomies[of scale] as farm size increases"(Peterson,1997, p.2tt\.
Consequently,
with a reductionof subsidies,the US corn and cottonfarmingsize and
populationis most likely to be reduced, acceleratingthe current decline, without
necessarilyeffectinga reductionin actualfarming acreage.
As a result,the culturaland environmentallandscapeof farmingin the US is
most likely to change accordinglyas subsidies will be reduced and total output
declines. With a reduction in farming population,the public as a whole will
€ Thesedisparities
betweenthe variousstudiescanbe bestexplained
by thedifferentkey
implicitly
situatedwithineachmodel.Thosekeyassumptions
assumptions
are estimates
on
yearuponwhichthe simulation
demandandsupplyelasticity,
is basedupon,andwhetheror
notmarketsegmentation
wasassumedandcottonstockswereincluded.Formoredetailed
analysis,referto the earliermentioned
FAOTradeBackgrounder
No.1on cotton.

fromthe agricultural
discourseof the myth
becomemoredisconnected
increasingly
of the 'smallscaletarmer'as fewerfarmingoperationswill remain.However,this
fact that the US farmersconstitute
effectis mitigatedby the unrelenting
one of the
most powerfulhistoricallobbyinggroupsthat are willingto battleany reductionin
production-effecting
NCC (NationalCottonCouncil)Chairman,Woods
subsidies.
Eastland,warnedin a reactionto the recentproposalof budgetcuts withinthe
or weakening
agricultural
sector,that"anyreduction
of the safetynet providedby the
2OO2larm law will negativelyimpactthe securityof all Americans",
framingit as
"equivalent
to unilateraldisarmament"
withinthe international
WTO context(NCC,
2005).Furthermore,
the AmericanFarm Bureau(AFBF)and a diversegroupof
"willput at risk the promising
organizations,
arguedthat budgetcuts in agriculture
environmental
benefitsof the bill,and the nutritional
healthof someof the poorest
populations
in our country"(AFBF,2005).Consequently,
it becomesapparentthat
greaterpressureexiststo remedyany reductionor limitson subsidieswith other
Returningto the 'colored'boxesscheme,one approach
compensatory
measures3o.
for which great supportfor the farmersexists,would be to strengthenpresent
programs,so called Conservation
conservation
ReserveProgram(CRP) and
SecurityProgram(CSP),whichare GreenBox subsidiesand have
Conservation
beenwell-established
on a globalscalewithoutmuchcontroversy
in suchcountries
as Switzerland
underthe notionof 'multi-functionality.'This
conceptof strengthening
the greenbox throughboxshiftingawayfromthe amberbox wouldallowfor greener,
production,
moresustainable
as farmersare receiving
moneyto eithertakelandout
(CRP)and to farmsustainable
(CSP).Furthermore,
of cultivation
as suchsupportis
s Onesuggested
measureis greatersupportfor farmersandrancherspurchasing
land,as
wellas the removalofthedeathtaxes.etc.

currentlycappedat a maximumamount,this wouldgreatlyfavorthe smallerfarms
withthe generalpublic'sperception
correspond
of 77"/"supportfor
andconsequently
large farming
subsidiesto smallfarms,yet only 31 "h supportfor subsidizing
(PIPA/Knowledge
Networks,2004, p.22tt).
businesses
the big winnerin the UnitedStatesof subsidiesreduction
Consequently,
appearto be the public,as formerlybudgeted
tax moneywill be
wouldultimately
by the PIPAsurvey,as the public
freed up. This view seemsto be strengthened
moreaware,throughthe worksof suchNGOsas EWG,of the
becomesincreasingly
subsidies.
This debatewill especiallybecomemoreheatedas
mythof agricultural
discussions
and publicitywill increaseduringthe Presidential
budgetproposal
negotiations.
Ultimately,however,it becomesevidentthat any saved budgetary
moneywill most likelybe lost withinthe budgetarybattlesand otherpork created
withinit.

lmpact#2: Spreadof GlobalAgribusinesses

will not only hit hardthe farmers
This potentialreductionin US production
who were put out of business,but as well globalagribusinesses
who earn their
greatestshareof profitswithinthe US farmingindustry.(seeGraph11: BiotechCrop
In the year 2004,the US, one of 14 designated
Countriesand Mega-Countries)
contributedto more than 58 % of total biotechcrop
Biotech Mega-Countries,
production.
valueof biotechcropsamountedto more
Overall,the globalproduction
for approximately
thanestimatedUS$ 4.7 billion,whichaccounted
16%of the US$
30 billionglobal commercialseed market (ISAAA,2004).These figuresare
especially
essential
whenwitnessing
the rapidgrowthof GM cornandcottonplanting
in the UnitedStates.In 2001, the percentageof geneticallyengineeredcorn
amounted
to 26 o/"of all corn,and 69 o/"of all uplandcotton.Thisnumberincreased
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to 2004 by the numberof US GM corn plantedincreasinglo 45 o/",and 81.1 million
acres. Cotton establisheda percentage increase as well, as its total GM cotton

to a staggering
69 %
from15.5millionin 2001,whichamounted
acreageincreased
to 13.5 million,a decreasein termsof acreageto 13.9 millionin 2004,but a
percentage
increaseto 76 "h (PEWAG,2004; see Table4: MaiorUS GM Crops).ln
2004AnnualReport,47 o/oof its seeds
termsof profits,as reportedin Monsanto's
and genomicsgrossprofitcomesfrom corn seedsand traits.Takinginto account
that NorthAmericaaccounts59 % of sales by geographicregion,it becomes
apparentthat more than a quarterof its profitsfrom seedsand genomicsare
within the US (Monsanto,2OO4).
achieved
withinthe US and
Granteda possibledecreasein cornandcottonproduction
havean immenseimpacton such
in profitswouldconsequently
a resultingreduction
largecompaniesas Monsanto.lt is for this reasonthat we needto take a broader
the
settingand examining
view of the issueby stepping'outside'the agricultural
'wholepackage'of the Doha Development
Round.As WTO GeneralDirector
"[...]
Supachihimselfrecentlystatedin an addressto Africanand NordicMinisters,
alone is not sufficient.
We need the other areasof the
progressin agriculture
The networkof linkagesbetweendifferentareas
to alsomakeprogress.
negotiations
before
and issuesis well known.We can certainlynot waitfor resultsin agriculture
MarketAccess],Services,Rules
makingfurtherprogressin NAMA[Non-Agricultural
and all the otherareas"(WTONews,2005).Takingthis holisticview,it becomes
leveragewithinthe structuralbody
whichholdssignificant
apparentwhy Monsanto,
markets
whileagricultural
of the WTO,is not opposedto the currentproceedings;
possibilities
will be
withinthe US mightdry up, severalnew springsof agricultural
As notedearlier,several
tradinglandscape.
openedby freeingup the agricultural
integrating
GM cropswithintheir
Africancountriesare currentlycontemplating
issuesand TRIPS,etc.,not
The strengthening
of the Singapore
farmingoperations.
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only facilitatethat process,but also are aided by an increasein the free movementof
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the reductionin
goods,servicesand capitalacrossthe globe.Consequently,
proliferation
of
subsidieswithina US contextcouldlikelyresultin an increasing
servicesabroad.Thus,the
and otheragricultural
biotech,as wellas agro-chemical
q u e sti o nra i se db y K i rste nand Sar tor iusin their intr iguingar ticle"Linki ng
countries:
is therea newrolefor
farmersin developing
and small-scale
agribusiness
towards
the movements
needsto be keptin mindwhileevaluating
contractfarming?"
in developingcountries(Kirstenand Sartorius,2002,
"agricultural
industrialization"
p.1ff).

Intensificationand Dependency
lmpact#3: Genetically-modified
is
itselfas an obviouschoicefor expansion
Oneof the nationsthatpresents
approach"
towardsGM cropsthrough
SouthAfrica.Havingadopteda "promotional
GM act,estimateswerethat95 o/oof its cottonfarmerswere
its earliermentioned
(Ledermann,
the largest
2003).Occupying
Bt-cottonby 200112002
usingMonsanto's
in Sub-Saharan
Africa,SouthAfricahaspositioned
shareof development'space'
throughthe creationof a
revolution
itselfat the cuttingedgeof the biotechnological
Consequently,
networkof researchcenterswithinthe privatesectoranduniversities.
as wellas
it is markedby a strongprivate,publiccooperation

'stateof the art'

for an increase
in
property
rights(ibid.).Thus,thegroundwork
intellectual

of agriculturehave beenestablished,especially
investmentsintothe modernization
corn market.
in the, from a GM perspective,lesser-developed
exists,the thesisneedsto
Giventhat the potentialfor furtherintensificationsl
be evaluatedwhetheror not the SouthAfricanfarmerswill actuallybenefitfrom the
reductionof subsidiesand the Frameworkagreement.As establishedearlier,the
cotton marketpresentlyis not shapedfor the export market,as all cotton has been
it presentsitselfas a very important
usedwithina domesticcontext.Nevertheless
of small-scalefarmerswho dependon the
sourceof incomefor severalthousands
a smallincreasein the prices
cottonharvestfor theirfood security.Consequently,
receivedwouldcertainlystrengthentheir livelihoods,
especiallyif implementedwith
'hungryseasons'throughthe
conjunctpoliciesof reducingthe
buildingof storage
silos,encouraginga returnto traditionalagriculturalmethods,such as increasingthe
diversityof plantingcycles,etc. Overall,as pointedout by Todd Mossand Alicia
Bannon,the possibilitycertainlyexists,as foundin two case studies,that a 10 % of
priceincreasecouldleadto a3O%"increasein food security(Mossand Bannon,

2oo4).
However,taking into accountthe earlierdiscussedaccountof South Africa's
agricultural
sectorbeingmarkedby a liberal,yet highlyintegratedverticaloligopoly,
one could expectthat only a small trickledown effectmight be likelyto occur.32
As
articulatedwithinthe recent"The State of AgriculturalCommodityMarkets"reportby
31The gains from the applicationof Bt-cottonhoweverneed to be more closelyevaluated,not
only in economicterms,usingthe languageof 'gross-margins',
but alsofrom the perspective
of ecologicalsustainability.From anotherperspective,however,it is clear that the potential
for intensificationand expansionof productiondoes exist,as after fallingproductionfor
severalyears,"producersrespondedto a sharp increasein the real producerpricesof white
and yellow maize and have increasedtheir harvestarea"for the last two productionseasons
(NDA,2003,p.145).ln addition,the millingindustrydoesstillhold potential,as it currentlyis
runningat around80 % of its availablecapacity.
32This is mainlytrue for the corn market.
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companies
level,a few verticallyintegrated
have
the FAO,"at the international
gainedincreasing
controloveragricultural
trade"(FAO(2),2004,p.31).Furthermore,
in theSouth
of lessthana handfulof retailers
withthe prominence
as observed
of the marketgivesthemsignificant
Africanmarket,"supermarkets'domination
andtrade,including
throughdirectinvolvement
distribution
leverage
overproduction,
is
countrysuppliers'(ibid.,p.31).Thiseffectof concentration
withdeveloping
pronounced
withinthe maizesectorandwilllikelyaffectsimultaneously
especially
farmers.33
large-andsmall-scale
their
Furthermore,
thesefarmersclearlyrunthedangerof increasing
of GMseedsas the verticalintegration
of the
dependency
by the application
vertically
downwards
to theseed.As Mariam
commodity
chainwouldbe extended
in SouthAfricahasargued,
Mayet,thedirectorof theanti-GMCentrefor Biosafety
"multi-national
DowAgrosciences
andMonsanto]
companies
[mostprominently
[are]
fortheproduction
in thesouthhemisphere
of GM seedsfor export
seekingnurseries
2005).Filingan objection
lastyearwiththe
to the UnitedStates"(CapeTimes,
it hassuccessfully
lobbiedthegovernment,
Department
of Agriculture,
as of early
by multi-national
DowAgrosciences
thisyear,to "turndownan application
to testits
(GM)maizein SouthAfrica"(ibid.).Oneof the mainreasonsfor
genetically
modified
potential
wasthe unknown
impactof pesticide-resistant
objection
by thegovernment
species.Furthermore,
Dowexplicitly
statedin their
GM maizeon non-target
application
thatthe reasonfortheirfiledtrialswas"togatherinformation
to
(ibid.).Consequently,
European
Unionregistrations"
whilethe
substantiate
in the lesserimportant
cottonsectoron GM production
hasalreadywell
dependency
s Small scalefarmershowevermight be enjoyinga considerabledisadvantageas they are
less able than largerfarmersto createan alliancethat could constitutea challengeto the
strongmaizeoligopoly.
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progressed,GM maizehas not yet fullyestablisheditselfwithinthe SouthAfrican
market.
large-scalemaizefarmersin SouthAfricahavebecome
Furthermore,
dependenton largeloansbothfrom the governmentalLand Bank,as
increasingly
well as commercialbanks.As newsof the currentharvestestimatestricklein,
'belly-up'asthey are forcedto defaulton loans
severalfarmersare threatenedgoing
due to an extremelylow and volatilemaizeprice.Holdingmorethan 3.2 milliontons
of maizestocksand havingexpandedproductionareasfrom previousyears,farmers
are facedwith currentpriceswhichare well belowthe R900that wouldbe need in
orderto "covertheir inputcosts"andwe are not even talkingaboutprofit""(Njobeni,
2005).Currently,the market pricefor white maize stands at their lowestlevel ever,
due to an over-supplyand a lackof
with R512,havingdroppedby morethan R50034
drought(Reuters,2005).Ultimately,it becomesapparentthat the currentstrategyof
mightnot be profitableor even applicablewithinthe presentcontext.
intensification
From a macro-economicperspective,the opening up of the agricultural
market of the developed countrieswould not greatly affect South Africa's maize
market, as presently,in years when maize surplusesexist, "South Africa exports
maize mainly to Zimbabwe, Japan, Zambia, Malawi, Mauritius, Kenya and
Mozambique"(NDA, 2OO3,p.1a6).Consequently,unless vast increasesin output
would take place, South Africa is unlikelyto become a major player outside of an
African context in the maize market. Thus, while subsidies reduction would
s Due to the liberalizationeffortsundertakenwithina post-apartheidcontext,which included
the deregulationof the industryand the abolishmentof the Maize Boardin 1997,priceshave
been determinedunder free marketconditionthroughthe tradingat the SAFEX.
'gamble'of
Consequently,some analystsadvocatefor farmersto take part withinthe global
fockingin their harvestthroughthe purchaseof futureson the maizemarkets.lf they would
have undertakenso, they could have lockedin last fall, when the pricewas around R1000
and sold presentlywithouthavingto deal with the loss of R400 sincethen.

91

potentially
increasethe pricedue to a dropof supplyon a globalscale,the issueof
in
is of lesserimportance,
as SouthAfricaengagesmostprominently
tariffreductions
due to maize'scrucialrole withinthe domestic
regionaltrading. Nevertheless,
to the issue of domesticfood self-sufficiency,
the
contextand in relationship
Consequently,
a short-term
of a strongsectoris of utmostimportance.
continuation
priceincreasemightmostlikelybenefitSouthAfricanlarge-scale
farmersthe most,
marketsettingand holdthe necessary
as they are operatingundera liberalized
capacityandcapitalto increaseproduction.

lmpact # 4: Sustainabifityof Maize and Cotton Price Increase
is heightened
withintheMalian
economy,
Thisimportance
bothinthecontext
Maizein Malihasbeenestablished
as an important
of maizeandcottonproduction.
is much
sourceof nutritionin a domesticcontext,whereascotton'simportance
in termsof scaledueto its risingimportance
furtherreaching
as the mainexport
accountsfor as muchas 92.3% of totalexportproductsin
crop.Overall,agriculture
farmersareto profitin the
as Mali'ssmall-and large-scale
2003.Consequently,
themostfromanyglobalpricegains,it is important
the
short-term
to question
potential
of suchgainsin the long-term.
sustainability
pricesin
As hasbeenwelldocumented
by severalauthors,
commodity
generalandcottonpricesin particularhavebeenmarkedby a steadyhistorical
(FAO(1),2OO4,
highseasonalvolatility
decline,as wellanomnipresent
Moseley,
pricesconsequently
Commodity
are notonlymarkedby the lawsof supply
2OO4).
withintheglobaleconomyanditsvarious
anddemand,buthavebecomeintegrated
wheretraders,withimperfect
information,
stockmarkets,
aremakingdecisions
on

integrate
theirown
output,andconsequently
of production
potential
vulnerability
as we can
thisoccurrence,
To illustrate
perception
of riskswithinthecurrentprice3s.
sector
commodity
seein Graph11,12 andTable5, overall,theAfricanagricultural
a historical
depression
hasundergone
overthe last40 yearsif analyzedfroma
Graph12
Source:FAO,
'State...",
2004

Graph11
Source:
FAO,
"State...",
2004

worseningof termsof trade.As estimated
havingsufferedthe mostdueto increasing
termsof tradecostnon-oil1970and 1997declining
by the WorldBank,"between
annualgross
of 119% of theircombined
in Africatheequivalent
countries
exporting
(FAO,2004,p.13).
product(GDP)in lostrevenues"
domestic

s A recentexampleis the reactionof tradersto the final WTO disputerulingin early March
that declaredUS cotton subsidiesillegal.On news of this decision,cottonfuturesrose to 51
cents / lb for May deliveries.They are expectinga "bullish"market,signifiedby lower cotton
plantingand risingglobalcottondemand,whichhas led to its highestlevelsinceOctober
2004. However,fears alreadyexist that "priceshave climbedtoo fast [... as the textilemills
might notl consumethe excesssupplyof both U.S. and world cotton."Furthermore,as shown
in the earlierSouthAfricancase, droughtforecastshave also been activelyintegrated.
Overall,consequently,the short marketreactionis an indicatorof the expectationsof traders
(Purchasing.com,
2005).
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Iable 5

Cotton
Maize

1961-63
146

1971-73
158
5.5

1981-83
128
4.4

1991-93

2001-o2

70
2.5

40
1.7

Source:
Oxfam,2002
are
Prices defleatedby the UnitedSfafesConsumerPricelndex: 1995=l)
US cents/lb
Cotton:
US$/bushel
Maize
in Graph12"Cottonexportsgrowbutincomelags",
Second,as illustrated
whileonecommonrevenueto a declinein termsof tradedueto fallingexport
production,
thisattemptto offset
andrisingfoodimportpricesis to increase
earnings
As a matterof fact,whilecountries
non-compatible.
the lossesbecomeincreasingly
for more
commodity
(including
thatdependon cottonas a singleagricultural
Mali)36
increased
theirexportvolumes,
havesignificantly
than20 % of theirtotalrevenues
Thus,as in the
increase
in exportrevenues.
theyhavenotseenthecorresponding
caseof cotton,whileexportvolumeshaveincreasedin these6 countriesby more
droppedby 4 % during
haverespectively
than40 % duringthe 1990s,the revenues
needingtheforeignexchange
derivedfromexports
the sameperiod.Consequently,
in orderto repayearlierdebts,as wellas payfor foodimports,severaldeveloping
of cottonandmaize
by the highvolatility
havebeenhurtconsiderably
countries
prices.As illustrated
by a lMFMorldBankstudy,thepast"sharpdropin the pricesof
keyexportcommodities
[were]the mainreasonwhythe ratioof debtto exportshad
(ibid.,p.21).
poorcountries"
in 15 heavilyindebted
worsened
dangerously
cuttingacrossalltraditional
Thissharpdropin pricesis a linearphenomenon
in Table5, bothcottonandmaize
As illustrated
agricultural
exportcommodities.
pricesmeasuredin realtermshavedeclinedconsistently
overthe past40 years
increase
in pricedueto an
the potential
(ibid.).Consequently,
whenevaluating

sThese countriesare CentralAfricanRepublic,Togo,Mali,Benin,Chad,BurkinaFaso.

whilea 4 "/"increasein the pricehasbeen
in US and EUsubsidies,
elimination
as mentioned
of the currentWTOdecision,
in the aftermath
estimated
realistically
earlier,the estimatedpriceincreasesrangefrom2.8 "/"lo 29.7, withan averageof
impactsof developed
countrysubsidy
seeTable6: "Estimated
16% (FAO(1),2OO4;
thegeneraldownward
trendfroma
removalonworldprices,...").Havingobserved
of
andlongevity
perspective,
on thesustainability
thedamningquestion
historical
thesepriceincreasesneedsto be asked.Thus,a potential16 percentincreasein
implementation
of theWTO
worldcottonandmaizepricesthroughthe successful
appearslikea dropof
Agreementandthe CottonDisputeSettlement,
Framework
in the
forces,as manifested
wateron a hotstove,giventhe structurallong-term
prices.
commodity
termsof tradeandworldagricultural
declining
by forcesthat lie outsidethe traditional
The matteris furthercomplicated
earlier,cottonpriceshavebeeneffectednotonly
analysis.As illustrated
economical
of risks,
by thelawsof supplyanddemand,butas wellby traders'perception
by majorcottonactors.As
physicalcircumstances
andthedecisionsundertaken
volumeof cottonprocessed
each
earlier,China,dueto itscommanding
mentioned
of thecottonmarket.
year,hasa greatamountof influence
on the annualvolatility
China'slevelofnet
(exporter)
as wellas an importer,
Actingas botha producer
factor
importsof rawcottonhasbeenascribedas "thesinglemostimportant
Chinacurrentlyaccountsfor
affectingworldcottonprices"(CottonIncorporated).
(FAO(1),
andnearly35 % of consumption"
"over25 % of worldcottonproduction
p.3tf).At the moment,as it is unclearwhetheror notChinais currently
2OO4,
in world
areunsurewhatimpactan increase
cottonproduction,
analysts
subsidizing
Giventhe paststrongresponsein
priceswouldhaveon Chineseproduction.
in China,whena 2O"/"increasein the domesticcottonpriceledto a 26 "h
200212003
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clearlyamounts
to
increase
in production
area,theworld'slargestcottonproducer
pricesin a post-US-EU-subsidies
environment.
oneof the mainfactorsaffecting
in cottonpricesdueto
it thusbecomesprevalent
thatincreases
In summary,
whilebeneficial
in theshortterm,arenotonlyalsoaffected
in subsides,
a reduction
of otherfactors,butas wellplacedin starkopposition
in the short{ermby a multitude
assuming
a continued
observed
above. Consequently,
withthe historicaltrends
products,
whilegreaterbenefits
willbe
worsening
of thetermsof tradefor agricultural
globalsupplyas a
in the shorterterm,increased
reapedfromthecottonproduction
of higherprices,willreduceanyprior
reaction
to thesehigherprices,or expectations
as demandfor cottonwillmostlikelynotincrease
dramatically.3T
shorttermbenefits
of cottonproduction
Havingthusquestioned
the longtermsustainability
in termsof
standpoint
in thediscussion
of Mali(Moseley
revenue,
as wellas froman ecological

37As a matterof fact, a large part of US cottonspendingwas devotedtowardsa marketing
campaign,as witnessedon US TV that pitchescottonas a natural,Americangood and
consequentlytries to eliminateits archenemy,cheaperpolyester.

and Logan,2003),I will evaluateas a final pointthe issueof food security.
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lmpact#5: Food Securityfor the small-and large-scalefarmer
Estimating
the ultimateimpactof the WTOFramework
agreement
on smallfarmers,
we needto establish
a concreteunderstanding
andlarge-scale
of the
Expanding
conceptof foodsecurity.
acrossfourscales,theinternational,
national,
the Framework
for foodsecurity
household
andindividual,
andthediversity
of its
is enormous.Whilepresently,
according
conceptualization
to Maxwell,
over"two
definitions
of theterm"do exist,itssourceliesin the 1970s,whenit
hundreddifferent
(Norton,2004,
wasappliedas an indicator
of a "nation's
aggregate
foodproduction"
p.99).Generally,
thisconcepthasevolvedto ourpresentunderstanding,
which

stresses"the abilityof poor householdsto gain accessto food in the necessary
while a discourseof the definitionsof food
amounts"(ibid.,p.99).Consequently,
securitymightbe an interestingavenuefor furtherexploration,I will use the wellknownfood securitydefinitionpresentedby the FAO Committeeon WorldFood
Security,whichstatesthat food securitymeansthat "all peopleat all times have both
physicaland economicaccessto the basicfood they need"(USAID1992).
To brieflyelaborateon this definition,the importantkey elementis tood
highlightsthe importanceof accessto locally
access. Whilefood self-sufficiency
producedfood withouthavingto dependuponexternaldonorsand commercial
'expands'thisaccessboth in termsof its geographicalscale
imports,food access
of capitalistmodesof production,with the introduction
and throughthe introduction
of
cash-crops,and a focuson tradeas a meansfor

'securing'thisaccess.To
cite the

USDAdefinitionof this conceptof food access,it stressesthat "individuals
have
adequateincomesor other resourcesto purchaseor barterto obtainlevelsof
appropriatefoodsneedto maintainconsumptionof an adequatedieVnutrition
level"
(ibid.).
It standsconsequentlyin stark contrastto policiesproposingnationwidefood
These policieshave generallybeen characterizedas a costly,if not
self-sufficiency.
impossible,approach,that inducesthe dangersof an autarkicapproachwith a
historicalquest "to extractingrural producecheaplyto feed cities,creatingperverse
incentives,harmingfood outputand employmentand worseningundernutrition"
(Norton,2OO4,p.101).Thus,as advocatedby Norton,the'fundamentallesson'
learnedfrom past mistakesis that "to achieveimprovedlevelsof nutritionin rural
households,croppingpatternsshouldbe allowedto follow comparativeadvantage,
and farmersshould not be given artificialincentivesto grow basicfoods.The surest
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This comparativeadvantagehas continuallybeen linkedduringboththe

colonialand post-colonialerain the Maliancontextwith the

'whitegold',

cotton.

Grantedthat over 200'000farmers,and over 93 % of farm householdsin the CMDT
zone,dependon cottonas their sourceof income,it becomesapparentthat any
increasein producerpricewith otherfood pricesstayingstablecouldresultin a
of food securityin termsof increasingtheirabilitiesto
significantstrengthening
purchasefood crops. Long-termtrends have shown that, while the internal
autarchicalstrategyhas largelybeen abandoned,least-developedcountrieshave
productsup throughthe 1980sto an
movedfrom holdinga net surplusof agricultural
expandingnet deficitof close to $5 billionby 20O2.(see Graph 13: "Agriculturaltrade
Furthermore,
futureprojectionsby
balanceof leastdevelopedcountries,1961-2002")
the FAO predictthat by the year 2030, "the net food trade deficitof developing
countriesis expectedto swellto more than US$50billionin constant1997-99US$"
(ibid.).Thus,whilean increasingnet deficitexist,from a macroscale,food security
and insecurityappearsto be closelyrelatedto three indicatorsof internationaltrade:
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exports,the shareof foodaid in food
the shareof foodimpodsin totalmerchandise
(ibid.
for consumption
importsandthe shareof totalfoodimportsin caloriesavailable
p.19).Consequently,
as seenin Graph14below,thefoodinsecure
while
countries,
devotinga largepartof theirexportearningstowardsimportsof foodcrops,"covera
(ibid.).
consumption
fromfoodimports"
smallershareof theirapparent
it becomesapparent
Consequently,
thatin orderto increase
theirfood
Graph14
Source:FAO,
"State..
.".2OO4

securitfs, presentlyfood insecurecountries"mightimporteven more food to cover
shortfallsin domesticproductionand ensurefood securityif they were not
constrainedby limitedexportearnings"(ibid.).Thus,recallingthe currenttrends
proposedby the global and nationalactorsaway from food self-sufficiencyin the 70s
productionwith the goalof achievingfood security,this
and 80s towardsagricultural
presentdata seemsto suggestthat this trend is well underwayand no future return
open,networkedand globalizedeconomyis
to formerpoliciesin an increasingly
foreseeable.
Finally,this endeavoris also supportedby furtherdata sets that suggestthat
pastfood spikes,whilestillcurrentlybeingdetrimentalto nationaleconomiesthat are
s lt is howeverimportantto pointout that the break in food securitycategorizationappearto
be drawn ratherrandom.Furthermore,the graph does not addressthe questionof the reason
for this phenomenondirectly.
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upona smallnumberof economic
exportandimportgoods,have
heavilydependent
increasing
sustainability
vastlybeenreducedandresultedin a, at leastperceived,
of
(seeGraph15:"Distribution
of the incidence
of importprice
thispolicyapproach.
Calculations
by Diazet al.showthatthecoefficient
lor maize
spikes...")
of variability
($lmt;andcotton(cents/kg)
hasdecreased
from0.21in 1960-1999
to 0.16in the
p.
(Diazet al.,2OO2,
1990sfor maizeandfrom0.19to 0.14for cottonrespectively

Graph15
Source:FAO,
" Statg..." ,2004

notonlySouthAfricahasmovedtowardsa greaterliberalization
Interestingly,
withthemajorexception
of sugar,butso hasMali,withthe major
of theirmarkets,
exception
of cotton.Receiving
considerable
international
support(PRMC;
Programme
du MarcheCerealier),
de Restructuration
as wellas underpressure
by
theWorldBankunderitsSAP(StructuralAdjustment
Program),
thegovernment
deregulated
theircerealmarketsstartingin 1981.Investigating
the response
of
cerealtraders
to thismarketreformeffortin the cereafsector,Demb6f6and Staatz
"alltheproblems
foundthatwhilethesemarketreformsfailedat resolving
of cereals
problemson the
andfoodsecurityin Mali",as it did ignorestructural
marketing

production
were"effectivein
sideof farming,theynevertheless
andtransportation
loweringcosts,and improvingphysicalaccessto coarse
increasing
competition,
grainsby consumers"
(Dembele
Consequently,
andStaatz,2000,p.159ff).
their
thatthe saleof stateenterprises,
studyseemsto supportthe liberalassumption
permitting
privatesectorinvolvements
willincrease
competition
andefficiency,
prices,as wellas more
andlowerconsumer
resulting
in greaterproducer
ultimately
'equal'food
margins,
A casein pointarethe marketing
whichdecreased
distribution.
andfellby almost2O"/"tor"milletandsorghum
dueto the increasing
competition,
areas"(ibid.,p.153).Furthermore,
betweenBamakoanditstwo majorsupplying
"mostevidencesuggeststhatthe reductionin marketingmarginswaspassedback
it is important
to note
to farmersin theformof higherprices"(ibid.,p.153).However,
in thegraintrade,decided
thatthe largertraders,dueto thelowermarginsavailable
investing
to investelsewhere,
andsmallertraders"responded
mostdramatically"
(ibid.).Consequently,
heavilyintotrucksandstoragecapacities
throughmarket
reforms,
thesesmallertraders,whichusedto operatein theshadoweconomyunder
the monopolyof the OPAM(OfficeMaliendes ProduitsAgricoles)
andfaced
repression,
movedintotheformaleconomyandcouldincrease
theirprofitsas well
as reducetheirmargins,as theyno longerwere"forcedto operateclandestinely"
(ibid.,p.148ff).
Fillingthegap,thesetraders'exploited'this
newlygainedfreedomof access
to all regional
marketsacrossthecountry(including
neighboring
countries)
as they
"movedcerealsto areaswherepricesweremostattractive"
(ibid.p.156).Measuring
theaveragecorrelation
of retailmilletpricesacrossthe urbanmarketareasin Mali,
"from0.70in themid-1980s
Dembele
andStaatzfoundan increase
to 0.97during
partially
tradeflowshaveincreased
the 1990s"(ibid.,p.156).Overall,
dramatically,
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due to the devaluationof the CFA as well as the removalofimporland export
restrictions
both in Mali and neighboringcountries.In summary,on a regionallevel,
the marketreformshave lead to greaterphysicalavailabilityof grains in marketsthat
previouslywere markedby food deficits.However,when takingthe international
economyintoaccount,a clear"risk"existsthat due to the increasingcompetitionwith
wealthierneighboringcountries,such as Cote D'lvoireand Senegal,"someMalian
consumersmay be pricedout of the market"(ibid.,p.1560.Furthermore,
any market
instability,
be it local,national,regionalor global,will have an effectnow on the
marketpricesas they are no longerprotectedfrom outside'ripples'.
Takinginto accountthis decreasein pricestabilitydue to internationalization
of trade,food securitydoes not seem to have improvedaccordingly.As the reforms,
whilesuccessfulin reducingthe costsof graindistribution,
marketingcostsas well as
retailprices,poor peoplestilllackthe purchasingpowernecessaryto purchase
grainsin periodsof low supply,exchangefluctuationsand the resultinghigh price
volatility.Consequently,improvingaccessfor the poorestlies outsidethe current
marketreformsundertakingunderthe PRMCand would"requirea muchbroader
effortto reducepovertyand developedtargetedsocialsafety nets in Mali"(ibid.,
p.161).
Evaluatingthe effectof past policy measuresundertakenin post-Apadheid
SouthAfrica,NickVick findsthat deregulation
of the grain market,whichincludedthe
abolitionof pricefixingmechanisms,resultedsimilarto the Maliancase in increased
opportunities
for tradersand "smalland medium-scale
businessesin processingand
distributing
maizeand maizeproducts"(Vick,2004,p.162).As pricesare
coupledto the worldmarketlevel,farmersin generalhave respondedby
increasingly
eitherreducingtheir inputcostsand/orincreasingtheir agricultural
asset
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Thus,Nayobserved
of operations.
concentration
as wellas increasing
diversification
farmsandan overall
in the numberof smallercommercial
an overall"increase
the realpricefor foodhas
increase
in theaveragefarmSize"(ibid.,p.157).Overall,
decreasedin the ruralareasin SouthAfricaas the conceptof comparative
setting.
advantage
hasbeenmorestronglyappliedwithintheliberalized
price'
withthe retreatof the"'single-channelfixed
for example,
Consequently,
andpan-seasonal
by pan-territorial
marketing
regime[thatwas]characterized
costs,as wellas the
pricing",
pricestookintoaccountsuchfactorsas transportation
farmersin SouthAfricahave
regional
dynamics
of supplyanddemand.In summary,
through
theirlivelihood
strategies
by diversifying
responded
to thisabolition
supported
parttimefarming,adhering
farmingor pricehedging,
to contract
increased
in
futuresmarket,resulting
by the creation
of theSAFEXandotheragricultural
"greater
costs"(ibid.,p.162).
andlowertransaction
certainty
atfected
However,
smallerfarmersseemsto havebeenthe mostnegatively
on agricultural
research3s
wascut back,leaving
spending
as firstgovernmental
dueto
withoutanysupportservicesin the country.Secondly,
severalsmallfarmers
to the
withinthe large-scale
farmingsector,attributed
thedeclinein employment
paceof landredistribution,
wage,andthe reluctant
which
introduction
of a minimum

3eOf coursepublicspending,while reduced,was to a certaindegreeoffset by privatesector
research,especiallyin South Africa.However,it becomesevidentthat adheringto the
principlesof economiesof scale and profit-maximization,
these companiesand research
enterpriseslargelytend to reachthe large-scaleproducers.Furthermore,an interestingissue
Act and its "BumpersAmendment,i.e.
arises,suchas the FiscalYear 1995Appropriations
"the US directiveagainstprovidingassistanceto localagriculturalcommodities'producers
whose exportsmay competewith US agriculturalproduction"(USAID,2002, p.32).
Consequently,even though in high demand,the handsare tied for the world'slargestaid
organization,USAID,to undertakeany strengtheningof agriculturalcotton researchwithinthe
Maliancontext.
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accountfor lessthan2 o/oso fat,Vickarguesthatthe ruralfarmers'foodsecurit/o
withthe absenceof effectivegovernmental
hasnot improved.Furthermore,
a taskusually
to reachtheseruralpoorswiththesocialserviceprograms,
structures
farmingemployers,
ruralfarmersengaging
in
by theirformerlarge-scale
undertaken
haveincreasingly
agriculture
becomepolarized
in twoclasses,in
export-oriented
minority
succeedin developing
of households
multiplelivelihood
whicha "privileged
income,
whilea poorermajority
basedon skillsandpredictable
of
strategies
findtheirestablished
increasingly
strategies
undermined
andoftenmove
households
fromwhichtheywillattemptto developa new
on in searchof betterlocations
(Vick,p.175ff).
In conclusion,
Vickpaintsa'darkpicture'for
therural,
strategy"
strategies
areincreasingly
sector,as agricultural
undermined
by lackof
traditional
governmental
supportandsafetynets,womenareexperiencing
increased
for "rightsto residence
anda generaltrend
towardspushing
vulnerabilities
[that]take
(ibid.,p.176ff).
precedence
overrightsto cultivation
andgrazing"
Thus,a greatneed
migration
of rural-urban
existsto geta betterunderstanding
on a regional
scale,
system,in orderto providefor the more
supportedwitha foodsecuritymonitoring
thatareinvolved
directlyor
than12 millionpeople,25 "/oof the wholepopulation,
in thecommercial
or traditional
ruralagricultural
indirectly
sector(ibid.,p.173ff).
Vick
growth"theo4/1is stillwellalive
findsthatthe"multipliers
fromagricultural
ultimately
andshouldreceiveits deservedattentionin orderto strengthen
foodsecurityand
€ Vick rejectssubsistenceagricultureas a viablestrategy,adheringto the conclusionof a
recentresearchreport,ECl, which "concludedthat the singlemost importantdeterminantof
productionmovesout ol
food securityin SouthAfricais cash in hand [...] Unlessagricultural
littleimpacton food insecurityand
subsistencelevelsto some scale of commercialization,
povertyis possible"(ibid.,p.168).
ar
Agriculturalgrowththeorysuggeststhat for every dollarof increasedearningswithin
agriculture,
additionalspendingwill be createdthrougha 'multiplication'of
that dollar's
purchasingpower.Thus, multipliersto non-tradablesform agriculturalincomegrowth ranges
from below2.0 (i.e.Niger)to above2.75 (i.e.BurkinaFaso)(Mellor,1999,p.9).
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theearlierthesisby
thusregurgitating
powerof the ruralpopulations,
purchasing
notonlyfor
in agriculture
areimportant
realpriceincentives
Nortonthat"adequate
(Norton,2004,p.103).
ruralpoverty"
growthbutalsofor alleviating
economic
as an
andfoodinsecurity
To a greatextent,thisfocuson seeingvulnerability
issue,is sharedby Moseleyand
as opposedto a supply-side
incomeproblem,
FamineEarlyWarningSystems
of Discourse,
Logan.Intheirworkon "ThePolitics
biasin the international
andHungerin Africa",theyarguethatthereis a considerable
problemthat,while
foodin-/security
as a supply-side
towardsinterpreting
community
level,is stilllargelyfocusedon a
of thehousehold
the importance
acknowledging
nations'political
developed
economical
thatignoresimportant
approach
macro-level
howthis
2005,p.4).Demonstrating
andLogan,forthcoming
analysis(Moseley
withinthe interests
of Africa'slargest
is closelyentrenched
approach
supply-side
of
of earlywarningsystemsas indicators
donors,theyargueagainsttheapplication
means
of foodsecuritymonitoring,
that"theinexactness
andconclude
vulnerability
safetynetwillalwaysbe riddledwithholes"(ibid.,
or international
thatthe national
p.18).
in orderto evaluatethe ultimateeffectswe needto connect
Consequently,
marketswiththestructural,
supply-side
economyof agriculturaltrade
the political
in food
problems,
in the previoussection.Thus,anyimprovements
as elaborated
arean important
throughreducedsubsidies
whilehigherpricesgarnered
security,
the real
factor,willhavecomein overthe longterm"onlyaboutthroughreducing
incomegrowth"
coupledwithbroad-based
anddistribution,
costsof foodproduction
willbe neededin orderto
(Dione,2000,,p.137).Bothprivateandpublicinvestments
as wellas technical
support
infrastructure,
in bothphysical
ensurean improvement
Theroleof theprivatetrader,as wellas the large-scale
to thefarmingcommunities.
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11. PolicyConsiderations
Havingstudiedin-depththe potentialoutcomesof the WTO Framework
Agreementand the CottonDisputeSettlementat large,and the farmingsectorwithin
the UnitedStates,SouthAfricaand Mali in particular,it becomesevidentthat no
of
clear-cutpanaceaexists.Dedicatingthis finalsectiontowardsthe proposition
policyconsiderations,
I will advocatefor threewide-rangingavenuesthat all lead
'developmental
space'withinan increasingly
towardsthe ultimategoal of increasing
'modernized',
globalagricultural
liberalizedand industrialized
setting.This expansion
spacewithinagricultureoccursat five levels:the global,
or creationof developmental
national,regional,localand the individual.Whileit will be impossibleto coverall five
levelswith due justice,all proposedavenueswill ultimatelybe aimingat
or creatingthe flexibilityand choiceof the marginalized
farmersin the
strengthening
spacefor equally
medium-to long-runwithoutnegativelylimitingdevelopmental
groups.
non-agricultural
marginalized
Havingwitnessedthe decreasingpoliticalcloutof the US agricultural
sector,
as seen in the recentproposedbudgetcuts by PresidentBush,the firstsuccessful
challengefoughtat the WTO by developingnations,and the partial,
legalagricultural
yet in termsof modalities,incompletevictoryachievedwith the phasingout of
subsidiesin the July 31't FrameworkAgreement,it becomesclearthat the
bargainingpowerof developingnationson the globallevelhas increased.

appearsto lie in the
spacea2
of developmental
increase
a potential
Consequently,
of theG20.
coherence
horizonwiththecontinued
these
story'inthelong-term,
in orderto sustainthis'success
However,
of theirlegalunderstanding
and
nationsshouldinvestheavilyintothe strengthening
of the rulingsas wellas during
to keepa checkon the implementation
capabilities
This
negotiations.
in the HongKongsummitandupcoming
the negotiations
the legalabilit/3of bothMali'sand
publicinvestment
intostrengthening
academic
thisprocessof freer,lesswillbe keyin monitoring
SouthAfrica'snegotiators
andNGOsin
the roleof scholars
trade.Furthermore,
agricultural
distorted
in the ageof globalization
andthe
heightened
increasingly
injustices'has
articulating
approach
shouldbe taken,
a dual-pronged
Consequently,
internetrevolution.
andfarmers,
academia
betweenthebureaucracy,
of linkages
throughthecreation
prohibiting
past
currentviolations,
outandchallenging
whichfocuseson pointing
and
thatstrengthen
andshapingfuturenegotiations
violationsfromreoccurring
whileacknowledging
the major
space.Ultimately,
defendanygaineddevelopmental
in thepastin theWTO,I
witnessed
shortcomings
andinstitutional
democratic
willbe the greatest
through
nation'spossibility
stronglybelievethateachdeveloping
towardsshapingtheinternational
itselfwitha commitment
andestablishing
including
doesnothaveto occur
traderulesfromwithin.Of course,thislong{ermstrategy
a2The increaseof developmentspace, accordingto Wade (2004),would includea shift away
'water'or acting room
from furthertrade homogenizationtowardsgrantingstatesreasonable
to chooseeffectivelevelsof nationalprotectionduringtimes of volatilityand infancy.
4 lt is importantto note that the WTO is alreadyofferingseverallegalworkshops,financed
usuallyby Northerncountries,such as the Netherlands.While a major conflictof interest
existswith the UnitedStatescertainlynot wishingto be strengtheningdevelopingnations
'education',an interestingspace does
abilityto challengetheir own subsidiesthroughlegal
exist as Europeannationshave been battlingagainstthe US on the Africancontinentto ban
GM crops.lt is withinthis contextof a'GM-war'thatseveralEuropeananti-GMlOs, NGOs
and governmentshave providedlegal adviceand support,which increasestheir bargaining
power outsidethe realmof GM crops.
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of the G20 alliancehas shown,overcomingmany
as the perseverance
unilaterally,
obstacles.Overall,includingthe importanceof the TRIPS,TRIMSand the
real-politik
GATS in diminishingand limitingdevelopmentspace,the overarchinggoal should
not be simplyto gain

'marketaccess',but to appropriatefor themselvesthe tools

'development
space'and reversingthe 'kickingawayof the
necessaryto create
developmentladder',as describedby RobertWade (2003).
Whileone potentialstrategyof developmentspace,as articulatedby Wade,
sector,its
strategyof importsubstitutionin the manufacturing
is the well-discussed
free from contract
sectoris traditionalagriculture,
equivalentwithinthe agricultural
fertilizer,pesticidesand
farming,with reduceddependencyon non-organic
herbicides,as well as patentedseeds and a capablestate that can protecttheir
marketin cases of high volatility.All of these factorsare representedto the extreme
in the struggleagainstbiotechcompanies,such as Monsanto,throughtheir highly
verticalproductionprocess,as well as their powerfullobbyingand legal capacity
withinand outsidethe WTO settinga.Takinginto accountthe potentialimpactof the
WTO Frameworkin extendingthe reachof biotechnologyand strengtheninglocal
on non-organicinputs,it becomesimperativethat the national
farmers'dependency
governmentsimplementpoliciesthat filterthis power-imbalance.
Grantedthat the
of biotechnologicalfarming
are stilllargelyunknown
benefitsand the disadvantages
and facts are abundantpointingin both directions,it appearsto be most reasonable
for the legislatureto adopt policiesof a

'precautionaryapproach'45
towards

n As a matterof fact, severalof past WTO high-rankingofficershave held management
posts within Monsanto.
4sWhileseveraldefinitionsexist,the mostprominentone is the one foundin the Rio
and Development,
as set out in the declaration's
15thand 16th
on Environment
Declaration
principles.This precautionaryapproachrequiresthat "whenthere are threatsof seriousor
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withinthe industrialized
in orderto regaina legaldegreeof autonomy
biotechnology,
whilenot excludingthe potentialbenefitsof
context.Furthermore,
agricultural
theirfarmersandits
per se,governments
shouldbe varyof sacrificing
biotechnology
as seenin thecaseof SouthAfrica,thatare
landsforfieldtestingexperiments,
foodsecurity
of thesefarmers,butrather
aimednottowardshelpingimproving
Giventhe immense
marketcontext.
theirownrolein the international
strengthening
both
actors'sides,
on bothpro-andcontra-biotech
amountof fundingthatis invested
intoany
MaliandSouthAfricawouldbe welladvisedto includeconditionalities
conditionalities
couldinclude,
potential
or licenseshandedout.Possible
contracts
withpublicuniversities
to promotethe
butnotbe limitedto,thesharingof information
credits
of financial
cropsor the inclusion
of indigenous
development
biotechnological
what
thegoalwouldbe to counteract,
farmers.Consequently,
to smaller-scale
capitalsoughtoutthe local
as thetrendthat"international
Moseleyhasobserved
programs
in orderto proliferate
andintensify
extension
wealthythroughagricultural
(Moseley,
2005,p.18).
technologies"
cashcroppingandits associated
in theshort-to mediumeconomically
beneficial
Of course,whilepotentially
appearsto
it becomes
evidentthatsoildegradation
finalanalysis,
run,in Moseley's
production,
as
methods
of agricultural
be morecloselylinkedto thetechnological
thedominant
discourse
of
opposedto anyindexof poverty(ibid.).Thus,challenging
of
theoverallecological
sustainability
povertyinducedenvironmental
degradation,
in the longrunwith
mightbe threatened
maizeandcottonproduction
modernized
andthreatens
to
andinorganic
fertilizer,
of pesticide
increasing
application
gainsachieved
throughmorestableand
anyshorttermeconomic
overshadow

irreversibledamage,lack of full scientificcertaintyshall not be used as a reasonfor
(UNEP,1992).
postponingcost-effectivemeasuresto preventenvironmentaldegradation"
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to
needsto paycloseattention
thegovernment
higherworldprices.Consequently,
of modernized
agriculture
sustainability
as wellas theecological
boththeeconomic,
yields,
marginalized
increasingly
in orderto avoidslippingintoa 'straight-jacket'of
soilsandfarmers.
policies
thatgo beyondthe
governmental
shouldbe established
Furthermore,
by theWorldBank,by
pushfor liberalization
of the cottonsector,as demanded
andoligopolies
of monopolies
in
theestablishment
thatcounteract
creatingpolicies
prevalent
in thecaseof both
thetradingsector.Thisfactorappearsto be especially
SouthAfricaandMali,whereasin SouthAfricathe issueappearsto expandwell
policydoesnothave
beyondthetraderintothe retailsector.Of course,thisnational
of thefreetrade,but ratherthroughpromoting
to be undertaken
throughlimiting
greatercompetition
the democratic
capacityof the
amongtheseactors,supporting
withthe
andcooperating
citizensin voicingtheirownopinionandstrengthening
Overall,extending
actorsin shapingfairermarkets.
farmers'unionsas important
bothMalianandSouthAfrican
AmartyaSen'sthesison faminesanddemocracy,
in theagricultural
marketsarereduced,
governments,
influence
as theirdomestic
in orderto notweakenthefood
of accountability
thestrengthening
shouldencourage
ruralpopulation.
security
of marginalized,
Finally,
as seenin the caseof SouthAfricaandMali,thereis a greatneedfor
governmental
involvement
actingas safetynets,as wellas extension
continued
support
farmers.Thisgovernmental
agentsthatreachand supportthe small-scale
in orderto avoid
howeverneedsto be as dynamicandflexibleas possible,
as wasthecasein Mali,the
andnotto prolong,
counteracting
marketincentives
improved
fallowsand
croprotations,
lackof supportfor intercropping,
historical
foodsecurity.Oneof the most
seenas integralin strengthening
diversification
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promising
for thegovernment
certainly
wouldbe in the
avenuesof policyinvolvement
provisionof creditsfor small-scale
farmersoo
thatare lessattractivefor
as wellas thesupportforthe creation
of locallyownedstorage
agribusinesses,
fegislation4T,
thecreationof commodityexchange
capacitysystems,anti-monopoly
of pricinginformation
in orderto providefor (temporary)
marketsandbetterdiffusion
frompricevolatility.
Of course,thisgovernmental
shelters
supportis largelyfinanced
viewedcottonas the keyexport
by multi-andbi-lateraldonorsthat havepreviously
However,
withan increasing
focuson ecological
croptowardsdevelopment.
mightbe ableto garnera newinfluxof supportby
sustainability,
thesegovernments
developing
organiccotton,as an example,
thatwillcounteract
manyof the negative
withcottonproduction
effectsassociated
throughincreasing
bothits ecological,
andeconomic,
highestqualityresulting
reducedsoildegradation,
in higherprices,
Onerecentavenueof suchproduction
sustainabilit/8.
effortshasbeenundefiaken
in MaliandKyrgyzstan
withthesupportof severalhigh-ranking
Swissgovernmental
aid agencies,suchas Helvetas.Resultsformthe 2OO2and
and non-governmental
2003harvesthaveshownthat notonlyyields,as comparedto conventional
cotton,
6 One of the most beneficialavenuesto improvefood security,I would argue,is the
possibilityof supportinga group of farmersfinanciallyin order for them being able to buy into
storageand processingtacitities,for example,duringthe processof liberalizationin order to
offsetthe negativeeffectsobservedin the case of SouthAfrica.This is especiallypertinent
withinthe contextof Mali,where currentlyliberalizationetfortsin the cotton sectorare
underway.Furthermore,in the case of South Africa,financialsupportfor land redistribution
should be made more readilyavailable,as the currentprocesshas been a disappointment.
47As noted by Nortonon the topic of anti-monopolylegislation,he pointsout that "legal
remediesfor casesof abuseof the power of monopoliesand oligopolies[...], can be made
available,and shouldbe. Nevertheless,provingabuse is likelyto be a cumbersome,
uncertainprocess,and the difficultiesof doing so shouldnot be underestimated,especiallyin
circumstanceswherejudiciariesare relativelyweak"(Norton,p.95).
€ As statedby Meier,the reasonsfor organicproductionvary from "occupationalhealthand
opportunityto escape'treadmill'ofcreditsfor inputs"for the producersto "Opportunityto turn
'faceless'communityinto a cleady profiledproduct"for
the cottonand apparelindustry.
Furthermore,a facilitatedaccessto the Swiss cottonimportmarkethas been established,
and severalinternationalactorshave stressedtheir interestor alreadypurchasedorganic
cotton,includinglkea, Nike, H&M and Patagonia(Meier,2OO4).
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12. Conclusion
it consequently
becomes
clearthatthe issueof assessing
In conclusion,
the
Agreement
on farmersin boththedeveloped
and
impactof theWTOFramework
in anystudywillexist.
worldis vastlycomplexandclearlimitations
developing
Agreement
I hopeto haveclearlyshownthatthe WTOFramework
Nevertheless,
for twomainreasons.
First,the
currently
cannotbe deemeda historicbreakthrough
is certainlyinappropriate,
as it willtakeup to 10yearsto
termbreakthrough
progress
doesnotstall.Second,analyzing
if negotiation
implement
its
the agreement
whileholdingthe potential
to constitute
a historic
historicity,
theagreement,
willultimately
to the URAA,nevertheless
dependuponthe
achievement
compared
2005.lt is
workingoutof themodalities
at the HongKongSummitin December
policyconsideration
withinthiscontextthatthe earlierproposed
of strengthening
the
especially
urgentandimportant
legalcapabilities
to closelegalloopholes,
becomes
boxshifting
activities,
as wellas increasedevelopment
suchas the documented
spacein the long-run.
the impacton small-and large-scale
Concerning
farmers,it appearsthatthe
greatestbeneficiary
in boththe UnitedStatesandMaliwouldbe thesmallerscale
farmers.ln SouthAfrica,on theotherhand,dueto the highmarketing
marginsand
setting,the larger-scale
marginalization
withina liberalized
theirincreasing
farmers
pricemostreadily.
wouldbe theonesthatwillreapthebenefits
of an increased
Beingableto respondto higherpriceswithincreasing
supply,theywouldmostlikely
outcompeting
be ableto increase
theirowncapital,consequently
smaller-scale
farmersevenfurther.

Takinga step back,however,it becomesevidentthat in the longterm,the
priceincreasemightproveto be unsustainable
unlesslarge-scalestructural
economicchangeswouldtake placeon a globallevel.However,as has become
evidentin the earlieranalysisof the WTO FrameworkAgreementand the Dispute
Settlementvictory,thesestructuralchangesare not to be foundwithina settingof an
at all
increasingly
neo-liberalagriculturalmarket.Thus,strategiesof diversification
of
scalesmightproveto be the most successfulavenue,througha reinvestment
potentialshort-termincreasedagriculturalprofitsinto other sectorsand agricultural
commodities,
as well as througha returntowardsmoretraditionalagricultural
no-tilland organicfarming.
approaches,e.g. inter-cropping,
Ultimately,however,for futurestudiesand the interestedreader,three main
story-linesshouldbe kept in mind and on the academicand policyradarscreen:
First,how longwill the gainedbargainingpowerof the G20 be sustained?Listening
to peoplehavingcloseraccessto negotiations,
severedeflectionsand internal
disputeshaveweakenedthe alliance'sconsistencyand couldunderminea great
Second,the modalitieswill be extremelyimportantand as soon as
achievement.
agreedupon,a wealth of reportswill likelybe releasedby the NGO armada,lead by
Oxfam,assessingthe impacts.A specialeye shouldbe kept on the UnitedStates
farminglobbies,as their pressreleasestend to be very indicativeof theirtrue stance.
Concerningthe DSM, Oxfam has alreadystartedas of March2005 a new campaign
furtherrulingsin favorof
targetingricesubsidiesin the US. Consequently,
developingnationsmay be very likely.Finally,in termsof agriculturaldevelopment,
two key eventsto be closelywatchedis the continuedpush for biotechnologyin
Africa,such as the introduction
of GM coftonin Mali,and the potentialforan
mightoccur.Bothcases,I
increasein contractfarmingas agricultural
specialization
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to thesuccessof strategies
on
willturnoutto be detrimental
stronglybelieve,
of concentration
on the vertical
foodsecurityas an increasing
strengthening
chainwilloccur.Thus,it willonlybe througha complexactionand
commodity
andleasfdeveloped
countrieswillbe
at severalscalesthatdeveloping
cooperation
theirowndevelopment
ladder'andincrease
ableto 'climbupthedevelopment
nations.
thekickby thedeveloped
space,counteracting
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Appendix ll
Source: WTO
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APPENDIX
III
Source:ERS/USDA,
2001
by country,199$98
Exportsubsidyexpenditure
$ billion
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Commoditycategory

1995

Wheat
Coarsegrains
Rice
Oilseeds
Fibers
Fruitsand vegetables
Sugar
Milkproducts

169.3
420.O
55.3
83.3
0.4
166.3
512.9
2,547.1
75.7
2,010.1
135.5
189.2
11.9
26.6
25.8
779.4
114.7
7,323.6

Wine
Beef
Pork
Poultry
Other meats
Livestock
Tobacco
Processedproducts
Other agriculturalproducts
Total

1996
403.4
494.4
97.7
49.9
0.0
126.4
692.7
2,695.3
85.9
1,947.1
94.4
104.7
11.3
14.7
5.9
852.4
209.5
7,885.6

1997

1998

197.9
306.4
36.3
10.1
0.0
95.1
890.7
1,938.7
47.2
950.2
95.4
107.8
10.1
0.1
0.8
709.5
't59.0

562.9
864.5
28.7
2.7
0.0
89.8
913.2
1,992.9
35.5
732.5
403.7
128.8
2.2

5,555.3

o.2
0.9
747.5
1 6 1. 6
6,667.7

1999
53'1.1
772.0
27.5
1.0
0.0
79.2
510.0
2,255.1
27.4
808.0
288.5
102.2
2.6
1.2
0.0
841.0
257.4
6,504.1

1/ Not all countrieshave notifiedas yet for this year.
Source:EconomicResearchService(ERS)calculationsfrom WorldTrade Organization(VWO)exportsubsidynotifications.
http:/lwww.ers.usda.gov/dbAlto/

AppendixlV
WTOJuly Framework
Agreement
Doha Work Programme
DecisionAdopted by the GeneralCouncilon 1 August2OO4

1.
The GeneralCouncilreaffirmsthe Ministerial
Declarations
and Decisionsadoptedat
Dohaand the full commitmentof all Membersto give effectto them. The Council
to completethe DohaWork Programmefullyand to conclude
emphasizesMembers'resolve
launchedat Doha. Takingintoaccountthe Ministerial
the negotiations
successfully
Statementadoptedat Cancfn on 14 September2003,and the statementsby the Council
at the Councilmeetingof 15-16December2003,the
Chairmanand the Director-General
Counciltakesnoteof the reportby the Chairmanof the TradeNegotiations
Committee(TNC)
and agreesto take actionas follows:
a. Agriculture: the GeneralCounciladoptsthe frameworkset out in AnnexA to this
document.
b. Cotton: the GeneralCouncilreaffirmsthe importanceof the SectoralInitiativeon
Cottonand takes note of the parametersset out in Annex A withinwhich the traderelatedaspectsof this issue will be pursuedin the agriculturenegotiations.The General
Councilalso attachesimportanceto the developmentaspectsof the Cotton Initiativeand
wishesto stressthe complementaritybetweenthe trade and developmentaspects. The
Counciltakes note of the recentWorkshopon Cottonin Cotonouon 23-24 March2004
organizedby the WTO Secretariat,and other bilateraland multilateraleffortsto make
progresson the developmentassistanceaspectsand instructsthe Secretariatto
continueto workwiththe developmentcommunityand to providethe Councilwith
periodicreportson relevantdevelopments.
Membersshouldwork on relatedissuesof developmentmultilaterallywith the
institutions,
internationalfinancial
continuetheirbilateralprogrammes,
and all developed
countriesare urgedto participate.In this regard,the GeneralCouncilinstructsthe
DirectorGeneraltoconsultwith the relevantinternationalorganizations,
includingthe
BrettonWoods lnstitutions,the Food and AgricultureOrganizationand the International
Trade Centreto directeffectivelyexistingprogrammesand any additionalresources
towardsdevelopmentof the economieswhere cotton has vital importance.
c. Non-agricultural Market Access: the GeneralCounciladoptsthe frameworkset
out in AnnexB to this document.
d. Development:
Principles: developmentconcernsform an integralpartof the Doha Ministerial
Declaration.The GeneralCouncilrededicates
and recommitsMembersto fulfillingthe
development
dimensionof the Doha Development
Agenda,whichplacesthe needsand
interestsof developingand least-developedcountriesat the heartof the Doha Work
Programme.The Councilreiteratesthe importantrole that enhancedmarketaccess,
balancedrules,and well targeted,sustainablyfinancedtechnicalassistanceand capacity
buildingprogrammes
can play in the economicdevelopment
of thesecountries.

Special and DifferentialTreatment:the GeneralCouncilreaffirmsthat provisionsfor
specialand differential(S&D)treatmentare an integralpart of the WTO Agreements.
The CouncilrecallsMinisters'decisionin Doha to reviewall S&D treatmentprovisions
with a view to strengtheningthem and makingthem more precise,effectiveand
operational.The Councilrecognizesthe progressthat has been made so far. The
Councilinstructsthe Committeeon Trade and Developmentin SpecialSessionto
proposals
expeditiouslycompletethe reviewof all the outstandingAgreement-specific
for a decision,by July
and reportto the GeneralCouncil,with clear recommendations
2005. The Councilfurtherinstructsthe Committee,withinthe parametersof the Doha
issues,the
mandate,to addressall otheroutstandingwork,includingon the cross-cutting
monitoringmechanismand the incorporationof S&D treatmentinto the architectureof
WTO rules,as referredto in TN/CTD|7 and report,as appropriate,to the General
Council.
The Councilalso instructsall WTO bodiesto which proposalsin Categoryll have been
referredto expeditiouslycompletethe considerationof these proposalsand reportto the
for a decision,as soonas possibleand no
GeneralCouncil,with clearrecommendations
laterthan July 2005. In doingso thesebodieswill ensurethat,as far as possible,their
meetingsdo not overlapso as to enablefull and effectiveparticipationof developing
countriesin thesediscussions.
Technical Assistance: the GeneralCouncilrecognizesthe progressthat has been
made sincethe Doha MinisterialConferencein expandingTrade-RelatedTechnical
Assistance(TRTA)to developingcountriesand low-incomecountriesin transition. In
furtheringthis effortthe Councilaffirmsthat such countries,and in particularleastdevelopedcountries,should be providedwith enhancedTRTA and capacitybuilding,to
increasetheir effectiveparticipationin the negotiations,to facilitatetheir implementation
ol WTO rules,and to enablethem to adjustand diversifytheir economies. In this context
with other
and furtherencouragesthe improvedcoordination
the Councilwelcomes
agencies,includingunderthe lntegratedFrameworkfor TRTA for the LDCs (lF) and the
Joint IntegratedTechnicalAssistanceProgramme(JITAP).
issues,the GeneralCouncil
lmplementation: concerningimplementation-related
reaffirmsthe mandatesMinistersgave in paragraph12 of the Doha Ministerial
lssuesand Concerns,
Declarationand the Doha Decisionon lmplementation-Related
to find appropriatesolutionsto outstandingissues.
and renewsMembers'determination
The Councilinstructsthe Trade NegotiationsCommittee,negotiatingbodiesand other
WTO bodiesconcernedto redoubletheir effortsto find appropriatesolutionsas a priority.
Withoutprejudiceto the positionsof Members,the Councilrequeststhe Director-General
to continuewith his consultativeprocesson all outstandingimplementationissuesunder
includingon issuesrelatedto the
paragraph12(b)of the Doha MinisterialDeclaration,
extensionof the protectionof geographicalindicationsprovidedfor in Article23 of the
TRIPS Agreementto productsother than wines and spirits,if need be by appointing
Chairpersonsof concernedWTO bodiesas his Friendsand/orby holdingdedicated
shall reportto the TNC and the GeneralCouncilno
consultations.The Director-General
later than May 2005. The Councilshall reviewprogressand take any appropriateaction
no laterthan July 2005.
Other Development lssues: in the ongoingmarketaccessnegotiations,recognising
the fundamentalprinciplesof the WTO and relevantprovisionsof GATT 1994,special
attentionshall be givento the specifictrade and developmentrelatedneeds and
concernsof developingcountries,includingcapacityconstraints.These particular
concernsof developingcountries,includingrelatingto food security,ruraldevelopment,
livelihood,preferences,commoditiesand nel tood imports,as well as prior unilateral
liberalisation,should be taken into consideration,as appropriate,in the courseof the
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Agricultureand NAMA negotiations.The trade-relatedissuesidentifiedfor the fuller
tradingsystem,should
integrationof small,vulnerableeconomiesintothe multilateral
also be addressed,withoutcreatinga sub-categoryof Members,as part of a work
programme,as mandatedin paragraph35 of the Doha MinisterialDeclaration.
Least-DevelopedGountries: the GeneralCouncilreaffirmsthe commitmentsmade at
Doha concerningleast-developedcountriesand renewsits determinationto fulfilthese
commitments.Memberswill continueto take due accountof the concernsof leastdevelopedcountriesin the negotiations.The Councilconfirmsthat nothingin this
Decisionshall detractin any way from the specialprovisionsagreedby Membersin
respectof these countries.
e. Services: the GeneralCounciltakes note of the reportto the TNC by the Special
and reaffirmsMembers'commitmentto
Sessionof the Councilfor Trade in Servicesae
progressin this area of the negotiations
in linewith the Doha mandate.The Council
adoptsthe recommendationsagreedby the SpecialSession,set out in Annex C to this
document,on the basisof whichfurtherprogressin the servicesnegotiations
will be
pursued. Revisedoffersshould be tabled by May 2005.
f.

Other negotiatingbodies:

Rules,Trade & Environmentand TRIPS: the GeneralCounciltakesnoteof the
reportsto the TNC by the NegotiatingGroup on Rules and by the SpecialSessionsof
and the TRIPSCouncil.eThe Council
the Committeeon Tradeand Environment
reaffirmsMembers'commitmentto progressin all of these areas of the negotiationsin
line with the Doha mandates.
Dispute Settlement: the GeneralCounciltakes note of the reportto the TNC by the
SpecialSessionof the DisputeSettlementBodfl and reaffirmsMembers'commitment
to progressin this area of the negotiationsin line with the Doha mandate. The Council
adoptsthe TNC's recommendationthat work in the SpecialSessionshouldcontinueon
the basis set out by the Chairmanof that body in his reportto the TNC.
g. Trade Facilitation: taking note of the work done on trade facilitationby the Council
for Trade in Goods underthe mandatein paragraph27 of the Doha Ministerial
Declarationand the work carriedout underthe auspicesof the GeneralCouncilboth
priorto the Fifth MinisterialConferenceand after its conclusion,the GeneralCouncil
decidesby explicitconsensusto commencenegotiationson the basisof the modalities
set out in Annex D to this document.
Relationship between Trade and Investment, Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy and Transparency in Government Procurement: the Council
agreesthat these issues,mentionedin the Doha MinisterialDeclarationin paragraphs
20-22,23-25 and 26 respectively,will not form part of the Work Programmeset out in
that Declarationand thereforeno work towardsnegotiationson any of these issueswill
take placewithinthe WTO duringthe Doha Round.
h. Other elements of the Work Programme: the GeneralCouncilreaffirmsthe high
priorityMinistersat Doha gave to those elementsof the Work Programmewhich do not
4eThis reportis containedin documentTN/S/16.
s The reportsto the TNC referencedin this paragraphare containedin the following
documents:NegotiatingGroupon Rules- TN/RU9; SpecialSessionof the Committeeon
- TN/TE/9;SpecialSessionof the CouncilforTRIPS- TN/IP/10.
Tradeand Environment
5tThis reportis containedin documentTN/DS/10.
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involvenegotiations.Notingthat a numberof these issuesare of particularinterestto
developing-country
Members,the Councilemphasizesits commitmentto fulfilthe
mandatesgivenby Ministersin allthese areas. To this end,the GeneralCounciland
other relevantbodiesshall reportin line with their Doha mandatesto the Sixth Sessionof
the MinisterialConference.The moratoriacoveredby paragraph11.1 of the Doha
lssuesand Concernsand paragraph34
MinisterialDecisionon lmplementation-related
are extendedup to the SixthMinisterial
Conference.
of the DohaMinisterialDeclaration

2.
The GeneralCouncilagreesthat this Decisionand its Annexesshall not be used in
any disputesettlementproceedingunderthe DSU and shallnot be usedfor interpreting
the
existingWTO Agreements.
3.
The GeneralCouncilcallson all Membersto redoubletheireffortstowardsthe
conclusionof a balancedoveralloutcomeof the Doha DevelopmentAgendain fulfilmentof
the commitmentsMinisterstook at Doha. The Councilagreesto continuethe negotiations
launchedat Doha beyondthe timeframeset out in paragraph45 of the Doha Declaration,
leadingto the SixthSessionof the Ministerial
Conference.Recallingits decisionof 21
October2003 to acceptthe generousoffer of the Governmentof Hong Kong,Chinato host
the Sixth Session,the Councillurther agreesthat this Sessionwill be held in December2005.
Annex A
Frameworkfor EstablishingModalitiesin Agriculture

1.
The startingpoint for the currentphaseof the agriculturenegotiationshas been the
mandateset out in Paragraph13 of the Doha MinisterialDeclaration.
This in turn builton the
long-termobjectiveof the Agreementon Agricultureto establisha fair and market-oriented
tradingsystemthrougha programmeof fundamentalreform.The elementsbelowoffer the
additionalprecisionrequiredat this stageof the negotiationsand thus the basisfor the
negotiationsof full modalitiesin the next phase.The levelof ambitionset by the Doha
mandatewill continueto be the basisfor the negotiationson agriculture.
2.
The finalbalancewill be foundonly at the conclusionof thesesubsequent
negotiations
and withinthe SingleUndertaking.
To achievethis balance,the modalitiesto be
developedwill need to incorporateoperationallyeffectiveand meaningfulprovisionsfor
specialand differentialtreatmentfor developingcountryMembers.Agricultureis of critical
importanceto the economicdevelopmentof developingcountryMembersand they must be
able to pursueagriculturalpoliciesthat are supportiveof their developmentgoals, poverty
reductionstrategies,food securityand livelihoodconcerns.Non-tradeconcerns,as referred
to in Paragraph13 of the Doha Declaration,will be taken into account.
3.
The reformsin allthree pillarsform an interconnectedwhole and must be
approachedin a balancedand equitablemanner.
4.
The GeneralCouncilrecognizesthe importanceof cottonfor a certainnumberof
countriesand its vital importancefor developingcountries,especiallyLDCs. lt will be
addressedambitiously,expeditiously,and specifically,withinthe agriculturenegotiations.
The provisionsof this frameworkprovidea basisfor this approach,as does the sectoral
initiativeon cotton. The SpecialSessionof the Committeeon Agricultureshallensure
appropriateprioritizationof the cotton issue independentlyfrom other sectoralinitiatives.A
subcommitteeon cotton will meet periodicallyand reportto the SpecialSessionof the

Committeeon Agricultureto reviewprogress.Workshallencompassalltrade-distorting
policiesaffectingthe sector in all three pillarsof marketaccess,domesticsupport,and export
competition,as specifiedin the Doha text and this Frameworktext.
Coherencebetweentrade and developmentaspectsof the cotton issuewill be
5.
pursuedas set out in paragraph1.b of the text to whichthis Frameworkis annexed.

DOMESTICSUPPORT
The Doha MinisterialDeclarationcalls for "substantialreductionsin trade-distorting
6.
domesticsupport".With a view to achievingthese substantialreductions,the negotiationsin
this pillarwill ensurethe following:
.

Specialand differential
treatmentremainsan integralcomponentof domestic
periodsand
support.Modalitiesto be developedwill includelongerimplementation
lower reductioncoefficientsfor all types of trade-distorting
domesticsupportand
continuedaccessto the provisionsunderArticle6.2.

.

There will be a strongelementof harmonisationin the reductionsmade by developed
Members.Specifically,higherlevelsof permittedtrade-distortingdomesticsupport
will be subjectto deeper cuts.

.

Each such Memberwill make a substantialreductionin the overalllevelof its tradedistortingsupportfrom bound levels.

.

As well as this overallcommitment,Final BoundTotal AMS and permittedde minimis
levelswill be subjectto substantialreductionsand, in the case of the BlueBox,will
be cappedas specifiedin paragraph15 in order to ensure resultsthat are coherent
with the long-termreformobjective.Any clarificationor developmentof rules and
conditionsto governtrade distortingsupportwill take this into account.

Overall Reduction: A Tiered Formula
The overallbase level of all trade-distorting
7.
domesticsupport,as measuredby the
Final BoundTotalAMS pfus permittedde minimislevel and the level agreedin paragraph8
belowfor Blue Box payments,will be reducedaccordingto a tieredformula.Underthis
formula,Membershaving higherlevelsof trade-distorting
domesticsupportwill make greater
overallreductionsin order to achievea harmonizingresult. As the first instalmentof the
overallcut, in the first year and throughoutthe implementationperiod,the sum of all tradedistortingsupportwill not exceed80 per cent of the sum of Final BoundTotal AMS plus
permittedde minimisplus the Blue Box at the level determinedin paragraph15.
The followingparameterswill guidethe furthernegotiationof this tieredformula:

8.
.

This commitmentwill applyas a minimumoverallcommitment.
lt will not be applied
as a ceilingon reductionsof overalltrade-distorting
domesticsupport,shouldthe
separateand complementaryformulaeto be developedfor TotalAMS, de minimis
and Blue Box paymentsimply,when taken together,a deepercut in overalltradedistortingdomesticsupportfor an individualMember.

.

The basefor measuringthe Blue Box componentwill be the higherof existingBlue
Box paymentsduringa recentrepresentativeperiodto be agreedand the cap
establishedin paragraph15 below.

Final Bound Total AMS: A Tiered Formula
9.

To achievereductionswith a harmonizingeffect:
.

FinalBoundTotalAMSwill be reducedsubstantially,
usinga tieredapproach.

.

MembershavinghigherTotalAMS will makegreaterreductions.

.

To preventcircumventionof the objectiveof the Agreementthroughtransfersof
unchangeddomesticsupportbetweendifferentsupportcategories,product-specific
AMSs will be capped at their respectiveaveragelevelsaccordingto a methodology
to be agreed.

r

Substantialreductionsin FinalBoundTotalAMS will resultin reductionsof some
product-specif
ic support.

10.
Membersmay make greaterthan formulareductionsin order to achievethe required
level of cut in overalltrade-distorting
domesticsupport.
De Minimis
11.
Reductionsin de minimiswill be negotiatedtaking into accountthe principleof
speciafand differentialtreatment.Developingcountriesthat allocatealmost all de minimis
supportfor subsistenceand resource-poorfarmerswill be exempt.
12.
Membersmay make greaterthan formulareductionsin order to achievethe required
levelof cut in overalltrade-distorting
domesticsupport.

Blue Box
13.
Membersrecognizethe role of the Blue Box in promotingagriculturalreforms.In this
light,Article6.5 will be reviewedso that Membersmay have recourseto the following
measures:
.

Directpaymentsunderproduction-limiting
programmesif:
- such paymentsare basedon fixedand unchangingareasand yields;or
- such paymentsare made on 85% or less of a fixed and unchangingbase
levelof production;or
- livestockpaymentsare made on a fixed and unchangingnumberof head.

.

Directpaymentsthat do not requireproductionif:
- such paymentsare based on fixed and unchangingbases and yields;or
- livestockpaymentsmade on a fixed and unchangingnumberof head; and
- such paymentsare made on 85% or less of a fixed and unchangingbase
levelof production.

will be negotiated.
Any suchcriteria
14.
The abovecriteria,alongwith additionalcriteria
than AMS measures,it being
will ensurethat Blue Box paymentsare lesstrade-distorting
understoodthat:
.

Any new criteriawould need to take accountof the balanceof WTO rightsand
obligations.

.

Any new criteriato be agreedwill not have the perverseeffectof undoingongoing
reforms.

15.
Blue Box supportwill not exceed5"/"of a Member'saveragetotal value of agricultural
in the
productionduringan historicalperiod.The historicalperiodwill be established
negotiations.This ceilingwill applyto any actualor potentialBlue Box userfrom the
period. In caseswherea Memberhas placedan
beginningof the implementation
exceptionallylarge percentageof its trade-distortingsupportin the Blue Box, some flexibility
will be providedon a basisto be agreedto ensurethat such a Memberis not called upon to
make a whollydisproportionatecut.

Green Box
16.
Green Box criteriawill be reviewedand clarifiedwith a view to ensuringthat Green
effectsor effectson production.
Box measureshave no, or at most minimal,trade-distorting
Such a reviewand clarificationwill need to ensurethat the basicconcepts,principlesand
effectivenessof the Green Box remainand take due accountof non-tradeconcerns.The
improvedobligationsfor monitoringand surveillanceof all new disciplinesforeshadowedin
paragraph48 belowwill be particularlyimportantwith respectto the Green Box.
EXPORTCOMPETITION
callsfor "reductionof, witha viewto phasingout, all
17.
The Doha MinisterialDeclaration
forms of exportsubsidies".As an outcomeof the negotiations,Membersagreeto establish
detailedmodalitiesensuringthe paralleleliminationof all formsof exportsubsidiesand
disciplineson all exportmeasureswith equivalenteffectby a credibleend date.

End Point
18.

bytheenddateto be agreed:
willbe eliminated
Thefollowing
as scheduled.
Exportsubsidies
programmes
withrepayment
or insurance
Exportcredits,exportcreditguarantees
periodsbeyond180days.
relatingto exportcredits,exportcreditguarantees
or insurance
Termsandconditions
periods
programmes
in
repayment
of
180
days
and
below
which
are
not
with
These
will
inter
withdisciplines
to be agreed.
disciplines cover,
alia,
accordance
premium
payment
interest
rates,minimum
requirements,
minimum
of interest,
and
subsidies
or otherwise
distorttrade.
otherelementswhichcanconstitute

.

Trade distortingpracticeswith respectto exportingSTEs includingeliminatingexport
subsidiesprovidedto or by them, governmentfinancing,and the underwritingof
losses.The issue of the future use of monopolypowerswill be subjectto further
negotiation.

.

Provisionof food aid that is not in conformitywith operationallyeffectivedisciplinesto
will be to preventcommercial
be agreed.The objectiveof suchdisciplines
displacement.The role of internationalorganizationsas regardsthe provisionof food
issues,will be
and developmental
aid by Members,includingrelatedhumanitarian
addressedin the negotiations.The questionof providingfood aid exclusivelyin fully
grantform will also be addressedin the negotiations.

Such
provisionsfor paragraph18 will be established.
Effectivetransparency
19.
provisions,in accordancewith standardWTO practice,will be consistentwith commercial
confidentialityconsiderations.

Implementation
accordingto a
and disciplinesin paragraph18 will be implemented
Commitments
ZO.
will be implementedby annual
scheduleand modalitiesto be agreed.Commitments
instalments.Their phasingwill take into accountthe need for some coherencewith internal
reformsteps of Members.
will ensure
The negotiationof the elementsin paragraph18 and theirimplementation
21.
equivalentand parallelcommitmentsby Members.

Special and Differential Treatment
Developingcountry Memberswitl benefitfrom longerimplementationperiodsfor the
22.
phasingout of all forms of exportsubsidies.
Developingcountrieswill continueto benefitfrom specialand differentialtreatment
23.
underthe provisionsof Article9.4 of the Agreementon Agriculturefor a reasonableperiod,to
be negotiated,afier the phasingout of all forms of exportsubsidiesand implementationof all
disciplinesidentifiedabove are completed.
Memberswill ensurethat the disciplineson exportcredits,exportcreditguarantees
24.
or insuranceprogramsto be agreedwill make appropriateprovisionfor differentialtreatment
in favourof least-developedand net food-importingdevelopingcountriesas providedfor in
paragraph4 of the Decisionon MeasuresConcerningthe PossibleNegativeEffectsof the
and Net Food-lmportingDevelopingCountries.
ReformProgrammeon Least-Developed
lmprovedobligationsfor monitoringand surveillanceof all new disciplinesas toreshadowed
in paragraph48 will be criticallyimportantin this regard. Provisionsto be agreedin this
respectmust not underminethe commitmentsundertakenby Membersunderthe obligations
in paragraph18 above.
25.
STEs in developingcountryMemberswhich enjoy specialprivilegesto preserve
domesticconsumerprice stabilityand to ensurefood securitywill receivespecial
considerationfor maintainingmonopolystatus.

Special Circumstances
In exceptionalcircumstances,which cannotbe adequatelycoveredby food aid,
26.
commercialexportcreditsor preferentialinternationalfinancingfacilities,ad hoc temporary
financingarrangementsrelatingto exportsto developingcountriesmay be agreedby
Members. Such agreementsmust not have the effectof underminingcommitments
undertakenby Membersin paragraph18 above,and will be basedon criteriaand
consultationproceduresto be established.

MARKETACCESS
The Doha MinisterialDeclarationcalls for "substantialimprovementsin market
27.
access".Membersalso agreedthat specialand differentialtreatmentfor developingMembers
wouldbe an integralpartof all elementsin the negotiations.
The Single Approach: a Tiered Formula
28.
To ensurethat a singleapproachfor developedand developingcountryMembers
meetsall the objectivesof the Doha mandate,tariff reductionswill be made througha tiered
formulathat takes into accounttheir differenttariffstructures.
To ensurethat such a formulawill lead to substantialtrade expansion,the following
29.
principleswill guide its further negotiation:
.

Tariff reductionswill be made from boundrates.Substantialoveralltariffreductions
will be achievedas a final resultfrom negotiations.

.

Operationally
effective
EachMember(otherthan LDCs)will makea contribution.
specialand differentialprovisionsfor developingcountryMemberswill be an integral
part of all elements.

.

Progressivityin tariff reductionswill be achievedthroughdeeper cuts in highertariffs
with flexibilitiesfor sensitiveproducts.Substantialimprovementsin marketaccess
will be achievedfor all products.

The numberof bands,the thresholdsfor definingthe bands and the type ol tariff
30.
reductionin each band remainunder negotiation.The role of a tariffcap in a tieredformula
with distincttreatmentfor sensitiveproductswill be furtherevaluated.

Sensitive Products
Selection
the overallobjectiveof the tieredapproach,Membersmay
Withoutundermining
31.
designatean appropriatenumber,to be negotiated,of tariff lines to be treatedas sensitive,
takingaccountof existingcommitmentsfor these products.
Treatment
32.

The principleof

'substantial
improvement'will
applyto each product.

'substantialimprovement'will
of tariffquota
be achievedthroughcombinations
33.
commitmentsand tariff reductionsapplyingto each product. However,balancein this
negotiationwill be found only if the final negotiatedresultalso reflectsthe sensitivityof the
productconcerned.
Some MFN-basedtariffquota expansionwill be requiredfor all such products.A
34.
takingaccountof coherentand equitable
basefor suchan expansionwill be established,
criteriato be developedin the negotiations.In order not to underminethe objectiveof the
tiered approach,for all such products,MFN basedtariffquota expansionwill be provided
underspecificrulesto be negotiatedtakingintoaccountdeviationsfrom the tariffformula.

Other Elements
Otherelementsthat will give the flexibilityrequiredto reacha finalbalancedresult
35.
includereductionor eliminationof in-quotatariff rates,and operationallyeffective
improvementsin tariffquota administrationfor existingtariffquotasso as to enable Members,
and particularlydevelopingcountryMembers,to fully benefitfrom the marketaccess
opportunitiesundertariff rate quotas.
36.

Tariff escalationwill be addressedthrougha formulato be agreed.

37.

The issueof tariff simplificationremainsunder negotiation.

38.

The questionof the specialagriculturalsafeguard(SSG) remainsunder negotiation.

Special and differential treatment
39.
Havingregardto their ruraldevelopment,food securityand/orlivelihoodsecurity
needs,specialand differentialtreatmentfor developingcountrieswitl be an integralpart of all
elementsof the negotiation,includingthe tariff reductionformula,the numberand treatment
of sensitiveproducts,expansionof tariff rate quotas,and implementationperiod.
will be achievedby requiringlessertarifl reductioncommitmentsor
40.
Proportionality
tariffquota expansioncommitmentsfrom developingcountryMembers.
4'1.
DevelopingcountryMemberswill have the flexibilityto designatean appropriate
numberof productsas SpecialProducts,based on criteriaof food security,livelihoodsecurity
and ruraldevelopmentneeds. These products will be eligiblefor more flexibletreatment.
The criteriaand treatmentof these productswill be furtherspecifiedduringthe negotiation
phase and will recognizethe fundamentalimportanceof SpecialProductsto developing
countries.
42.
A SpecialSafeguardMechanism(SSM)will be establishedfor use by developing
countryMembers.
commitmentto achievethe fullest
43.
of the long-standing
Fullimplementation
liberalisationof trade in tropicalagriculturalproductsand for productsof particularimportance
to the diversificationof productionfrom the growingof illicitnarcoticcrops is overdueand will
be addressedeffectivelyin the marketaccessnegotiations.

preferences
is fullyrecognised.
The issueof
The importanceof long-standing
44.
preferenceerosionwill be addressed.For the furtherconsiderationin this regard,paragraph
16 and other relevantprovisionsof TN/AGM/1/Rev.1will be used as a reference.

LEAST. DEVELOPEDCOUNTRIES
45.
Least-DevelopedCountries,which will have full accessto all specialand differential
treatmentprovisionsabove,are not requiredto undertakereductioncommitments.
DevelopedMembers,and developingcountryMembersin a positionto do so, shouldprovide
duty-freeand quota-freemarketaccessfor productsoriginatingfrom least-developed
countries.
46.
Work on cotton underall the pillarswill reflectthe vital importanceof this sectorto
certainLDC Membersand we will workto achieveambitiousresultsexpeditiously.
RECENTLYACCEDEDMEMBERS
47.
The particularconcernsof recentlyaccededMemberswill be effectivelyaddressed
throughspecificflexibilityprovisions.

MONITORINGAND SURVEILLANCE
48.
Article 18 of the Agreementon Agriculturewill be amendedwith a view to enhancing
monitoringso as to effectivelyensurefull transparency,includingthroughtimelyand
completenotificationswith respectto the commitmentsin marketaccess,domesticsupport
and exportcompetition.The particularconcernsof developingcountriesin this regardwill be
addressed.

OTHERISSUES
49.

lssuesof interestbut not agreed: sectoralinitiatives,differentialexporttaxes, Gls.

in Article12.1of the Agreement
and restrictions
on
Disciplines
on exportprohibitions
50.
willbe strengthened.
Agriculture
AnnexB
Frameworkfor EstablishingModalitiesin
Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products

1.
This Frameworkcontainsthe initialelementsfor futureworkon modalitiesby the
NegotiatingGroupon MarketAccess. Additionalnegotiationsare requiredto reach
agreementon the specificsof some of these elements. These relateto the formula,the
issuesconcerningthe treatmentof unboundtariffsin indenttwo of paragraph5, the
participants,the issueof participationin the sectorialtariff
flexibilitiesfor developing-country
preferences.
the
ln
order to finalizethe modalities,the NegotiatingGroup is
and
component
issues
in a mannerconsistentwith the mandateof
address
these
expeditiously
instructedto
paragraph16 of the Doha MinisterialDeclarationand the overallbalancetherein.

productsshall
2.
We reaffirmthat negotiationson marketaccessfor non-agricultural
aim to reduceor as appropriateeliminatetariffs,includingthe reductionor eliminationof tariff
peaks,high taritfs,and tariffescalation,as well as non-tariffbarriers,in particularon products
of export interestto developingcountries. We also reaffirmthe importanceof specialand
differentialtreatmentand less than full reciprocityin reductioncommitmentsas integralparts
of the modalities.
3.
We acknowledgethe substantialwork undertakenby the NegotiatingGroup on
MarketAccessand the progresstowardsachievingan agreementon negotiatingmodalities.
We take note of the constructivedialogueon the Chair'sDraft Elementsof Modalities
(TN/MAA/V/35/Rev.1)
and confirmour intentionto use this documentas a referencefor the
futurework of the NegotiatingGroup. We instructthe Negotiating
Groupto continueits work,
as mandatedby paragraph16 of the Doha MinisterialDeclaration
with its corresponding
relerencesto the relevantprovisionsof ArticleXXV|ll bis of GATT 1994 and to the provisions
citedin paragraph50 of the Doha MinisterialDeclaration,
on the basisset out below.
4.
We recognizethat a formulaapproachis key to reducingtariffs,and reducingor
eliminatingtariffpeaks,high tariffs,and tariffescalation. We agree that the Negotiating
Groupshouldcontinueits work on a non-linearformulaappliedon a line-by-line
basiswhich
shall take fully into accountthe specialneeds and interestsof developingand leastdevelopedcountryparticipants,
includingthroughlessthan full reciprocityin reduction
commitments.
5.

We furtheragree on the followingelementsregardingthe formula:
-

productcoverageshall be comprehensivewithouta prioriexclusions;

-

tariff reductionsor eliminationshall commencefrom the bound rates after full
implementationof currentconcessions;however,for unboundtariff lines,the
basis for commencingthe tariff reductionsshall be [two]times the MFN
appliedrate in the base year;

-

the base year for MFN appliedtariff rates shall be 2001 (applicablerates on
14 November);

-

creditshall be given for autonomousliberalizationby developingcountries
providedthat the tariff lineswere boundon an MFN basis in the WTO since
the conclusionof the UruguayRound;

-

all non-ad valoremduties shall be converted to ad valoremequivalentson the
basisof a methodologyto be determinedand bound in ad valoremterms;

-

negotiations
shallcommenceon the basisof the HS96or HS2002
nomenclature,with the resultsof the negotiationsto be finalizedin HS2002
nomenclature:

-

the referenceperiodfor importdata shall be 1999-2001.

6.
We furthermoreagree that, as an exception,participantswith a bindingcoverageof
non-agricultural
tariff lines of less than [35] % would be exemptfrom makingtariff reductions
throughthe formula. Instead,we expectthem to bind [100]7oof non-agriculturaltariff
linesat
an averagelevelthat does not exceedthe overallaverageof boundtariffsfor all developing
countriesafterfull implementation
of currentconcessions.
7.
We recognizethat a sectorialtariffcomponent,aimingat elimination
or harmonization
is anotherkey elementto achievingthe objectivesof paragraph16 of the Doha Ministerial
Declarationwith regardto the reductionor eliminationof tariffs,in particularon productsof

exportinterestto developingcountries. We recognizethat participationby all participantswill
be importantto that effect. We thereforeinstructthe NegotiatingGroupto pursueits
discussionson such a component,with a view to definingproductcoverage,participation,
participants.
and adequateprovisionsof flexibilityfor developing-country
participantsshall have longerimplementation
We agree that developing-country
8.
periodsfor tariffreductions.In addition,they shallbe giventhe followingflexibility:
a) applyingless than formulacuts to up to [10] % of the tariff lines providedthat the
cuts are no less than half the formulacuts and that these tariff lines do not exceed
[10]% of the totalvalueof a Member'simports;or
b) keeping,as an exception,tarifflinesunbound,or not applyingformulacutsfor up
to [5] % of tariff lines providedthey do not exceed[5] % of the total value of a
Member'simports.
We furthermoreagree that this flexibilitycould not be used to excludeentire HS Chapters.
countryparticipantsshall not be requiredto apply the
We agree that least-developed
9.
formulanor participatein the sectorialapproach,however,as part of their contributionto this
increasetheirlevelof binding
they are expectedto substantially
roundof negotiations,
commitments.
Furthermore,in recognitionof the need to enhancethe integrationof least-developed
10.
countriesinto the multilateraltradingsystemand supportthe diversificationof their production
participantsand other participantswho so
and exportbase,we call upon developed-country
decide,to grant on an autonomousbasisduty-freeand quota-freemarketaccessfor noncountriesby the year [...].
agriculturalproductsoriginatingfrom least-developed
We recognizethat newly accededMembersshall have recourseto specialprovisions
11.
tor tarilt reductionsin order to take into accounttheir extensivemarketaccesscommitments
undertakenas part of their accession and that staged tariff reductionsare still being
implementedin many cases. We instructthe NegotiatingGroupto furtherelaborateon such
provisions.
12.
We agree that pendingagreementon core modalitiesfor tariffs,the possibilitiesof
supplementarymodalitiessuch as zero-for-zerosectorelimination,sectorialharmonization,
and request& offer, shouldbe kept open.
participantsand other participantswho so
13.
In addition,we ask developed-country
of
low
duties.
decideto considerthe elimination
We recognizethat NTBs are an integraland equallyimportantpart of these
14.
negotiationsand instructparticipantsto intensifytheir work on NTBs. ln particular,we
encourageall participantsto make notificationson NTBs by 31 October2004 and to proceed
with identification,examination,categorization,and ultimatelynegotiationson NTBs. We
take note that the modalitiesfor addressingNTBs in these negotiationscould include
horizontal,or verticalapproaches;and shouldfully take into accountthe
requesUoffer,
principleof specialand differentialtreatmentfor developingand least-developed
country
participants.
15.
We recognizethat appropriatestudiesand capacitybuildingmeasuresshallbe an
part
integral
of the modalitiesto be agreed. We also recognizethe work that has already

been undertakenin these areas and ask participantsto continueto identifysuch issuesto
improveparticipationin the negotiations.
We recognizethe challengesthat may be faced by non-reciprocalpreference
16.
beneficiaryMembersand those Membersthat are at presenthighlydependenton tariff
products. We instructthe
revenueas a resultof these negotiationson non-agricultural
NegotiatingGroupto take into consideration,in the courseof its work, the particularneeds
that may arise for the Membersconcerned.
Groupto work closelywiththe Committee
We furthermoreencouragethe Negotiating
17.
in SpecialSessionwith a viewto addressingthe issueof nonon Tradeand Environment
agriculturalenvironmentalgoods coveredin paragraph31 (iii) of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration.

Annex C
Recommendationsof the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services

(a)
Memberswho have not yet submittedtheir initialoffers must do so as soon as
possible.
(b)

A date for the submissionof a roundof revisedoffers shouldbe establishedas soon
as feasible.

(c)

With a view to providingeffectivemarketaccessto all Membersand in orderto
ensurea substantiveoutcome,Membersshall striveto ensurea high qualityof
offers,particularlyin sectorsand modesof supplyof exportinterestto developing
countries,with specialattentionto be given to least-developedcountries.
Membersshall aim to achieveprogressivelyhigherlevelsof liberalizationwith no
a prioriexclusionof any servicesectoror mode of supplyand shall give special
attentionto sectorsand modesof supplyof exportinterestto developingcountries.
Membersnote the interestof developingcountries,as well as other Members,in
Mode4.
Membersmust intensifytheir effortsto concludethe negotiationson rule-making
underGATS ArticlesVl:4, X, Xlll and XV in accordancewith their respective
mandatesand deadlines.
Targetedtechnicalassistanceshouldbe providedwith a view to enablingdeveloping
countriesto participateeffectivelyin the negotiations.
For the purposeof the Sixth Ministerialmeeting,the SpecialSessionof the Council
for Trade in Servicesshall reviewprogressin these negotiationsand providea full
reportto the Trade NegotiationsCommittee,includingpossiblerecommendations.
Annex D
Modalities for Negotiations on Trade Facilitation

Negotiationsshall aim to clarifyand improverelevantaspectsof ArticlesV, Vlll and X
1.
of the GATT 1994 with a view to furtherexpeditingthe movement,releaseand clearanceof
goods,includinggoodsin transit.? Negotiations
shallalso aim at enhancingtechnical
assistanceand supportfor capacitybuildingin this area. The negotiationsshall furtheraim at
provisionsfor effectivecooperationbetweencustomsor any other appropriateauthoritieson
trade facilitationand customscomplianceissues.
The resultsof the negotiationsshall take fully into accountthe principleof specialand
2.
countries. Membersrecognizethat
differentialtreatmentfor developingand least-developed
periodsfor
this principleshouldextendbeyondthe grantingof traditionaltransition
the extentand the timingof enteringinto
commitments.In particular,
implementing
capacitiesof developingand leastcommitmentsshallbe relatedto the implementation
developedMembers. lt is furtheragreedthat those Memberswould not be obligedto
undertakeinvestmentsin infrastructureprojectsbeyondtheir means.
Least-developed
countryMemberswill only be requiredto undertakecommitmentsto
3.
financialand tradeneedsor their
the extentconsistentwiththeirindividualdevelopment,
and institutional
capabilities.
administrative
As an integralpart of the negotiations,Mernbersshall seek to identifytheir trade
4.
facilitationneeds and priorities,particularlythose of developingand least-developed
countries,and shall also addressthe concernsof developingand least-developedcountries
relatedto cost implicationsof proposedmeasures.
lt is recognizedthat the provisionof technicalassistanceand supportfor capacity
5.
buildingis vital for developingand least-developedcountriesto enablethem to fully
participatein and benefittrom the negotiations.Members,in particulardevelopedcountries,
thereforecommitthemselvesto adequatelyensuresuch supportand assistanceduringthe
negotiations.s
Supportand assistanceshouldalso be providedto help developingand least6.
developedcountriesimplementthe commitmentsresultingfrom the negotiations,in
accordancewith their natureand scope. In this context,it is recognizedthat negotiations
could lead to certaincommitmentswhose implementationwould requiresupportfor
infrastructuredevelopmenton the part of some Members. In these limitedcases,developedcountry Memberswill make every effortto ensuresupportand assistancedirectlyrelatedto
the natureand scopeof the commitmentsin order to allow implementation.lt is understood,
however,that in cases where requiredsupportand assistancefor such infrastructureis not
forthcoming,and where a developingor least-developedMembercontinuesto lack the
necessarycapacity,implementationwill not be required. While every effortwill be made to
ensurethe necessarysupportand assistance,it is understoodthat the commitmentsby
developedcountriesto providesuch supportare not open-ended.
7.
Membersagree to reviewthe effectivenessof the supportand assistanceprovided
and its abilityto supportthe implementationof the resultsof the negotiations.

e lt is understoodthat this is withoutprejudiceto the possibleformatof the linal resultof the
negotiationsand wouldallow considerationof variousforms of outcomes.
s In connectionwith this paragraph,Membersnote that paragraph38 of the Doha Ministerial
Declarationaddresses relevanttechnicalassistanceand capacity building concerns of
Members.
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In order to make technicalassistanceand capacitybuildingmore effectiveand
8.
operationaland to ensure bettercoherence,Membersshall inviterelevantinternational
includingthe lMF, OECD,UNCTAD,WCO and the WorldBankto undertakea
organizations,
collaborativeeffort in this regard.
Due accountshall be taken of the relevantwork of the WCO and other relevant
9.
in this area.
organizations
international
shallapplyto these
Paragraphs45-51of the Doha MinisterialDeclaration
10.
negotiations.At its first meetingafter the July sessionof the GeneralCouncil,the Trade
Groupon TradeFacilitation
Committeeshallestablisha Negotiating
Negotiations
and appoint
Groupshallagreeon a work planand schedule
its Chair. The firstmeetingof the Negotiating
of meetings.
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